

JPRS 80390

24 March 1982

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1660

MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL

No. 11, November 1981

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

24 March 1982

USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1660

MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL

No. 11, NOVEMBER 1981

CONTENTS

Contents of 'MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL', November 1981.....	1
Internationalist Character of Soviet Armed Forces Discussed (A. Skryl'nik).....	3
Wartime Operations: The Victory at Moscow (D. Muriyev).....	12
Wartime Operations: Achieving and Maintaining Fire Superiority (G. Peredel'skiy).....	21
Wartime Operations: Employment of Long-Range Aviation (Ye. Belov, A. Pervov).....	28
Wartime Operations: Antitank Artillery Regiment in Moscow Battle (N. Medvedev).....	36
Wartime Operations: Antitank Artillery Regiment Actions Near Moscow (P. Varganistov).....	44
Wartime Operations: Tank Division Actions in Moscow Battle (A. Getman).....	53
Comments on 25th Anniversary of Cuban Armed Forces (B. Bannikov).....	58

Comments on Mao Zedong as Betrayer of Internationalist Principles (A. Mikhaylov).....	66
Russian Military-Defensive Posts in Kazakhstan (Zh. Kasymbayev).....	75
Wartime Operations: Employment of Operational Groups in Moscow Battle (V. Shevchuk).....	83
Outline for Lecture on Soviet Armed Forces Postwar Development (P. Tsygankov).....	90
Book Review: Military Questions in State and Party Documents (M. Kir'yan).....	96
Book Review: Partisan Reconnaissance Activity in Belorussia (A. Knyaz'kov).....	100

CONTENTS OF 'MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL', NOVEMBER 1981

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) p 2

[Full-text translated articles published in this JPRS report are indicated with an asterisk (*)]

[Text] CONTENTS

page

- *The 26th CPSU Congress and the International Indoctrination of Servicemen -
A. Skryl'nik 3

Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War

- *The Great Victory at Moscow - D. Muriyev 11
*The Struggle for Fire Superiority During the War - G. Peredel'skiy 19
*From the Experience of the Employment of Long-Range Aviation in the Third
Period of the War - Ye. Belov and A. Pervov 26

Heroes and Feats

- A Golden Constellation - S. Petrov 33

Skill and Heroism

- *The 289th Antitank Artillery Regiment in the Battles on the Approaches to
Volokolamsk - N. Medvedev 37

Memoirs

- *On the Approaches to the Capital - P. Varganistov 43
*The 112th Tank Division in the Battle of Moscow - A. Getman 49

In the Armies of Socialist Countries

- *A Glorious Anniversary - B. Bannikov 53

	page
Against the Falsifiers of the History of World War II	
*Betrayal of the Principles of Internationalism - A. Mikhaylov	59
Scientific Reports and Information	
Military History in the Works of M. V. Lomonosov - A. Ageyev	67
*Russian Military-Defensive Posts in Protecting the Kazakh Lands Against Enemies - Zh. Kasymbayev	71
*From the Experience of Employing Operational Troop Groups in the Battle of Moscow - V. Shevchuk	76
In Aid of Military History Instructors	
*Lecture Instructions for "The Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces after World War II" - P. Tsygankov	81
Criticism and Bibliography	
*Military Questions in CPSU and Soviet Government Documents - M. Kir'yan	85
*Partisan Reconnaissance - A. Knyaz'kov	87
Chronicle of the Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces	89
Current Events, Facts and Findings	91

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

INTERNATIONALIST CHARACTER OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 3-10

[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Maj Gen A. Skryl'nik: "The 26th CPSU Congress and the International Indoctrination of Servicemen"]

[Text] The deeds and thoughts of the Soviet people, the men of the Army and Navy are permeated with strong feelings of affection for the motherland, loyalty to the ideals of the socialist community and class solidarity with the workers of all nations. Our society possesses all the socioeconomic and the spiritual prerequisites for further raising the internationalist awareness of the builders of communism, for strengthening the friendship of our nation's peoples and for the flourishing and mutual enrichment of their cultures.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, at the 26th Party Congress said: "It is the party's sacred duty to indoctrinate the workers in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism and the proud feeling of belonging to the united great Soviet motherland."¹

Proletarian, socialist internationalism is a powerful ideological weapon of the CPSU and the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties of all nations in the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of the world. Under its banner, the Leninist party raised the workers of multinational Russia to the victory of October and ensured the building of socialism in our nation and the defeat of fascism during the years of the Great Patriotic War. It is leading the Soviet people to communism under this banner as well.

Just as the interior world of man is indivisible and all facets of society's spiritual life are interrelated, so the basic areas of indoctrinating a new man are organically intertwined, including the political, moral, legal, patriotic and international. In their unity are solved the problems of indoctrinating the youth in a spirit of loyalty to the ideals of communism, in a spirit of collectivism and humanism, patriotism and internationalism, a conscientious attitude toward labor and the shaping of a feeling of social duty and personal responsibility for carrying out one's duties in production and in the process of military service.

International indoctrination is carried out in the aim of turning the ideas of proletarian, socialist internationalism into profound convictions and moral standards of conduct. In the elaboration and the establishing of the need for this work the

leading role was played by our party's founder, V. I. Lenin. "We are the opponents of national enmity, national prejudice or national exclusiveness," he wrote. "We are internationalists.... We want a voluntary alliance of nations, an alliance which would not permit any coercion by one nation of another, an alliance which would be based on the fullest trust, on a clear awareness of fraternal unity and on fully voluntary agreement."²

Bourgeois nationalism is the product of a capitalist society and a poisoned weapon of the reaction. It can be expressed in the extolling of all that is "one's own" or national and in the affirming of the inferiority of other peoples and the exceptionalness of "one's own." In extreme manifestations nationalism assumes the form of chauvinism. In bourgeois nations where it flourishes, its supporters foster increased hostility for other peoples and at times even a zoological hate of them approaching a desire not merely to enslave them but also eradicate them. The 26th CPSU Congress pointed out that our party "has fought and always will fight decisively against such alien manifestations to the nature of socialism as chauvinism or nationalism and against any nationalistic distortions...."^{2a} From the very first day that Soviet power existed, the questions of the international indoctrination of the nation's population have been of particular concern. The autocracy encouraged national prejudice as it was easier to hold the backward peoples in check. October put an end to this. All national and national-religious privileges and restrictions were abolished and the free development of the national minorities and ethnographic groups was proclaimed. Under the conditions of an intense struggle against the domestic and foreign counterrevolutionary, it was extremely essential to have *the consolidation of the revolutionary forces of all the peoples inhabiting our vast motherland*. In his "Letter to the Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victories over Denikin," V. I. Lenin pointed out that the Russian and Ukrainian workers without fail require a close military and economic alliance, otherwise the capitalists will suppress and strangle them one by one.³

Lenin's ideas on the unity of peoples in the cause of defending the victories of Great October were vividly embodied in the Soviet Armed Forces which were organized on the basis of true class fraternity of the workers from all nationalities and were indoctrinated in a spirit of proletarian internationalism. While under Tsarism almost 40 nationalities in Russia were deprived of the right to serve in the Army and Navy, the Soviet government in its "Decree on the Organization of the Worker-Peasant Red Army" opened access to its ranks "for all citizens of the Russian republic over the age of 18."⁴

The great influx of representatives from the national minorities into the ranks of the Armed Forces made it possible to organize a number of national troop units and subunits. In the spring and summer of 1918, for example, from among the Tatars and Bashkirs there were organized: the First Tatar-Bashkir Militia, the First Mixed Bashkir Regiment and the Moslem Soviet Regiment in Ufa, a two-company volunteer detachment in Belebey, the Orsk Volunteer Moslem Combat Detachment in Orsk, the Orenburg Moslem Regiment in Orenburg, the Moslem Regiment in Astrakhan' and the Urals Tatar Battalion of Red Communards and the 21st Moslem Regiment in Perm'.⁵ The incorporation of the representatives of all nationalities of the nation and their military formations in the Red Army was of great significance for uniting the peoples of the Soviet state in the struggle against the enemies.

The vitality of Lenin's nationality policy was evident with particular strength during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The fierce clash with Nazi Germany was

a severe testing for the strength of the international ties of the peoples and military of the socialist fatherland. The Nazis viewed the Soviet Union as an "ethnic conglomerate" devoid of internal unity. They were hoping that our nation would not withstand the testing of the war, that it would break up into component parts and thereby be doomed to defeat. However their hopes did not come true. In the fierce struggle against fascism, the USSR was further strengthened. The fraternal peoples which comprised it were ready to devote all their strength for the sake of a common victory, in realizing fully that they were defending the most progressive social order and their own national and state independence. In the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces, in addition to the Russians who comprised a majority of the personnel, fighting heroically and shoulder to shoulder against the Nazis were Ukrainians, Belorussians, Tatars and men of other nationalities. In the Central Asian and Transcaucasus republics, entire formations were almost completely organized from the indigenous population, including: Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Thus, the national composition of the men of 200 rifle divisions numbering over a million men in 1944 was characterized by the following data (in percent): Russians 58.32, Ukrainians 22.27, Belorussians 2.66, Uzbeks 2.02, Kazakhs 1.57, Georgians 1.52, Azerbaijanis 1.48, Armenians 1.36, Estonians 1.01, Mordovians 0.62, Chuvashi 0.58, Tajiks 0.46, Kirghiz 0.36, Turkmen 0.41, Latvians and Latgals 0.29, Lithuanians 0.14, Tatars 1.83, Jews 1.28, Bashkirs 0.35, Udmurts 0.20 and Maris 0.19.⁶

The combat solidarity of the Soviet troops was furthered by active mass political work by the party. The decrees adopted by the Central Committee during the war years on ideological questions demanded the ubiquitous indoctrination of the workers and the Army and Navy personnel in a spirit of friendship among peoples and proletarian internationalism. The main thing in the propaganda and agitation aimed at strengthening the fraternal community of peoples was an explanation of Leninist ideas on the defense of the single socialist fatherland which was common to all nations and nationalities. The multinational composition of the Army and Navy was considered in ideological work. In the units and subunits where a majority of the personnel had poor knowledge of Russian, mass agitation work was carried out in their mother tongues. Suffice it to say that in 1943, 55 front and army newspapers as well as many division newspapers were published in the languages of the Soviet peoples (in addition to Russian).⁷

The class unity of the workers from all the nationalities of our nation and the indoctrinating of personnel in a spirit of friendship among peoples determined the monolithicity of our Armed Forces' combat formation.

The necessity of further strengthening international indoctrination of the Soviet people and the Army and Navy personnel under present-day conditions is dictated by two interrelated aspects. In the first place, under the conditions of developed socialism the integration of the Soviet nations and nationalities is being accelerated and the commonness of the historic destinies of the Soviet people is being evermore affirmed. As was emphasized at the 26th Party Congress, "there are a flourishing and mutual enrichment of national cultures and the formation of a culture of the united Soviet people, a new social and international community."⁸ Secondly, in indoctrinating the Soviet citizens in a spirit of internationalism, the party considers the phenomena and processes characterizing the development of world socialism. For the successful furthering of the revolutionary process it is essential to have a correct understanding of the relationship of national and

international interests, its faithfulness to the general patterns and the ability to creatively apply them to the specific conditions of a given nation.

In being concerned with the shaping of the spiritual world of the patriots and internationalists, the party has strictly observed the Leninist principles of international indoctrination. It is a question primarily of the socioclass approach to carrying out this task. "The interests of fraternity and solidarity of the workers from the different nations,"⁹ V. I. Lenin pointed out, should lie at the basis of worker solidarity. In striving for the all-round development of the nations and nationalities, the internationalist communists isolate primarily what unites and unifies all working people and do not permit the artificial fanning of national features to the detriment of the common interests of the workers. Equally alien to them are both the exaggeration of national traits and their underestimation. The Accountability Report of the Party Central Committee to the 26th Congress emphasizes: "We are against the trends aimed at the artificial obliteration of national features. But we consider the artificial exaggeration of them to be equally inadmissible."¹⁰

Ensuring a unity of the national and the international is one of the important problems in communist indoctrination. Its complexity is explained by the structure of human social awareness. Ordinarily in daily life a man's immediate interests are more understandable to him. As for fundamental international tasks, these are more remote and abstract. The achieving of an organic unity of patriotism and internationalism in the awareness and practical activity of the Soviet people ultimately comprises the essence of patriotic and international indoctrination.

In turn, a concrete historical approach, as a Leninist principle of international indoctrination, impels us to thoroughly consider the uniqueness of the given stage in the new society's construction and in the development of our Armed Forces. This makes it possible to correctly determine the effect of sociopolitical factors on implanting the international views of people and to find the most effective forms and methods for indoctrinating patriots and internationalists.

Our socialist reality, the Soviet way of life and service in the new type army have a direct impact on the development of internationalist awareness. In carrying out Lenin's nationality policy, the party has worked to increase the material and spiritual potentials of each Soviet republic and their maximum utilization for the harmonious development of the entire nation. The task of developing the former backward national borderlands of Russia has been successfully carried out. The close collaboration of all our country's nations and the selfless aid of the Russian people have transformed them. The great socioeconomic changes in the Central Asian republics are well known. The workers of the Baltic, Moldavia and Transcaucasia have achieved noticeable successes. Creative work is being carried out on an enormous scale in the RSFSR, the Ukraine and Belorussia. The party has carried out socialist transformations in overcoming the national prejudices and biases which have developed over the ages and in instilling an internationalist awareness in the masses of people. Here it has shown great tact and unswerving principledness. The unity of the Soviet nations is stronger now than ever before, as was pointed out by the 26th Party Congress. The fraternal friendship of all the peoples in our multinational motherland is growing steadily stronger. Within the single national economic complex of the country, year after year the relationships of mutual aid and all-round economic cooperation between the Union republics have been improved. International

indoctrination is aided by such processes occurring in our nation as the broadening of the population's multinational composition in the Soviet republics, the increase in the percentage of citizens from nonindigenous nationalities in a number of republics and the active involvement of the representatives of all nations and nationalities of our country in the work at major construction projects, in tapping the riches of Siberia and the Far North and in the development of the Nonchernozem Zone.

On a basis of friendship among peoples and a unity of interests of the Soviet nations and nationalities, the patriotism and internationalism of its defenders are growing and becoming stronger. This has been the deepest source of their mass heroism in the battles against the enemies of the socialist fatherland. The Soviet nations and nationalities have a united military organization, the Armed Forces. The Communist Party and the Soviet government strictly observe equal rights and duties for all citizens regardless of nationality in carrying out military duty. The representatives of many nations and nationalities serve in each army and navy collective. Joint training, the standing of guard duty and alert duty as well as participation in the socialist competition, social life, in the work of the party and Komsomol organizations--all of this helps to develop a feeling of collectivism and mutual respect among the personnel.

The accomplishments of the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and officers in any formation or unit were judged not by the belonging to one or another nationality but rather by their attitude toward service and social affairs, from their skill and from that contribution which they made to increasing combat readiness. In the promoting of servicemen to higher positions, in awards and commendations their political, moral and professional qualities were the determining thing. For example, in the Taman' Division, where men from 29 nationalities and peoples are serving, in recent years the representatives of 17 nationalities have received orders and medals.¹¹

An important circumstance which helps to deepen a feeling of friendship among peoples is the fact that the Soviet military, as a rule, serve outside their republic, kray or oblast. Daily contact with the fraternal peoples and familiarity with their culture, everyday life, rites and traditions help to strengthen ties of friendship between them. The struggle against negative phenomena, obsolete traditions and rites also helps international indoctrination. It would be an oversimplification to reduce these merely to vestiges of the past. Even under conditions when there are no objective prerequisites for national antagonism, among certain people, if they are not constantly indoctrinated, nationalistic distortions are still not excluded.

In the ideological struggle against socialism, the imperialists actively employ nationalism as a means of separating peoples and preparing for military adventures. Certain Western figures have not at all learned the lesson taught during the last war to the Hitler-type racists. In endeavoring to move the socioclass problems of bourgeois society into the background, many sociologists who defend this system have made a great effort to interpret the events of social life from nationalistic positions and have artificially inflamed chauvinistic moods for the purpose of justifying Israeli aggression against the Arab nations, U.S. interference into the internal affairs of other states and the occupation of Northern Ireland by British troops. The Western subversive centers, in conducting propaganda against the Soviet Union, cultivate a psychology of national exclusiveness and endeavor to defame and disrupt

the friendship of the Soviet peoples. The hostile fabrications of bourgeois propagandists are repudiated by life itself, by the flourishing and merging of our country's nations and nationalities and by the ever-deeper establishing of the ideas of internationalism in the awareness of all Soviet people. For the Soviet people, truly national interests are inseparable from class, international ones.

The further internationalization of the economic and social life of the fraternal peoples and the enriching of their cultures under the conditions of developed socialism create favorable conditions for strengthening the material and spiritual bases of army and navy military might, for improving the political and military indoctrination of the personnel and for developing feelings of Soviet common national pride among the men. "Our army is a special army in the sense that it is a school of internationalism, a school for indoctrinating feelings of fraternity, solidarity and mutual respect of all Soviet nations and nationalities," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "Our Armed Forces are a united, close family, the living embodiment of socialist internationalism."¹³

The rich ideological content of international indoctrination determines the diversity of its methods. The Marxist-Leninist training of officers, the political studies of warrant officers, political exercises for soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers, lectures and talks, visual agitation and political information devoted to the successes of the Union republics and exhibits of achievements by the fraternal peoples--all these forms and means of ideological work by the commanders, political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations serve to indoctrinate the military patriots and internationalists. In the units and ships Lenin lessons have become widespread and the subject of them is the friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism. There are also special-subject evenings on "Our Motherland is the USSR," "An Unbreakable Union of Free Republics," "The Area in Which We Serve" and others. The close ties of the units and ships with the local party and Komsomol organizations and with the plant and kolkhoz collectives also contribute to the international indoctrination of the Armed Forces youth.

Russian is an important means for integrating the Soviet military of all nationalities as instruction and indoctrination in the Army and Navy are conducted in it. Hence the attention which is given in the national republics to improving all work related to its study. As practice has shown, the young soldiers who have mastered Russian more quickly learn the modern weapons and complex equipment and become class specialists. In the units service comrades help those who have a poor knowledge of Russian. The selecting of books in the languages of the Soviet peoples for the unit and subunit libraries has also become a duty for the political bodies. The units and ships receive recent sociopolitical and artistic journals from the republics.

The main thing in ideological work in strengthening the combat morale of the Army and Navy and in raising the effectiveness of political, military, patriotic and international indoctrination at the present stage is a thorough study of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the struggle to carry them out. A constant theme in all the organizational and political work of the military councils, commanders, political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations is the explaining of the leading role of the Communist Party in building communism and defending the nation. In the course of reorganizing the sections and spheres of ideological work in light of the congress demands, a great deal is being done to improve the level for propagandizing Lenin's nationality policy.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government devote constant attention to strengthening unity and developing cooperation with the fraternal countries and their armies and to strengthening the international positions of the socialist commonwealth on the world scene. V. I. Lenin repeatedly pointed out that the peoples who have freed themselves from the trammels of capitalism need a collective defense of revolutionary victories. "...In confronting the enormous front of the imperialist states," he said, "we who are fighting against imperialism are a union which requires close military solidarity and we view any attempts to violate this solidarity as a completely inadmissible phenomenon and as a betrayal of the interests of the struggle against international imperialism.... We state that there must be a unity of the military forces and deviation from this unity is inadmissible."¹⁴

In being guided by Lenin's instructions, the military, like all the Soviet people, from the very first days of the state's existence, have been indoctrinated in a spirit of *solidarity and proletarian internationalism vis-a-vis the peoples of other countries*. The representatives of workers from foreign states who desire to fight for the triumph of Soviet power in Russia were permitted to join the Red Army. In bidding farewell to internationalist soldiers leaving for the front, V. I. Lenin said: "To you has fallen the great honor of defending sacred ideas with weapons in hand..., to actually realize the international fraternity of peoples."¹⁵ During the years of the Civil War around 300,000 foreign citizens fought in the ranks of the Red Army.¹⁶ Subsequently, the combat friendship of the internationalists was strengthened and was clearly apparent in the defense of the Spanish Republic. In 1939, the USSR extended a helping hand to fraternal Mongolia in order to repel Japanese aggression in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol Eiver.

World War II provided particularly many examples of military cooperation. Along with the Soviet people, patriots from Yugoslavia, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary as well as German antifascists fought against fascism in the Soviet Armed Forces. The total number of foreign units and subunits armed and trained by the Soviet Union was over 550,000 men by the war's end.¹⁷ With the shifting of the combat operations of the Soviet Armed Forces outside our nation, the party intensified the class and international indoctrination of the men. They were explained the importance and tasks of the Soviet Army's liberating mission and the duty of each soldier and commander to properly represent the socialist motherland abroad. The ideas of class solidarity and humanism helped our soldiers rise above their personal grief which the fascists had brought them. It was not easy to do this. In his memoirs, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov frankly admitted: "Honestly speaking, while the war was on, I was fully determined to return the Nazis for their cruelty in kind. But when, having defeated the enemy, our troops entered Germany, we restrained our anger. Our convictions and international feelings did not allow us to give way to blind revenge."¹⁸

It must be said that on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War, in certain places in the West, particularly in the FRG and United States, an attempt was again made to resurrect false assertions of Goebbels propaganda and to cast aspersions on the Soviet military, to attempt to whitewash the Nazi thugs and to lift the blame from the SS butchers for their atrocities on Soviet land and in other European countries. These were vain attempts.

The Soviet soldiers won the hearts of the peoples freed from fascism by their humane attitude toward the public, by a constant readiness to come to the aid of women,

children and old persons who had suffered in the war and by their nobility of soul. Even prejudiced persons, in carefully observing the conduct of the Soviet military and in analyzing their actions, repudiated the Nazi fabrications about the "atrocities of the Bolsheviks."

Loyal to the glorious ideals of internationalism and to the traditions of the class solidarity of workers from all countries, the Soviet military at present is honorably serving on the land of the fraternal Hungarian, East German, Polish and Czechoslovakian peoples. Along with the men of the other socialist Warsaw Pact countries, they are vigilantly guarding socialism and are ready at any minute to defend it against the aggressive intrigues of imperialism. "...The military-political defensive alliance of the socialist nations," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "dependably serves peace. It possesses everything necessary to securely defend the socialist victories of the people."¹⁹

The high combat capability and readiness of the Warsaw Pact armies is ensured primarily by the indoctrinating of the men in a spirit of total loyalty to the Leninist ideas of socialist patriotism and internationalism, by the constant improving of military skills and by the regular holding of joint troop, naval, special and command-headquarters exercises which are remarkable schooling in international combat comradeship and the strengthening of friendship between the fraternal countries.

In the present situation, when international imperialism headed by the United States has begun outright preparations for war and has intensified its aggressiveness, it is essential to be particularly vigilant. The CPSU and the Soviet government, in consistently and purposefully carrying out a peace-loving Leninist policy, at the same time are undertaking every measure to further strengthen the military-political alliance of the socialist commonwealth. The effective indoctrination of Armed Forces personnel in a spirit of friendship of the Soviet peoples, military comradeship in arms with the soldiers of the socialist nations and loyalty to the Leninist ideals of international worker solidarity helps to unite the armed defenders of the socialist fatherland and to form in them a constant readiness to honorably carry out their patriotic and international duty.

FOOTNOTES

¹ "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 57.

² V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, p 43.

^{2a} "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 57.

³ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 40, p 46.

⁴ "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti" [Decrees of Soviet Power], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1957, p 352.

⁵ "Iz istorii bor'by sovetskogo naroda protiv inostrannoy voyennoy interventsii i vnutrenney kontrrevolyutsii v 1918 g." [From the History of the Struggle of the Soviet Peoples Against Foreign Military Intervention and the Domestic Counter-revolution in 1918], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1956, pp 473-474.

- 6 KOMMUNIST, No 13, 1972, p 80.
- 7 Ibid., p 77.
- 8 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 57.
- 9 V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 27, p 441.
- 10 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 57.
- 11 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 December 1980.
- 13 L. I. Brezhnev, "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Urgent Questions of CPSU Ideological Work], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 556.
- 14 V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 40, pp 98-99.
- 15 Ibid., Vol 37, p 26.
- 16 "Partiya i Armiya" [The Party and the Army], Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p 78.
- 17 "Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Silakh" [Party Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces], Voenizdat, 1978, p 279.
- 18 G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Remembrances and Reflections], Vol 2, Moscow, APN, 1974, p 439.
- 19 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 6.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

WARTIME OPERATIONS: THE VICTORY AT MOSCOW

Moscow: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 11-18

[Article published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War" by Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences, Col (Ret) D. Muriyev: "The Great Victory at Moscow"]

[Text] Among the great battles which predetermined the death of the Nazi Army, the battle on the fields around Moscow was one of the main ones. The first major defeat of the Nazi army in the course of World War II and the first major victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces won in such a difficult and hard period marked the beginning of a fundamental change in the war.

The most important result of the Battle of Moscow (30 September 1941--20 April 1942) was the major defeat of the troops in the Army Group Center, the largest and most battleworthy enemy grouping. The offensive operation Typhoon which was widely proclaimed by Goebbels propaganda suffered a complete collapse. The Barbarossa Plan was unsound and adventuristic. Nazi Germany lost its "Blitzkrieg" and was forced to wage an extended war for which it was unprepared.

As a result of the counteroffensive by the Soviet troops at Moscow and the ensuing general offensive in the Western Strategic Sector, the enemy was thrown back 200-300 km from the capital and 11,000 population points were liberated, including over 60 cities. Moscow Oblast, Tul'skaya Oblast and a portion of Kalininskaya and Orlovskaya oblasts were completely cleared of Nazis.

The victory of the Soviet Army which seized the strategic initiative was the crucial event in the first year of the Great Patriotic War. "The Battle of Moscow brought the German troops their first major defeat in World War II," admitted the former chief of staff of the 4th Field Army of the Army Group Center, Gen H. Blumentrit. "This means the end of the Blitzkrieg which had provided Hitler and his Armed Forces with such outstanding victories in Poland, France and the Balkans.... The campaign in Russia and particularly its turning point, the Battle of Moscow, was the first very strong blow against Germany both in political and military terms."¹

The overall losses of the enemy ground army numbered around 1 million men, killed, wounded, frost-bitten and captured. More than 50 divisions suffered a defeat. The undermanning of each infantry division of the Army Group Center averaged 6,900 men.² From December 1941 through April 1942, the enemy was forced to shift 39 divisions,

6 brigades and around 800,000 draft reinforcements to the Eastern Front from within Germany and the occupied European countries.³

The Nazi command threw three tank groups out of four into the drive against Moscow. These also were deprived of a significant portion of the tank specialists. Thus, the 2d Tank Group which as of 5 October became a tank army, just from 1 December 1941 through 6 February 1942 lost 29,000 men;⁴ just from 1 October 1941 through 15 March 1942, 2,340 armor units and 74,183 motor vehicles were lost. During this time the replacements amounted to 7,411 (10 percent) motor vehicles and 1,847 armor units (80 percent).⁵ The losses were so high that the industry of Nazi Germany was unable to replenish them.

The enemy suffered even higher losses in artillery. Indicative are the losses of the 4th Field Army. In December alone it lost 43 heavy Howitzers out of the available 48, 28 mortars out of 36, 72 assault guns out of 84, 31 100-mm cannons out of 48 and 230 artillery tractors out of the 252.⁶

Substantial changes in the leadership of the Nazi armed forces resulted from the major losses in the ground army and aviation during the Battle of Moscow. The Commander-in-Chief of the German Ground Forces, Field Marshal Gen von Brauchitsch on 19 December was released from his duties "because of illness." Leadership of the ground forces was assumed by Hitler himself who in Brauchitsch found a scapegoat for the past and ensured greater power for himself in the future."⁷ The same fate befell the commanders-in-chief of the army groups "North" and "South" and many other commanders of the field forces and formations. As a total 35 generals were removed. "Such a defeat for the generals," wrote the English military historian J. Fuller, "had not been seen during the Battle on the Marne.... The German Army did not recover its lost energy and in the eyes of the entire world it lost the aura of an invincible army."⁸

The defeat of the Nazi troops on the fields around Moscow was a factor which significantly sapped their morale. After it antimilitary and anti-Hitler moods began to be more strongly apparent in the operational army. There were more frequent instances of soldiers and junior commanders going over to the Soviet partisans, underground organizations became more active in Germany itself, an anti-Hitler opposition appeared among the Wehrmacht officers and generals and military discipline was shaken. Even during the period of the Battle of Moscow, the German field court martials disciplined more than 62,000 soldiers, junior officers and officers.⁹ They were accused of crimes showing a moral decline of the army.

The victory at Moscow was of major international significance. It had a decisive impact on the national liberation struggle in the Nazi occupied countries and helped to intensify it. For example, in France there was a transition from isolated and often spontaneous acts of sabotage and retribution to more mass, organized actions by the National Front. In many regions of the nation, partisan detachments were organized and there were more frequent strikes in the factories and plants and in agriculture. In the statement of one of the prominent leaders of the international communist movement, W. Foster, the blow by the Soviet Army at Moscow marked a transition toward a great offensive against fascism.

The failures of the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German Front caused the Japanese and Turkish governments to put off the dates of attack on the Soviet Union. For this

reason the tension in the Far East and Transcaucasus somewhat lessened. The defeat of the Army Group Center at Moscow caused dissatisfaction with the Nazis and the policy of the government circles in Mannerheim Finland, Horthy Hungary, Royal Romania and Fascist Italy.

The victory of the Soviet Army at Moscow had an enormous impact on the strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition. On 26 May 1942, a Soviet-English treaty was signed for a period of 20 years on a wartime alliance against Nazi Germany and its allies in Europe and on collaboration and mutual aid after the end of the war. On 11 June of the same year, a Soviet-American agreement was concluded in Washington on the principles of mutual aid in conducting the war against aggression.

The defeat of the Nazi troops on the fields around Moscow as well as the successful offensive actions in the Tikhvin and Rostov sectors, in addition to the international, also had enormous political, economic and military significance for our nation. The altered conditions made it possible for the State Defense Committee [GKO] and the Supreme High Command [SHC] in a less tense situation to carry out measures to stabilize the front, to start up wartime production and prepare the strategic reserves. Our victory was also of inestimable significance in raising the morale of the people and the army. "The historic victory at Moscow," commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "inspired the Soviet people to new feats and strengthened their certainty that the enemy would inevitably be crushed."¹⁰

The high morale of the Soviet soldiers was also apparent in their mass military heroism. For outstanding feats in the Battle of Moscow, around 40 units and formations were turned into guards ones. Some 36,000 military defenders of Moscow received orders and medals while 110 of the most outstanding men and partisans received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The victory of the Soviet Union at Moscow was not unforeseen. It was achieved by the superiority of the Soviet social and state system, by the unshakable friendship of the peoples in our multinational state, by ardent Soviet patriotism and by the organizing and mobilizing role of the wise and battle-tempered CPSU and one of its leading detachments, the Moscow party organization.

In directing the efforts of all the people to defeat the enemy, the Communist Party was led by the Leninist thesis that success in combat can be achieved only "by the direct appeal of our party and Soviet power to the working masses...by the ability to explain to the masses why one must work at full force on one or another aspect of Soviet work at one or another moment; the ability to raise the energy, heroism and enthusiasm of the masses, in focusing the revolution-intensified efforts on the most important next task."¹¹

The Headquarters, Supreme High Command [HqSHC] was the basic executor of the party's will in organizing and leading the armed struggle.

Mar G. K. Zhukov commented repeatedly on the superiority of strategic leadership by the Soviet Command: "HqSHC saw farther and better than the Nazi strategic leadership. HqSHC was armed, in the first place, with a knowledge of the general laws of combat based upon the firm foundation of Marxism-Leninism. Secondly, better than the enemy it understood the concrete situation which determined the course of events on the fronts";¹² "It was the brains of the war.... A word said at Headquarters put

enormous armies into movement. It is not difficult to understand how great the wisdom of any decision adopted at Headquarters should be."¹³

The development of defensive operations showed that for the first time in the war the Soviet Army command succeeded in creating a relatively stable position along the entire Soviet-German Front and with the going over to offensive operations, to achieve a cooperation between the army, aviation and partisans aimed at defeating the main enemy strike grouping, the Army Group Center. This was expressed in the achieving and maintaining of constant actions against the enemy for the purpose of tying down the opposing groupings, causing damage and depriving it of the opportunity to maneuver the resources.

The problem of training and replenishing the operational army with strategic reserves was carried out by our command under the difficult conditions of the retreat of the troops and the evacuation of industrial enterprises, but due to the great organizational work carried out by the party and soviet bodies of HqSHC, by the start of December it had been possible to secretly move up reserves and significantly reinforce the troops on the Western Sector. For example, while at the beginning of October 1941, the Western Front had 30 rifle divisions, during the first days of December the number was now 50. The number of rifle brigades in it was increased from 1 to 16, the number of air divisions from 5 to 8, cavalry divisions from 3 to 16, tank brigades from 3 to 22, artillery regiments of the RVGK [SHC Reserve] from 28 to 53 and rocket battalions from 1 to 30.¹⁴

The experience of the battle at Moscow also enriched Soviet military art on the questions of selecting the axes of the main thrusts and determining the moment for going over to a counteroffensive. While on the scale of the Soviet-German Front the Moscow Sector was considered to be the main one, in it the basic strikes were made against the strongest and most dangerous enemy tank groupings. As for the moment of going over to a counteroffensive, this commenced when the enemy could no longer advance but at the same time had still not succeeded in going over to the defensive and creating defensive works. "The Russian troops," wrote the Nazi Gen K. Tippelskierch, "operating against the Army Group Center obviously waited until the advancing enemy had exhausted its last forces in order, in bringing up reserves, to go over to a counteroffensive."¹⁵

In the course of the defensive engagements, the troop battle formations were gradually more compacted and this made it possible to increase and improve the antitank and antiaircraft defenses to a greater depth. Combat was marked by the use of various methods for conducting it as well as initiative by the soldiers and officers. Heroism, high awareness, discipline and total dedication to the motherland were a standard of conduct for the Soviet military defending the capital. By the end of the defensive period, the rifle division had become more stubborn, flexible and capable of countering strong tank strikes and this was achieved by the development of antitank defenses to a great depth, by the creation of antitank areas, centers and strongpoints and artillery antitank reserves, by the broad maneuvering of resources, by the use of infantry weapons (antitank rifles, grenades, "Molotov cock-tails" and so forth) in combating the tanks, and by the creation of a trench system.¹⁶

Equally valuable was the experience in organizing and conducting offensive operations. The width of the zones of front field forces reached 300-600 km and army

ones up to 100 km. However, here the operational densities were often low. The question was complicated by the permitted uneven allocation of resources along the entire front. A change occurred after the instructions of HqSHC in the directive letter of 10 January 1942 on organizing the breakthrough of enemy defensive lines and an artillery offensive.¹⁷ These underlay the conduct of offensive operations by troop assault groupings and played a major positive role in the subsequent course of the war.

The offensive operations at Moscow abound in examples of the broad use of envelopments and outflankings, nighttime operations of the units and subunits, the use of tanks in forward detachments and from ambushes as well as ski battalions for increasing troop mobility under the conditions of a heavy-snow winter and the concentrating of air efforts against the air and ground enemy, particularly against its tanks. The diversity of combat operations which developed in a relatively short period of time provided the troops, commanders and staffs of all levels with great combat experience and helped to work out the most effective methods for organizing and conducting an engagement and operation under different conditions.

In indisputably recognizing that Moscow was defended by the entire nation and the words of the political instructor V. Klochkov "Russia is Vast But There is Nowhere to Retreat Behind Moscow!" became the ardent motto of all the capital's defenders, one must particularly note the contribution made by the workers of Moscow and the Greater Moscow Area to the struggle against the hated enemy. Under the leadership of the party and soviet bodies these workers provided inestimable great and diverse help to the operational army.

This help was expressed in the most diverse forms. During the first days of the war, 400,000 communists and Komsomol members from the capital and the oblast joined the ranks of the Soviet Army. During the difficult days of 1941, here were created 15 people's militia divisions and a significant number of units and subunits.

At that time in Moscow there was organized a separate special motorized rifle brigade (omsbn) from communists and Komsomol members. The brigade's subunits participated in the battles on the approaches to Moscow. Its command trained and sent into the enemy rear over 200 operational groups (more than 7,000 men) which conducted reconnaissance and aided the partisans. The partisan detachments and groups cooperated closely with the troops of the regular army, they disrupted the enemy lines of communications and destroyed its headquarters bodies and supply depots.

In October-December 1941, 600,000 Muscovites worked unstintingly in building defensive works around the capital city. Some 802 km of antitank obstacles were built on the near and distant approaches to Moscow, 611 km of barbed wire obstacles were created, 1,528 km of tree barriers and 7,581 firing points were equipped. On the streets of Moscow there appeared 22 km of antitank trenches, 10 km of barricades, 30 km of dragons teeth, 820 pillboxes, 496 firing points in buildings and around 24,000 antitank hedgehogs.¹⁸

During the first 6 months of the war alone, the Moscow workers turned over to the defense fund more than 142 million rubles from their personal savings and earnings. At that time this total equaled the cost of 1,400 aircraft or 750 tanks.¹⁹

The listed measures significantly strengthened the Moscow defenses and helped to unify the ranks of the Soviet Army and strengthen its might.

But there was one other form of help which was an important condition for success in the defensive and offensive engagements and operations, namely, the material support for the operational army.

In accord with the decision of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, in the Moscow Party Committee special departments were set up and the positions were established of secretaries for industrial sectors. The secretaries of the Moscow Committee and Moscow City Committee and the leaders of the leading departments such as S. I. Afanas'yev, A. F. Igoshin, K. F. Kalashnikov, Ya. S. Kolesov, A. F. Kuranchev, A. I. Maksimov, M. I. Malakhov, A. M. Pegov, G. M. Popov, A. F. Sekirko, N. P. Firyubin, B. N. Chernousov and S. Ya. Yakovlev headed by A. S. Shcherbakov, carried out gigantic work to mobilize all the resources of Moscow industry to aid the front. A major contribution to this very responsible undertaking was also made by the key workers of the Moscow Soviet and Moscow Oblast Executive Committee V. P. Pronin, P. S. Tarasov, M. A. Yasnov and others.

In Moscow there arose numerous patriotic initiatives which contributed to the accelerated reorganization of the economy on a wartime footing and to increasing the output of military products. Hundreds of thousands of workers from Moscow and the oblast each day overfulfilled their production quotas, keeping ahead of the plan and they worked for themselves and for a comrade fighting on the front. They filled the orders from the front with doubled and tripled energy, not counting the time and sometimes not leaving the job for days. Everywhere in the labor collectives, the movements of pacesetters, for combining jobs, for manning multiple machines and for mastering related specialties grew wider.

In appealing to the workers leaving for the front, the large collective of the Krasnyy Proletariy Plant urged them thus: "Be confident that you will have enough shells to cover the invading Nazis in an avalanche of steel. Never before has the plant had such a patriotic upsurge. Everyone feels himself to be the participants of a single detachment, a single column of the iron army defending its motherland."²⁰ These lines full of powerful inner force appeared in the plant newspaper on 25 June 1941.

The collectives of many Moscow enterprises announced their wish to convert to a 10-11-hour working day for the period of the war. The workers at the plant imeni Vladimir Il'ich were the initiators of this patriotic undertaking. The labor collectives of the largest machine building and machine tool building enterprises, the motor vehicle plant, the Krasnyy Proletariy Plant, the plant imeni S. Ordzhonikidze, the plant imeni Vladimir Il'ich, the Dinamo Plant, the Stankolit Plant, the Kompresor [Compressor] Plant, the Frezer [Milling Machine] Plant, the Kalibr Plant, the Serp i Molot [Hammer and Sickle] Plant, the first and second state bearing plants, the Moscow Light Bulb Plant as well as the Borets Plant, the plant for motor vehicle and tractor equipment and the enterprises of the Greater Moscow Area assumed increased obligations for producing mines, shells and bombs, grenades, rifles and sub-machine guns, machine guns and mortars as well as for the manufacturing and repair of weapons, tanks and aircraft.

However, the production of military products entailed serious difficulties due to the evacuation of the enterprises and population of Moscow and the oblast to the

eastern regions of the nation. By the end of November, only around 2.5 million persons remained of the city's 4.5 million population while 498 major enterprises of Union and Union republic significance had been evacuated. As was pointed out by N. A. Voznesenskiy, "the last 2 months of 1941 were the most difficult and critical in the history of the wartime economy and primarily for Soviet industry. During this period the enterprises evacuated to the east had already ceased producing products in the old areas but had not yet been set up in the new rear areas."²¹

Under these difficult conditions, the party organizations of the capital and oblast effectively solved the questions of utilizing the capacity and production areas remaining after the evacuation for producing products needed by the army and for repairing military equipment.

The collectives of the Moscow enterprises worked particularly actively and fruitfully. Within 2 weeks after the evacuation of the basic equipment, the Dinamo Plant and the plant imeni Kalinin had begun producing 120-mm mortars. The motor vehicle plant and the SAM plant produced machine gun pistols while mines, shells and fuzes were produced at the Plant imeni Vladimir Il'ich, the Krasnyy Proletariy Plant, the Borets Plant, the Lyubertsy Plant imeni Ukhtomskiy, the Presnenskiy Machine Building Plant, the Plant imeni Voykov and others.

Work was carried out widely to repair motor vehicles at the repair facilities of the military commissariats of Sokol'nicheskiy, Rostokinskiy, Kominternovskiy, Kuybyshevskiy and other rayons. To January inclusively, here 2,450 motor vehicles, 296 tractors and 60 motorcycles were repaired.²² From the middle of October, by a decision of the Moscow Party Committee and the Moscow Soviet, a number of enterprises were assigned to repair tanks, armored vehicles and armored trains. The Steam Locomotive Depot imeni Voykov alone repaired 12 armored trains, 4 armored vehicles, 9 motorcycles, 12 machine guns for the armored trains, 9 cannons, 4 side-firing and 1 anti-aircraft machine guns and 24 armored railway trucks. The Depot imeni Il'ich overhauled 8 armored trains which had arrived from the Kalinin Front. These armored trains were also armed here and supplied with additional antiaircraft turrets. During these terrible days, in Moscow all the plants and factories were working for defense.

By the autumn of 1941, around 2,000 Moscow enterprises had been switched to producing weapons and ammunition. Light tank production was begun for the first time. Eleven Moscow plants, including Serp i Molot, Dinamo, the Machine Tool Building Plant Plant imeni S. Ordzhonikidze and others provided mass repair of the tanks. During the first half of December alone, around 1,500 tanks and armored vehicles left the city's repair facilities.²³

The contribution of Moscow industry to ensuring the needs of the operational army was truly great. The workers of the Moscow Economic Region during the hard and difficult days at the end of 1941 and the start of 1942 supplied the front with over 76,000 automatics and 10,000 mortars, while repairing up to 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, at least 1,200 aircraft²⁴ and much other military equipment.

"The workers of the Moscow plants and factories worked constantly for the front," said L. I. Brezhnev in a report devoted to the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. "In all of its powerful organism, Moscow felt the advancing danger. It was seized with a fervent desire at whatever

the cost to check the enemy and to keep it from the Moscow streets and squares which were covered with the blood of the heroes of three revolutions."²⁵

Our people will never forget the feat of Moscow's defenders. The Communist Party and the Soviet government highly praised the courage, steadfastness and heroism of the Soviet soldiers and workers of Moscow, those who in the difficult year of 1941 held out in the fierce clash against the perfidious enemy and won a great historic victory. In commemoration of this victory, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Ukase of 1 May 1944 struck a medal "For the Defense of Moscow" which was awarded to all the participants in this great battle.

For outstanding accomplishments for the motherland, for mass heroism, courage and steadfastness shown by the soldiers, the partisans and workers of Moscow in the struggle against the foreign invaders and in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 8 May 1965, Moscow was awarded the honorary title of "Hero City" with the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

At present the remains of the Unknown Soldier who died in the defense of the capital rest by the walls of the grey Kremlin. The eternal flame will always remind us of the skill, courage and sacrifice of the Soviet people who defended their motherland, the USSR.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Z. Westphal et al., "Rokovyye resheniya" [Epoch Decisions], translated from the English, Voenizdat, 1958, pp 64, 108.
- ² F. Halder, "Voyennyy dnevniki" [Military Diary], Vol 3, Book 2, Voenizdat, 1971, pp 233, 234.
- ³ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1975, p 323.
- ⁴ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 4, 1966, p 38.
- ⁵ F. Halder, op. cit., Vol 3, Book 2, p 233.
- ⁶ "Razgrom nemetsko-fashistskikh voysk pod Moskvoy" [The Defeat of the Nazi Troops at Moscow], Voenizdat, 1964, p 400.
- ⁷ B. H. Liddel Hart, "Strategiya nepryamykh deystviy" [The Strategy of Indirect Actions], Moscow, Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1957, p 346.
- ⁸ J. F. Fuller, "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna 1939-1945 gg." [World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1956, pp 168-169.
- ⁹ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 4, p 304.
- ¹⁰ L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 126.

- 11 V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 305.
- 12 G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Remembrances and Reflections], Vol 1, Moscow, Izd. APN, 1974, p 331.
- 13 KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA, 6 May 1970.
- 14 VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1971, p 14.
- 15 K. Tippleskierch, "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [History of World War II], translated from the German, Moscow, Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1956, p 201.
- 16 TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 326, inv. 7534, file 3, sheet 7.
- 17 "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 3, Voenizdat, 1977, p 193.
- 18 "Goroda-geroi Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Hero Cities of the Great Patriotic War], An Atlas, Moscow, Izd. Glavnogo Upravleniya Geodezii i Kartografii pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, 1975, p 17.
- 19 A. M. Sinitsyn, "Vsenarodnaya pomoshch' frontu" [The Aid of All the People to the Front], Voenizdat, 1975, p 139.
- 20 "Istoriya Moskvy v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny i v poslevoyennyy period 1941-1965" [The History of Moscow During the Years of the Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period, 1941-1965], Moscow, Nauka, 1967, p 20.
- 21 N. Voznesenskiy, "Voyennaya ekonomika SSSR v period Otechestvennoy Voyny" [The Soviet Military Economy in the Period of the Patriotic War], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1947, p 41.
- 22 "Moskva--frontu. 1941-1945" [Moscow for the Front. 1941-1945], Collection of Documents and Materials, Moscow, Nauka, 1966, p 256.
- 23 "Ocherki istorii moskovskoy organizatsii KPSS" [Essays from the History of the Moscow CPSU Organization], Book 3, Moscow, Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1979, p 570.
- 24 KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 1, 1977, p 49.
- 25 L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom," Vol 1, p 125.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

WARTIME OPERATIONS: ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING FIRE SUPERIORITY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 19-25

[Article published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War" by Commander of Missile Troops and Artillery of the Ground Forces, Maj Arty G. Peredel'skiy: "The Struggle for Fire Superiority During the War"]

[Text]

The struggle to win and constantly maintain fire superiority over the enemy during the years of the Great Patriotic War was one of the crucial factors determining the outcome of the operation (engagement). Fire superiority was achieved by creating a quantitative and qualitative superiority over the enemy in weapons in the crucial sectors, by anticipating the enemy in opening fire, by surprise, by high effectiveness and massing of the fire, by using extensive maneuvering of fire and weapons and by continuous countering of enemy weapons.

The massing of the artillery and mortars on the most important sectors of the Soviet troop offensive was the guarantee for a successful struggle for fire superiority over the enemy. The creation of exceptionally high operational and tactical gun and mortar densities was achieved by the broad maneuvering of the artillery formations and units of the RVGK [Reserve of the Supreme High Command] as well as by the artillery of the combined-arms field forces and formations. In the major operations of the second and third periods of the war, in maneuvering the artillery from HqSHC to the fronts, from front to front and within the fronts, simultaneously from 150 to 500 and more artillery regiments were regrouped over distances of 150-400 km and sometimes more. In the defense breakthrough sectors, the fronts concentrated from 40 to 75 percent of the artillery in the second period of the war and from 50 to 80 percent in the third period. For example, in the Belorussian, Vistula-Oder and Berlin Offensive operations, there were involved, respectively, 31,000, 33,500 and 42,000 guns and mortars.¹ Here the Soviet troops in these operations had, respectively, a 3-fold, over 6-fold and 4-fold superiority over the enemy in terms of the number of guns and mortars.

The large amount of artillery and mortars used for conducting offensive operations in the third period of the war made it possible to create operational densities as follows: up to 130-200 guns and mortars per km of breakthrough sector in 1943, up to 150-250 in 1944 and 250-300 and more in 1945. The artillery tactical densities in the zones of advance of the combined-arms formations reached 300-375 guns and

mortars per km of breakthrough sector. For example, while the operational density was 142 guns and mortars per km of front in the breakthrough sector of the 11th Guards Army in the Orel Offensive Operation, it was 209 in the 60th Army in the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation, and 291 in the 8th Guards Army in the Vistula-Oder Offensive Operation.

It is essential to point out that the Soviet artillery in tactical and technical performance surpassed the artillery of Nazi Germany. During the war years there was an ongoing process of increasing the number of 76-mm and 122-mm cannons, 122-mm howitzers and 152-mm gun howitzers, that is, the weapons which could be most effectively used for destroying enemy weapons. In the offensive operations in the struggle to win fire superiority, new types of artillery, rocket and self-propelled, were also widely employed. Aviation was also used for these purposes and naval artillery in the coastal sectors.

The massing of artillery in the breakthrough sectors, in turn, provided an opportunity to successfully carry out the main task of winning fire superiority over the enemy, namely, to combat enemy artillery and mortars.

During the prewar years, counterbattery bombardment was viewed as the main combat mission in all types of combat.² This was to be carried out first of all by the men and equipment of the long-range (LR) artillery groups which were set up in the corps and divisions. A 1.5-fold superiority over the enemy was considered to be an indispensable condition for success in counterbattery bombardment and this should ensure the simultaneous and successive neutralization of the enemy batteries in relatively short times.

By the start of the war, for reconnaissance, neutralization and destruction of enemy artillery batteries, the Soviet Army had trained personnel of artillery troops, artillery and air reconnaissance and observation equipment as well as the corps and army artillery and the cannon artillery of the High Command Reserve. However, it is wise to point out that in the course of the Great Patriotic War, definite difficulties arose in organizing counterbattery bombardment. During the first period of the war, the reasons for this lay in the general unfavorable operational situation and in the lack of equipment for reconnaissance and neutralizing the batteries, and in the subsequent one by the increased scope of counterbattery bombardment as a consequence of the employment of large masses of artillery by both sides in the battles and engagements.

Combat practice convincingly showed that the combating of enemy artillery for the purpose of winning fire superiority required an entire complex of measures to organize the actions of the artillery groups and reconnaissance subunits.

A special role was assigned to reconnoitering the enemy artillery grouping, its firing positions and observation posts. The basic means for detecting an enemy artillery grouping was sound ranging. Under the conditions of the highly fluid troop operations in the second and third periods of the war, air reconnaissance was also of important significance and the success here depended largely upon the covering of reconnaissance aviation by fighters. With an unfavorable air situation or with strong air defense by the enemy troops, the fighters could also be used for reconnaissance and battery fire correction. An example of this was the use of YaK-9 and YaK-7b aircraft as daytime spotters in the conducting of the Lwow-Sandomierz Offensive Operation by the First Ukrainian Front.³

During the first 2 years of the war, in the course of counterbattery bombardment a search was carried out for the most effective methods for the control and use of artillery reconnaissance equipment for this purpose. Combat experience showed that poor control by the field force artillery staffs led to the ineffective use of even the significant artillery reconnaissance resources. This occurred, for example, in the 61st Army in July 1942 on the Bolkhov Sector. In particular, the staff of one of the field force reconnaissance battalions was cut off from its subunits and was unable to control them. And when the LR artillery group was organized, the reconnaissance battalion commanders received missions not from the group staff but rather determined them themselves. As a result, reconnaissance was carried out without coordination. The effectiveness of counterbattery bombardment was reduced.

As experience was gained, the conclusion was reached that it was essential to have centralized control of the reconnaissance facilities in an army and to attach them to the appropriate artillery groups. As a result the tasks of the reconnaissance subunits were carried out in the interests of the artillery units and subunits making up the group.

As the experience of numerous operations disclosed, it was possible to reconnoiter at least 70 percent of the enemy artillery grouping and determine the firing position coordinates prior to the start of an offensive while in individual operations this figure reached 80-90 percent. This was considered completely sufficient for effective counterbattery and countermortar bombardment.

Moreover, success in this bombardment depended also upon the methods of determining the settings. If they were determined solely by ranging (this provided the maximum accuracy), then the element of surprise was lost. For this reason, depending upon the conditions for carrying out the tasks and the specific situation, the settings were determined either by ranging or by shifting fire using a checkpoint, on the basis of full calculations or by calculating using the results of ranging guns. The last two methods were inferior in terms of accuracy but did guarantee surprise of attack.

The counterbattery bombardment was basically assigned to the high powered army artillery groups (AAG) which included from 4 to 6 artillery cannon brigades of the RVGK and numbered up to 200 and more guns of 122-mm and 152-mm caliber. This ensured the at least 1.5 or even 2-fold superiority in guns over the enemy artillery. Such a quantitative composition of the AAG also made it possible to conduct independent bombardment of the enemy artillery in developing the battle in the depth of defenses, when the corps, division and regimental artillery groups carried out the tasks of direct support for the infantry and tank offensive.

The counterbattery bombardment was planned and organized usually depending upon the situation by the artillery staffs of the corps, army and more rarely the front. Here the basic aim was, as a rule, to neutralize the enemy batteries, that is, to put them out of commission for a relatively short time. The total duration for the planned neutralization of the batteries for the purposes of winning fire superiority over enemy artillery was determined by the specific situation and varied from 15 minutes to 3½ hours. Here the greatest duration of neutralization was characteristic for operations and engagements which started by the crossing of water obstacles.

Planned counterbattery bombardment ordinarily started simultaneously with the artillery softening up for the infantry and tank attack and continued in the course of the artillery support of the attack deep in the enemy defenses. During the period of the artillery softening up of the attack, the neutralization of the batteries was carried out, as a rule, during the first and last intense shellfirings (these lasted 5-10 minutes). In such operations as, for example, the Vistula-Oder (the 5th Guards Army) and the East Prussian (5th Army), the first intense shellfire against the batteries was carried out 10 minutes after the start of the artillery softening-up of the attack, when the gun crews had taken their positions by the weapons. The effectiveness of such intense shellfire was confirmed by a check on the results of firing by the artillery staff officers of the armies and front who inspected the enemy artillery firing positions after the advance of our troops into the depth of defenses. For example, in the zone of advance of the 5th Guards Army at 32 artillery firing positions they discovered significant numbers of killed enemy artillery troops.⁴ Such intense shellfire was often a surprise, it caused significant losses to the enemy and contributed to the seizing of fire initiative.

The last intense shellfire in the course of the artillery softening up either coincided with its ending or, starting in 1943, overlapped its end and the start of the attack. By this it was possible to interdict counterfire by the defending troops at the moment when our infantry, in going over to the attack, had left its shelter and could be hit by accurate enemy artillery fire.

In addition to the first and last shellings, depending upon the duration of the artillery softening up, another one or three attacks were made and these were combined either with the firing of direct laying guns or air strikes.

For the period of the attack's artillery support, the staffs of the army artillery planned two or three intense firings against the enemy batteries. The first firing started when the infantry had taken the first line of trenches. During this period the enemy usually laid a solid curtain of fire for destroying the attacking troops without considering that its own subunits were still in the first line of trenches. The second intense shellfire started when our infantry and tanks had broken through to the second or third line of trenches. Here the purpose was to prevent the setting of defensive and interdictive fire. The third intense shellfire was carried out predominantly against the distant batteries when our infantry and tanks entered the area of the Nazi firing positions. This is how the artillery proceeded in the 42d Army during the Krasnoye Selo-Ropsha Operation, the 21st Army in the Vyborg Operation and the 5th Guards Army in the Vistula-Oder Operation. In those instances when the enemy had a strong artillery grouping or the conditions made it difficult to distinguish the actual batteries from the assumed, these were neutralized in two stages or one or two strikes were made by virtually all the artillery against all the batteries.

The actions of the LR artillery group of the XCVI Rifle Corps of the 70th Army in the East Prussian Operation can serve as an example of neutralizing the batteries of a strong artillery grouping in two stages. Of the detected 51 enemy artillery batteries and 29 mortar batteries, 22 artillery batteries at a range of 6-15 km were subjected to two sequences of group firing. As a result of the hits, the enemy batteries virtually did not fire at all during the 90-minute artillery softening up and the 35-minute Soviet artillery support for the attack of our troops. This made it possible for the formation's infantry and tanks to break through the first position of the enemy's main defensive line at a high pace.

The experience of combat operations shows that in conducting artillery firing there can be no details which can be disregarded, particularly if it is a question of dependable neutralization of the batteries in the aim of winning fire superiority over the enemy or weakening its artillery fire.

The consequences of seemingly insignificant oversights can be seen from the already mentioned example of the 61st Army. Its LR artillery group on 12 July 1943 was firing at 12 batteries. The initial settings had been determined by shifting fire from old sound ranging checkpoints. However, there was no monitoring of the firing. During the offensive 11 firing positions were checked. It turned out that only two batteries had been destroyed, four had been neutralized while not even craters were detected in the area of the other five positions.

During the war years, the divisional artillery was also widely employed for combating artillery, along with large caliber pieces. Combining the fire from large and medium-caliber weapons produced positive results.

Ammunition consumption for neutralizing enemy batteries usually was: 30-60 shells in neutralizing their actions, 140-350 for complete neutralization and 800-1,200 for destruction.⁵

The task of organizing the countering of enemy mortars was significantly more complicated. This was chiefly due to the difficulties of detecting them. At the outset of the war there was no experience in conducting mortar reconnaissance and there was also a shortage of artillery observation and reconnaissance equipment. In turn, the particular features of the combat properties and the ease of camouflaging the mortars significantly impeded their detection. The procedures ordinarily employed for reconnoitering artillery batteries were ineffective for mortar reconnaissance. In particular, it was impossible to get a fix on them from two rounds using sound ranging equipment due to the weak pulse in the equipment. Firing on the probable location of mortar positions also did not produce positive results. At the same time the enemy continued to widely employ mortars in combat. The countering of them assumed primary significance. The artillery troops of the Leningrad Front as early as 1942 established that it was possible to detect mortars using the optical, sound ranging and air reconnaissance devices in considering the particular features of the location of the firing positions on the terrain, the strength of the round's sound, the give-away features and so forth. The long search was crowned with success. It was proven possible to fix firing enemy mortars from the sound but with other, reduced parameters in the disposition of the sound ranging batteries.⁶ After testing, the new method was widely employed.

The specific features of combating mortars required the creation of special divisional or corps countermortar bombardment groups on a number of fronts. These included artillery units and subunits armed with 122-mm howitzers, 120-mm mortars and reconnaissance subunits. Due to these groups it was possible to more effectively carry out countermortar bombardment. For example, on the Leningrad Front this was most successfully initiated at the start of 1943, in particular in the operation of the 67th Army in the Sinyavin Sector in breaking through the Leningrad blockade. While previously it was possible to detect only individual enemy mortar batteries, by the start of the operation they had discovered 60 firing positions of 81-mm mortars and 22 positions of 105-mm mortars in ravines, quarries and behind the railroad embankment. After an analysis of the intelligence data, a large portion of these batteries

was fired on by the counterbattery group during the period of the artillery softening up for the attack. In each of the intense shellfirings, 40-60 gun and mortar rounds were expended for each mortar battery of 105-mm caliber, or a total of 250-300 rounds. Subsequent inspection of the enemy positions confirmed the rather high effectiveness of the neutralization fire against the mortar batteries.

It should be emphasized that not only the artillery was involved in the struggle for fire superiority over the enemy during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The aviation used in the interests of the ground troops (particularly in offensive operations) along with the artillery fought to win fire superiority by neutralizing and destroying the enemy artillery and mortar batteries in the course of the preliminary and direct air softening up for the attack and in the period of supporting the troop offensive deep into the defenses. Direct air softening up was carried out either prior to the start of the artillery softening up for the attack or simultaneously with it. If the artillery and air softening up was carried out simultaneously, then the artillery neutralized and destroyed the enemy artillery and mortar batteries in the first position of the main defensive line while the aviation struck the second and third positions of the main line as well as the second defensive line. But when the air and artillery softening up was carried out at different times, then all the detected enemy batteries located within the main defensive zone were subjected to artillery fire and air strikes.

The following example shows what a role was played by aviation in neutralizing the enemy artillery. During the first day of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation they planned 222 aircraft sorties for neutralizing enemy batteries and personnel during the period of the immediate preparations for the attack by the troops of the Third Ukrainian Front.⁷

Aviation also played a great role in neutralizing enemy weapons, particularly the antitank artillery, at the beginning of committing the tank armies to an engagement and continuing until the tank armies, the tank and mechanized formations reached the operational depth.

Naval forces, in cooperation with the ground troops, also participated in the struggle to win fire superiority both in the course of defensive and offensive operations. In talking about the combating of enemy artillery in the course of defensive operations, it must be pointed out that even during the difficult period of the defense of Odessa (5 August-16 October 1941), the shore artillery of the navy base made 357 out of the total 954 rounds against the enemy artillery batteries.⁸ The enemy artillery and mortar batteries were neutralized particularly successfully by the artillery troops of the Leningrad Front and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet during the period of the defense of Leningrad. For example, as a result of intense shellfire by the Soviet artillery against enemy batteries, during the day of 7 November 1943, the Nazis were unable to get off a single round against the city.

As a whole the naval forces cooperating with the defending ground troops on maritime sectors used up to 90-95 percent of the naval artillery for combating enemy artillery and supporting landings of our amphibious troops. Some 80-90 percent of all the naval aviation aircraft sorties were made for these same purposes.⁹

With the going over of the ground forces to the offensive, the special naval groupings which included surface vessels, shore artillery and naval aviation took a direct part in the artillery and air softening up in preparing to break through the tactical defensive zone, in attacking enemy guns, and primarily artillery positions, personnel and other objectives and targets.

The naval flotillas played an important role in combating enemy artillery in the offensive operations. Thus, in the course of the Belorussian Operation, artillery from the ships of the Dnepr Naval Flotilla destroyed and neutralized 25 artillery and mortar batteries and during the Berlin Operation 36 artillery and mortar batteries and 11 individual guns.¹⁰

Thus, the basic factors which determined the success in the struggle for fire superiority over the enemy during the war years were: the massing of artillery on the most important sectors, the effective use of all reconnaissance facilities in the aim of detecting the enemy artillery grouping, the accuracy of artillery fire combined with accurate air strikes and close cooperation of the ground troops artillery with naval artillery on maritime sectors.

Under present-day conditions, the winning of fire superiority over the enemy has assumed even-greater urgency. Artillery has also an important role to play in this.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 1, Voenizdat, 1976, pp 432, 457; Vol 2, 1976, p 147.
- 2 "Boevoy ustav artillerii RKKA" [Artillery Field Manual of the Worker-Peasant Red Army], Part 2, Voenizdat, 1937, pp 14-15.
- 3 "Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Soviet Artillery in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Voenizdat, 1960, p 473.
- 4 TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 236, inv. 2700, file 819, sheet 88.
- 5 "Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoy...", p 760; VOYENNY VESTNIK, No 8, 1978, p 82.
- 6 N. N. Zhdanov, "Ognevoy shchit Leningrada" [Leningrad's Shield of Fire], Voenizdat, 1965, pp 246-247.
- 7 "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War], Vol 3, Voenizdat, 1958, p 458.
- 8 VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 4, 1976, p 41.
- 9 "Voyennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [Military Art in World War II], Moscow, Izd. Voennoy Akademii General'nogo Shtaba, 1973, p 454.
- 10 VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1981, pp 39-40.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

WARTIME OPERATIONS: EMPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE AVIATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 26-32

[Article published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War" by Lt Col Ye. Belov and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Lt Col A. Pervov: "From the Experience of the Employment of Long-Range Aviation in the Third Period of the War"]

[Text] In the third period of the Great Patriotic War, the long-range aviation (LRA) formations were represented by bomber corps and divisions which were part of the long-range aviation which in December 1944 became the 18th Air Army under the commander of the Red Army Air Forces. The basic aircraft were the DB-3F (IL-4), YeR-2 and TB-7 long-range bombers as well as LI-2. The number of aircraft continuously increased.¹

With increased fighting strength, the capabilities of the LRA grew sharply. Thus, its total bomb load by the start of 1945, had increased by 2-fold in comparison with December 1943 and by 3-fold in comparison with December 1941. This made it possible for the Soviet Command during the third period of the war to make very effective use of the LRA formations for striking enemy objectives deep in the rear and for supporting partisan combat actions as well as the operations of the ground troops. The given article will examine only those tasks which were carried out by the LRA formations in the interests of the troops in strategic offensive operations. For this purpose they made more than 63,500 aircraft sorties and this was 75.5 percent of all the sorties made by them during the third period of the war. The LRA formations disrupted the operations of rail, motor and sea lines of communications, they destroyed troops and military equipment in the tactical and near operational depth, they fought for air superiority, they transported troops, military equipment and supplies and conducted air reconnaissance.

An important task was the *disrupting of the rail, motor and sea lines of communications in the aim of interdicting shipments as well as destroying enemy reserves.* For this strikes were made against rail and road junctions and ports and naval bases; troop trains on sidings and troops on the march were also destroyed. As a rule, these were carried out at night. In a majority of operations, from 40-80 percent of all the aircraft sorties were spent on them.² The broader use of LRA formations to carry out these missions was characteristic of the third period of the war. Thus, while in the second period of the war only 36 percent of the aircraft

sorties were made for the above-designated purpose, in the third period the figure was 58 percent.³

The Soviet Command endeavored to have the massed use of the LRA formations, without scattering their efforts along the entire Soviet-German Front. Thus, in the course of the Leningrad-Novgorod Operation from 3 to 7 air corps were used for attacking rail junctions and stations and from 4 to 6 of them in the area of Kishinev and Iasi. In the Belorussian Strategic Operation during the period of conducting the Bobruysk, Mogilev, Vitebsk-Orsha and Minsk Front offensive operations all 8 corps and 1 separate division were involved in attacking the rail junctions and stations. The strikes were made with large forces against a limited number of rail installations. As a rule, during a night an average of from 1 to 4 rail junctions and stations were subjected to simultaneous raids and 1-3 ports in the maritime sectors. For example, during the night of 5 June 1944, a massed raid was made by 6 corps consisting of 525 bombers against the Kishinev rail junction. During the following night a massed raid was made against the Iasi rail junction by 6 air corps consisting of 537 aircraft.⁴ In the course of the offensive operation to liberate the Baltic, during October 1944, the LRA formations 5 times made simultaneous raids against the ports of Libau and Memel.⁵ The heaviest was made during the night of 14 October against Memel. Four bomber air corps participated in it with a total of 320 aircraft.⁶

As a rule in the third-seventh day of the operation the LRA formations began to carry out the mission of disrupting the lines of communications and combating enemy reserves, that is, this happened when the ground troops, having broken through the tactical defensive zone, were developing the success in the operational depth, and the enemy, in shifting its reserves, endeavored to block the advance of our troops. This was the case, for example, in the Lwow-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and other operations. Sometimes the LRA formations began raiding the rail and motor objectives during the preparatory period (the Leningrad-Novgorod, Belorussian, Iasi-Kishinev and other operations). However, the number of sorties made in the preparatory period was slight and did not exceed 10 percent of the total number for carrying out this mission over the entire operation.

The depth of operations of the LRA formations against rail lines in a majority of operations varied on an average from 150 to 300 km. Only in the Belorussian Operation did it reach 500 km.⁷ Raids against highways and their junctions were made to a depth of 50-150 km.⁸

The LRA used the following methods of combat operations: massed and concentrated strikes, operations in waves and "free hunting." Massed raids were made comparatively rarely, most often against large objectives. The most widespread were the concentrated raids by corps groups of 80-110 aircraft. In the Vistula-Oder Operation the raids against the rail junctions of Breslau (during the night of 19 January 1945) and Lodz (during the night of 17 January 1945) were made, respectively, by 138 and 169 aircraft.⁹ Operations in waves were used during the intervals between the concentrated and massed raids in the aim of disorganizing and interdicting reconstruction work on the road and rail junctions as well as against enemy troops on the march. On 17 April 1945, in the second day of the Berlin Operation, the German Command began to hurriedly shift reserves to the areas where its defenses were being broken through. In order to interdict their planned moving up and in order to harm

them, the LRA formations during the night of 18 April made 244 aircraft sorties in the zone of the First Belorussian Front.¹⁰ As for the "hunters," they operated, as a rule, in groups of 2-4 aircraft and more rarely alone over the most important rail and road lines. For example, in the Vistula-Oder Operation during 2 nights (20 and 26 January 1945), individual groups of 3 or 4 A-20-Zh aircraft destroyed 5 trains in the section Moravska--Ostrava--Krnov.¹¹

As a result of the LRA operations, the enemy lines of communications operated intermittently while the reserves suffered significant losses, arrived late in the destinations and troop supply was disrupted. Thus, at the Brest rail junction which was bombed five times in July 1944, 30 trains with equipment and personnel were destroyed, 20 steam engines were damaged and the locomotive depot and the building of the main terminal were destroyed. On 11 July 1944, the bodies of up to 3,000 German soldiers were removed from under the rubble.¹²

However, in no operation was it possible to fully interdict enemy movements. This circumstance can be explained by a whole number of factors. *In the first place*, the strikes were made by far from the full effective strength of the LRA, *secondly*, bombing accuracy, particularly under bad weather conditions, was sharply reduced with the then-level of sight and navigation equipment on the long-range bombers operating at night. *Thirdly*, in the area where the operations were carried out a majority of the rail and motor lines were sufficiently developed and the objectives of the raids were rather invulnerable. For this reason larger LRA forces had to be assigned as well as highly efficient weapons.

The destruction of troops and military equipment in the tactical and near operational depth was carried out by the LRA formations in the course of the *air softening up and support for the troops in breaking through enemy defenses and developing a tactical success into an operational one*. The proportional amount of aircraft sorties for carrying out this mission declined sharply. While in the second period of the war around 32 percent of all the sorties in the strategic offensive operations were made for air softening up and support by the LRA formations, in the third period it was just 19.5 percent.¹⁴

The basic reasons for the reduced proportional amount of aircraft sorties for destroying troops and military equipment, as was already pointed out, were: the increased destructive capability of the weapons of the ground troop formations and air armies in breaking through the enemy defenses; the wider use of the LRA in disrupting the operation of the rail, motor and sea lines and for combating reserves.

In the course of the air softening up, the LRA formations destroyed the defensive works on the first and second defensive lines and struck troops and military equipment, artillery and mortars in their firing positions. The immediate air softening up was carried out, as a rule, during the night prior to the start of the operation in cooperation with the air army night bombers. Cooperation was provided for time and objectives. For example, in the Bobruysk Front Offensive Operation in the zone of the First Belorussian Front on 24 June, the LRA formations participated in the air softening up from midnight while the air army night bombers operated from 0230 hours until dawn. The LRA raided basically the objectives in the second enemy defensive zone and the air army aviation in the first.

The Soviet Army Command endeavored to use the LRA formations in a massed manner in conducting the air softening up. The LRA formations operated in the sector of the main thrust. For example, on the Third Belorussian Front, the I, VI and VII Air Corps made 100 percent of the sorties in the zone of the pending advance by the 11th Guards Army while in the Second Belorussian Front the II Guards, V and VI Air Corps operated in the zone of the 49th Army.¹⁵ In certain operations the LRA bombers in the course of the air softening up had to operate against objectives that were directly next to the forward edge. This was the case, for example, during the night of 23 June 1944 prior to the start of the Vitebsk-Orsha and Mogilev Front operations conducted within the Belorussian Operation. In the course of them, individual objectives were destroyed 1,000-1,200 m away from our troops.¹⁶ In these instances, light and radio guidance were organized for the purpose of dependably reaching the target and to avoid hitting our own troops. For this purpose in the Leningrad-Novgorod, Belorussian, East Prussian, Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations, light beacons, flares, bonfires, searchlights and motor vehicle headlights were employed to form illuminated corridors and an illuminated "T." Searchlight beams indicated the direction to the objective. The forward edge of our troops was marked by signal rockets and by the firing of tracer bullets.

After the publishing in the spring of 1944 of the draft Regulation on Breaking Through Positional Defenses, in addition to immediate softening up preliminary air softening up also began to be carried out involving the LRA formations (the Vyborg and East Prussian operations). Thus, in storming the fortress city of Koenigsberg, preliminary air softening up was carried out on 4 and 5 April 1945, that is, 2 days prior to the start of the final assault. The long-range and frontal aviation conducted 766 aircraft sorties to destroy fortifications and neutralize the strong-points and artillery.

As a total during the operations of the third period of the war only 1,751 aircraft sorties were spent on air softening up.¹⁷

In comparison with air softening up, the combat operations of the long-range aviation assumed a broader scope for air support of the troops. For this purpose during the third period of the war some 10,652 aircraft sorties were made.¹⁸ During this period of the air offensive characteristic of operations by the LRA formations was the massing of forces on the main sector. For example, in the air support for troops in the Berlin Operation all the LRA air corps were involved in the interests of the First Belorussian Front.¹⁹

During the course of the air support the basic objectives of the raids were the defensive works, centers of resistance, artillery positions and troop and military equipment concentrations in the tactical defensive zone. For this reason a maximum number of sorties (81 percent) conducted by the LRA during the third period of the war was carried out at a depth from 1 to 20 km from the forward edge against reserves approaching the battlefield and just 19 percent of the raids were at a depth of from 20 to 30 km.

Air support by the LRA forces was basically provided at night (90 percent of all the sorties) and more rarely in the day (10 percent of the sorties). In the course of an operation the intensity of support varied. It was highest during the first 3 or 4 days of an offensive. For example, in the Leningrad-Novgorod Operation 32 percent

of all the sorties made on air support during the operation were carried out in the first 3 or 4 days, 43 percent in the Belorussian Operation and 58 percent in the Berlin Operation.²⁰ In subsequent days the intensity of air support declined sharply, since the ground troops, as a rule, had reached open space and the LRA formations began to disrupt the operation of the rail and motor lines.

As was already pointed out, a concentrated raid made by a division or corps was the most widespread method of LRA combat operations. But massed raids were also employed. Thus, in the storming of Koenigsberg on 7 April 1945, a massed raid was used involving 514 LRA long distance bombers. Since this raid was made in the day, at 1310 hours, the bomber operations were supported by 232 fighters.²² In the Berlin Operation a massed raid was made by the entire LRA fighting strength 18 minutes before dawn on 16 April 1945.²³ In periods between the concentrated and massed raids and particularly with bad flying weather, the LRA formations conducted wave combat operations. This was the case, for example, in the Berlin Operation when because of bad weather during the night of 25 April the air support for the troops of the First Belorussian Front in the Berlin suburbs was provided by the LRA formation in waves consisting of subunits.²⁴

To win air superiority in the third period of the war the LRA spent 4,337 aircraft sorties, comprising 6.7 percent of all the aircraft sorties made in the offensive operations of this period. Their proportional amount declined in comparison with the first two periods of the war. In 1941-1943, the LRA formations spent 16,786 combat sorties (12.1 percent of all sorties) on carrying out this mission. The sharp decline in the proportional amount of aircraft sorties for the purposes of winning air superiority occurred because this was now on the side of the Soviet Armed Forces and the prime mission of the LRA was to disrupt the operation of the enemy lines of communications and combat its reserves.

In maintaining air superiority, the LRA destroyed enemy aircraft at airfields, it knocked out runways and air traffic control points, it neutralized air defense weapons and destroyed aviation fuel and ammunition dumps. The most widespread was the destruction of enemy aircraft at airfields. This was responsible for 90 percent of all the aircraft sorties made by the LRA for the purposes of winning air superiority in the third period of the war.²⁵ This made it possible very quickly to cause tangible harm to the enemy. For example, in the southwestern sector the III Guards LRA Air Corps in the course of two nighttime raids on 14 and 15 September 1944 destroyed around 200 aircraft at the airfields of the Budapest air center.²⁶

The LRA, like the frontal aviation, fought the enemy aviation both in the course of daily combat operations as well as during special air operations to destroy (weaken) the enemy air groupings. The former was the basic form of combat. Of the 4,337 aircraft sorties made by the LRA in 1944-1945, just 1,472 aircraft sorties, or 33.5 percent, had to be made for winning air superiority in the course of the air operations, while the remaining 66.5 percent of the aircraft sorties were made in the course of the daily combat operations.²⁷

The LRA conducted an air operation at full strength, for example, during the preparatory period of the Belorussian Strategic Operation from 13 through 18 June 1944. This was carried out upon a decision of HqSHC to weaken the enemy air grouping concentrated at the Belorussian airfields. Raids were to be made against eight

airfields where air reconnaissance had detected around 850 enemy aircraft.²⁸ The frontal aviation was not to be involved in this operation since for the purposes of operational camouflaging it was basically based at airfields distant from the front line. As a total during four nights (13, 14, 15 and 18 June) some 1,472 aircraft sorties were made and four massed raids were carried out each involving five or six LRA corps. One corps operated, as a rule, against one airfield.²⁹ The zone of coverage was 100-150 km in depth and up to 500 km along the front.

The involvement of the LRA air formations in *transport operations of personnel, weapons, ammunition, fuel and medicines in the interests of the front troops* was a compulsory measure necessitated by a number of factors: *in the first place*, by the insufficient capability of the ground types of transport to promptly supply the troops in offensive operations conducted at a high speed to a great depth, also under the conditions of the spring and autumn mud; *secondly*, by the lack of special air transports on the fronts (one or two LI-2 regiments).

The LRA formations, as a rule, began transport operations on the fourth-seventh day of an operation, when the troops had moved a significant distance away from the supply depots. Most often these were carried out in the interests of the front mobile groups which had a higher momentum of advance. For example, the LRA formations provided great help to the mobile troops in the course of the operation to liberate the Right Bank Ukraine. Under the conditions of the springtime mud, ground transport was unable to deliver fuel and ammunition to the advancing 3d Guards, 4th and 6th Tank armies. In March-April 1944, the LRA formations carried out 2,019 aircraft sorties for these formations, they transported 2,249 tons of ammunition, 1,316 tons of fuel and 3,130 soldiers and officers and evacuated 3,188 wounded.³⁰

A significant lag of the rear bodies behind the mobile troops occurred in the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder operations. By the sixth or seventh day of the Vistula-Oder Operation the front rear services lagged 100-200 km behind the mobile troops. Ground transport was unable to supply the rapidly advancing troops with the needed amount of fuel and ammunition. In the Belorussian Operation the VI and VII LRA Air Corps carried out 2,822 aircraft sorties for the mobile troops in July-August 1944 and delivered to the troops 1,209.1 tons of fuel, 1,394.3 tons of ammunition and 1,269 tons of other cargo. In addition, 12,200 military personnel were transported and 1,659 wounded evacuated.³¹

For air reconnaissance the LRA formations used just 2.2 percent of the aircraft sorties. Strategic reconnaissance was conducted by them to a depth of 500-600 km and operational to 350 km. Special sorties for air reconnaissance purposes were carried out by the best trained crews while the remainder were made incidentally to carrying out other missions.

Thus, the LRA formations took a rather active part in the strategic offensive operations during the third period of the war. This weakened the enemy defenses, it put it in a difficult position for regrouping troops and shifting reserves and caused it to base its aviation a significant distance away from the front line thereby reducing air operations.

In order to reduce losses from enemy fighters, ordinarily the LRA operated at night and at altitudes exceeding the effective limit for antiaircraft fire. During the

day, only transport operations were carried out and in exceptional instances massed raids were made under a fighter cover.

In the employment of the LRA formations during the offensive operations of the third period of the war, it is possible to trace a number of trends: *in the first place*, increased combat capabilities; *secondly*, an increased scale of involving air formations in offensive operations; *thirdly*, massed use in the major sectors of ground troop operations; *fourthly*, an increased number of aircraft sorties for carrying out its most intrinsic task, that is, disrupting enemy lines of communications. At the same time, the LRA formations continued to be very widely employed for destroying enemy troops and military equipment in the tactical defensive zone and here the raids were made close to the forward edge so that the ground troops could immediately make use of their result. The methods of LRA operations were continuously improved.

The experience of the involvement of the LRA formations in the offensive operations of the third period has not lost its significance at present.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 39, inv. 11519, file 1095, sheets 1, 120.
- 2 Estimated by the authors from TsAMO materials, holdings of the LRA formations.
- 3 Estimated by the authors from TsAMO materials, holdings of the LRA formations.
- 4 TsAMO, folio 39, inv. 11519, file 1089, sheet 5.
- 5 Ibid., file 1089, sheets 56-61.
- 6 Ibid., file 1081, sheet 60.
- 7 Ibid., file 1080, sheets 87, 142-150; file 1081, sheets 8, 9.
- 8 Ibid., inv. 72286, file 2, sheet 467.
- 9 Ibid., folio 480, inv. 7106, file 214, sheets 8-10.
- 10 Ibid., folio 18 VA, inv. 7106, file 207, sheets 95, 96.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Ibid., folio 39, inv. 11519, file 1080, sheet 148.
- 13 Estimated by the authors from TsAMO materials, holdings of the LRA formations.
- 14 TsAMO, folio 39, inv. 11519, file 873, sheets 1-12.
- 15 Ibid., sheets 7, 8.

- 17 Ibid., file 1084, sheet 21; file 1080, sheets 4-151; file 1088, sheets 13-27.
- 18 Estimated by the authors from TsAMO materials, holdings of the LRA formations.
- 19 TsAMO, folio 35, inv. 11285, file 1333, sheets 21, 22.
- 20 Estimated by the authors from TsAMO materials, holdings of the LRA formations.
- 21 [Not in text]
- 22 M. N. Kozhevnikov, "Komandovaniye i shtab VVS Sovetskoy Armii v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1977, p 205.
- 23 TsAMO, folio 35, inv. 11285, file 1333, sheet 19.
- 24 Ibid., folio 18 VA, inv. 7106, file 207, sheets 100, 101.
- 25 Estimated by the authors from TsAMO materials, holdings of the LRA formations.
- 26 "Soverskiye Voenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [The Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Voenizdat, 1968, p 344.
- 27 Estimated by the authors from TsAMO materials, holdings of the LRA formations.
- 28 TsAMO, folio 35, inv. 283248, file 6, sheets 32-41; folio 39, inv. 11519, file 1080, sheet 7.
- 29 Ibid., folio 35, inv. 283248, file 6, sheets 32-41.
- 30 Ibid., folio 39, inv. 11519, file 1080, sheet 40.
- 31 Ibid., folio 368, inv. 6508, file 80, sheet 399.

COPYRIGHT: "Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

WARTIME OPERATIONS: ANTITANK ARTILLERY REGIMENT IN MOSCOW BATTLE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 37-42

[Article published under the heading "Skill and Heroism" by Col (Ret) N. Medvedev: "The 289th Antitank Artillery Regiment in the Battles on the Approaches to Volokolamsk"]

[Text] October 1941. Regardless of enormous casualties, the Nazi troops were driving headlong toward our capital. This was understandable. Hitler had declared to the entire world that on 7 November he would review a parade of Nazi troops on Red Square.

For the Soviet troops around Moscow the situation at this time was severely bad. By the middle of October, the Nazis had succeeded in reaching the distant approaches to the city. Fierce, bloody battles broke out on the basic arteries leading to the capital.

In the Volokolamsk sector, the forward detachments of Nazi troops on 16 October were approaching Bolychevo Sovkhoz (25 km to the south of Volokolamsk station) and attacked the antitank strongpoint created here by a rifle company from the 1075th Rifle Regiment and a battery from the 525 ap PTO [antitank artillery regiment] (Diagram 1). Twice during the day the enemy numbering up to 60 tanks and a motorized infantry battalion, with active air support, endeavored to break through in this sector, but without success.

On the next day, in outflanking the antitank strongpoints at Bolychevo Sovkhoz and Fedos'ino, the enemy began a drive against Ostashevo.

In order to halt the enemy's advance, the commander of the 316th Rifle Division, Gen I. V. Panfilov, moved up into the area of Ostashevo two batteries of the 768 ap PTO and his own antitank reserve, the 296 ap PTO, where they created a new antitank area.

In line with the difficult situation which had developed to the south of Volokolamsk, the command of the 16th Army by 19 October had moved up to this sector its own antitank reserve, the 289 ap PTO, for reinforcing the antitank defenses of the 316th Rifle Division. The 289 ap PTO was located on the southern edge of the town along with four rocket battalions.




Diagram 1. Combat operations in the Volokolamsk sector, 16-18 October

Key: a--60 tanks of motorized infantry battalion; b--Up to 100 tanks and motorized infantry battalion; c--100 tanks to a motorized infantry regiment.

caliber antiaircraft artillery] battery of Sr Lt V. V. Kutukov. The latter had been given two missions, to cover the regiment's disposition against enemy aviation and in the event of a breakthrough by enemy tanks, to fight them. The regiment's command post was located in the Spass-Ryukhovskoye church.

All the battery guns had close fire coordination and in the event of necessity could overlap with their fire the arcs of fire of the adjacent guns. Each battery was assigned a basic and additional arc of fire. In order not to give away the antitank

The regiment's commander, Maj N. K. Yefremenko (the Regiment Commissar, Battalion Commissar S. F. Nemirov) received the mission from the chief of army artillery, Maj Gen Arty V. I. Kazakov, to occupy a disposition in the region of Spass-Ryukhovskoye, to create an antitank area there and to prevent the Nazi tanks from breaking through to Volokolamsk. The intelligence group which included the regiment's commander, the staff officers and battery commanders with scouts immediately set off for the designated area. The gun subunits soon were stretched out behind it.

By evening the intelligence group had arrived in Spass-Ryukhovskoye. During the remaining daylight, the regiment's commander, together with the battery commanders, conducted reconnaissance. Upon his decision, the regiment organized its disposition in two echelons (see Diagram 2), covering the basic tank approaches.¹

On the right flank, somewhat to the west of Spass-Ryukhovskoye were the positions of the third battery under Sr Lt D. K. Kapatsyn, covering the road from Milovan'ye. To the south of Spass-Ryukhovskoye were deployed the guns of the first battery under the command of Lt A. P. Arkad'yev. Nearby, covering the highway from Ostashevo to Spass-Ryukhovskoye were the gun positions of the fifth battery under Sr Lt A. I. Belyakov. On the left flank, by the bridge across the Voloshnya, were the positions of the gun crews of the second battery commanded by Lt L. A. Shipnevskiy. In the second echelon, to the southeast of Spass-Ryukhovskoye were the guns of the fourth battery of Sr Lt S. P. Siromakha and on the northern outskirts of this population point, covering the road to Volokolamsk, was the sixth MZA [small




Diagram 2. The organization of antitank defenses in Spass-Ryukhovskoye

fire plan prematurely, the regiment's commander ordered the first, third and fifth batteries to move one gun 250-300 m in front. These were to counter the reconnaissance and lone enemy tanks from temporary firing positions.

The artillery troops worked all night long, equipping their positions. The recent previous rains impeded the work. But, regardless of this, by morning the crews had dug and carefully camouflaged good gun pits, shelters for the guns, niches for shells, deep narrow slit trenches as well as dugouts for the personnel. The gun tractors were hidden in the forest.

The regiment's staff established radio and telephone contact with all the batteries. In the batteries telephone communications were set up between the platoons and with the guns assigned as ambushes, uniform signals were arranged and the possible variations clarified for controlling the regiment's fire along the various channels and sectors.

During the night of 19 October, the enemy at a price of great losses (25 tanks) crossed the Ruza River and took Ostashevo. Early in the morning of 19 October, Gen I. V. Panfilov arrived in Ryukhovskoye followed by the commander of the 16th Army, Lt Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy and the army artillery chief, Gen V. I. Kazakov. The subunits of the 1075th Rifle Regiment and the 296 ap PTO pulled back here from Ostashevo.

Maj Yefremenko reported to the commander that the regiment was ready for battle. When Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy was personally assured that communications were functioning with all the batteries and the regiment's commander could control the subunits, he ordered Gen Panfilov the subunits of the 1075th Rifle Regiment occupying the defenses to the south of Spass-Ryukhovskoye as well as a combat engineer platoon to be switched to the command of the commander of the 289 ap PTO, Maj Yeremenko, so as to more securely cover the positions of the antitank artillery. The experience of recent engagements had showed that often the artillery subunits were left without an infantry cover and for this reason suffered high casualties from enemy submachine gun fire.

In the morning the Nazis endeavored to exploit the success. Out in front of the first and fifth batteries there appeared 11 tanks and up to an infantry company. Having assessed the situation, the regiment's commander decided to repel the tack by the reconnaissance group using the firing of the guns from the temporary positions. The crews boldly engaged the enemy tanks in a duel. After the first rounds one tank burst into flame and two were hit. Being rebuffed, the enemy tanks and infantry turned back.

On 20 October the artillery troops again drove off several attacks. During one of them three tanks broke through to the firing position of the second battery and began to "flatten out" the trenches. Seemingly everything was still outside. But when the crew of one of the tanks opened the hatch (two others had moved forward and were blown up by the regiment's scouts) and crawled out of the tank, the artillery troops destroyed it. The battery personnel did not have any casualties as the narrow but deep and well-equipped trenches and slit trenches were good protection against the enemy tanks.

On 21 October, the Nazis undertook a reconnaissance in force in a new sector, from the area of Milovan'ye. Up to a battalion of infantry with 17 tanks endeavored to break through to Spass-Ryukhovskoye from the southwest. This attack was repelled by the crews of the first and third batteries in close cooperation with the subunits of 2/1075 Rifle Regiment. Encountering a decisive rebuff here and losing 5 tanks, the enemy retreated. It was obvious that the attacks with small forces from different directions were aimed at feeling out the defenses and reconnoitering the weak points.

After the battle, Maj Yefremenko and the battalion commissar Nemirov visited the firing positions of the batteries which had distinguished themselves. Regardless of the late hour, the men were still not asleep and they were all excitedly discussing the outcome of the engagement. The morale of the soldiers and sergeants, although they were engaged in heavy defensive battles, was high and the mood a fighting one. One notion stayed with literally all of them and gave them no rest, that is, not to allow the enemy to reach Moscow.

The communists and agitators in the batteries held talks with the personnel. Using the example of the just passed engagements they showed that the much-praised Nazi tanks burned well when hit by the accurate fire of the artillery troops and it was merely necessary to know their vulnerable points and hit these accurately.

For 2 days the Nazis did not show any special activity. Using this pause, the commander of the 316th Rifle Division created three strong antitank areas in the Ostashevo--Volokolamsk sector, one in Spass-Ryukhovskoye (the 289 ap PTO), Ryukhovskoye (the 296 ap PTO) and in the area of Kholstikovo and Volokolamsk station (two batteries of the 768 ap PTO), having significantly increased the density of the antitank weapons and the depth of the antitank defenses here. To the west of Volokolamsk station, in the area of Vysokovo, Chubarovo and Chukhlovo (off the diagram), an antitank area was created using the forces of the 525 ap PTO.²

In assuming that decisive engagements would start on the morning of 25 October, Maj Yefremenko assembled the battery commanders and clarified their missions. He ordered that they intensify reconnaissance, that each gun should have 100 rounds each and that all the batteries should have a duty crew during the night directly next to the guns. He also gave the location of the regiment's alternative command post.

At 0200 hours, the regiment's personnel, upon the commander's orders, took their places at the observation posts, by the guns and in the trenches with the rear supplies being hidden in the forest.

The enemy attack was preceded by a brief but powerful artillery softening up. However, the shelling did not cause great harm as the men and materiel of the batteries were in safe shelters and only the spotters followed the enemy's actions. Immediately after the end of the shelling, enemy aviation appeared. Groups of 25-40 aircraft continuously bombed the regiment's disposition in waves every 10-20 minutes. Having dropped their bombload, the Junkers-88 dove and fired their machine guns at the forward defensive edge. The regiment's antiaircraft battery engaged the aviation. One aircraft was shot down and two damaged.

The enemy aviation was still "hovering" over Spass-Ryukhovskoye when a tank column numbering up to 80 tanks emerged from the woods to the north of Ostashevo and deployed into battle formation. The heavy tanks with submachine gunners advanced in front followed by the medium and light tanks. Infantry marched erect in the spaces between.

When the tanks were 400-500 m from the firing positions, the batteries, upon the command of the regiment's commander, simultaneously opened fire with armor-piercing shells. The crews used shrapnel against the infantry. The first enemy attack was halted. Its battle formations became ragged and having lost 8 tanks, the enemy retreated to the initial position.

At noon, having regrouped their forces, the Nazi troops resumed the offensive. In the center were up to 50 tanks while on the flanks, to envelop the antitank area from the west and east there advanced two groups of 70-80 tanks each with infantry and cavalry. But this combined attack was also successfully driven off.

The men of all the batteries fought bravely showing intrepidity, endurance and cool-headedness. When on the left flank up to 15 tanks showed up in the rear of the fourth battery, the crews upon the command of Sr Lt Siromakha opened fire at the tanks from ranges of 400-500 m and caused serious harm to the enemy. Thus, the commander of the first gun Sgt Kalinin and gunner Radchenko with 10 rounds hit 5 tanks. The sergeant was wounded but continued in command until the gun was hit directly by an enemy shell.

Six tanks managed to break into the battery's firing position and began to "flatten it out." One of them halted over the foxhole in which the crew of Sgt Kalinin had taken shelter. Another tank crawled over the shelter in which the battery commissar, the political instructor Gus'kov, was with several men. When the tank halted, Sr Lt Siromakha stood up in the adjacent trench and threw a grenade under its tracks. The tankmen jumped out of the hatches of the burning tank but they did not succeed in escaping. A gun from the adjacent fifth battery opened fire against the tanks which had broken into the position of the fourth battery.

The duel between the artillery men and the tanks lasted several hours. The battlefield was cloaked in dust and smoke. In various places tongues of flames and columns of black smoke lit the sky. These were the enemy tanks in flames. But the regiment's batteries also suffered high casualties. When one of the guns fell silent in the third battery, Sr Lt Kapatsyn sent a messenger there, the commander of the signals squad P. D. Stemasov. It turned out that only the gunner R. I. Neronov remained of the gun crew and the rest had perished. The gun's carriage was covered with dirt and the panorama was broken. By this time the tractor driver G. M. Chobotov had made his way to the gun. Together Stemasov and Chobotov began to dig out the gun while Neronov ran to the shelter where the tractors were as there was a spare panorama there.

But the tanks were nearly upon the battery. Something had to be done. Then Stemasov decided to fire against the tanks aiming the gun by the barrel. The first round exploded not far from the tank. The second hit the target and the tank burst into flames. The success gave them confidence. Soon the gunner had crawled back to the gun with the spare panorama. The three brave men hit another 7 tanks.

In the second half of the day, the enemy, after fierce air bombing, with large tank and infantry forces, in bypassing Spass-Ryukhovskoye attacked Ryukhovskoye where the 296 ap PTO of Capt N. S. Aleshkin was.

The batteries of the 289 ap PTO were fighting now in an encirclement. The enemy attacked Spass-Ryukhovskoye not only from the front but also from the rear and from the side of Ivlevo and Dubosekovo. Regardless of the high casualties, the artillerymen continued to hold the occupied line although the situation was critical. In the fifth battery all the guns had been hit or crushed by tanks while the second and fourth ones had one gun each. The other subunits had also suffered heavy losses.

Only late in the evening did the enemy succeed in breaking into Spass-Ryukhovskoye. Under the cover of darkness, and benefiting from the fact that there was not a solid front line, the battery's personnel began to make their way out of the encirclement through the forests.

The enemy succeeded in taking Spass-Ryukhovskoye at a price of heavy casualties. During the heroic but uneven battle, just the artillery troops of Maj Yefremenko during the period from 19 through 25 October destroyed 59 enemy tanks, 2 infantry battalions, 3 aircraft and up to a cavalry platoon.³

For steadfastness and courage shown in the battles of Spass-Ryukhovskoye, the 289 ap PTO was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Over 120 men of the regiment received governmental decorations for the courage and heroism shown and for high military skills.

The decorations were presented to the artillerymen by the army commander, Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy, who personally had observed their duel with the enemy tanks.

The personnel of the 289 ap PTO also distinguished itself in repelling the November offensive by the Nazi troops against Moscow as well as in the counteroffensive.

For courage shown in the battles against the Nazi invaders at Moscow, for steadfastness, valor, discipline, organization and mass heroism, several antitank artillery regiments on 8 January 1942 were transformed into guards units. The 289 ap PTO became the First Guards Antitank Artillery Regiment.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ The 289 ap PTO was organized (as was the 296 ap PTO) during the first days of October 1941 on the basis of the 636 Antitank Artillery Regiment of the Ninth Artillery Antitank Brigade. The basic core of the regiment's personnel was regular commanders and Red Armymen. In the heavy defensive battles of the first month of the war they gained rich experience in combating Nazi tanks and infantry (Shyauliyay, Riga, Ostrov, Kholm, Porkhov and Staraya Russa). According to the TOE the regiment had five antitank batteries and one antiaircraft battery (20 76-mm cannons and 4 37-mm MZA cannons) (TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 1, inv. 975, file 1, sheet 15).

² TsAMO SSSR, folio 1, inv. 975, file 1, sheet 101.

³ Ibid., sheet 17.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

WARTIME OPERATIONS: ANTITANK ARTILLERY REGIMENT ACTIONS NEAR MOSCOW

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 43-48

[Article published under the heading "Memoirs" by Col (Ret) P. Varganistov*: "On the Approaches to the Capital"]

[Text] At the start of October 1941, the 509th Antitank Artillery Regiment [ptap] received orders to move to Gzhatsk where it would come under the command of the troop group commander, Gen Shcherbakov.

We arrived at the designated area near evening. The regiment's commander, Lt Col Gerasimov, in accord with the instructions of Gen Shcherbakov issued orders to the battalion commanders to take up their firing positions. The first battalion of Maj I. D. Kozhevnikov was deployed to the north of the intersection of the Moscow--Minsk highway and the Yukhnov road, the 3d Battalion under Lt N. P. Stasyuk took up a firing position by the crossroads while the 2d Battalion of Capt N. S. Marchenko was deployed along the Yukhnov road at the village of Nikol'skiy.

A training brigade was holding the defenses in this sector. Lt Col V. A. Gerasimov immediately established contact with its commander, Col Tomashevskiy. They agreed on the joint rebuffing of the enemy attack.

The regiment's personnel, without wasting time, began to equip the firing positions. Everyone worked at full force, as they understood that the Nazis could appear at any minute.

In fact, in the morning of 8 October, the enemy conducted an offensive against Gzhatsk simultaneously from two sides: from the southwest along the highway and from the south along the Yukhnov road. At mid-day enemy aircraft appeared over the battlefield. For more than an hour they bombed the battalion of officer candidates and Marchenko's battalion. It seemed that no one remained alive there.

"Report your situation!" requested the regiment's command post of Capt Marchenko.

*During the described period, P. P. Varganistov was the first assistant chief of staff of the 509th Antitank Artillery Regiment.

"The Nazis are crawling in a frenzy," replied the battalion commander. "The officer candidates are fighting courageously but under the pressure of superior forces they have been forced to retreat. There are casualties in the batteries. However, we are still holding the positions."

"Watch your flanks as they are exposed."

The situation had heated up on the highway. The enemy had begun to cross the Gzhat' River near the Voronova Settlement. Here were the firing positions of the battalion under Lt Stasyuk. We were aware of the testing the subunit would be put to. But we also knew that Stasyuk would be able to give the enemy its due although he was the youngest battalion commander. He quickly figured out the situation, he took bold decisions and tenaciously carried them out. A group of nine Ju-87 divebombers and two ME-110 fighters made a bomb attack against the battalion and strafed it with machine gun fire. The gun of Sgt I. S. Bessudnyy was closest of all to the crossing. Having noted that many enemy troops and military equipment had accumulated by the river, the gun opened up with intense fire. The Nazis moved back from the crossing but they sent several tanks and up to a platoon of submachine gunners to outflank Bessudnyy's gun. The antitank troops detected their maneuver on time. The battery commander moved the gun of Sgt A. A. Frankovich up to meet them. Having taken up a good position, the crew with the second round destroyed the head tank and forced the others to take shelter behind a hill. At this time aircraft appeared. Bombing started. One of the bombs struck 5 m away from the Frankovich weapon. A fire broke out. The flames had almost reached the artillery troops. It was hard to breathe. However, they continued firing against the Nazi submachine gunners attacking the gun. Ammunition ran out. The crew switched to their personal weapons.

The battle was becoming evermore heated. One after another alarming reports arrived at the regimental command post. Casualties were increasing in the batteries. They were running out of ammunition. The enemy had wedged deeply into the regiment's disposition. Already several batteries were fighting fully surrounded. At the village of Alekseyevka, the Nazis had attacked from the rear the gun crew of Sgt L. A. Ryzhov from the eighth battery of Lt A. A. Taranenko. The weapon had destroyed 3 tanks and up to 50 enemy soldiers and officers. The brutal enemy over the bodies of their own soldiers rushed at the men remaining alive.

Lt Col Gerasimov took the decision to bring the regiment out of the planned encirclement and deploy it to the east of Gzhatsk. Regardless of the difficult situation, all the surviving crews succeeded by common effort in moving to the new positions.

On the morning of 9 October, the enemy broke into Gzhatsk and began moving toward the positions of our regiment. We engaged in combat. Fighting along with us were the officer candidates from the training brigade and groups of soldiers and commanders from other units which had broken out of the encirclement. The artillerymen stood till their death. The second battery of Lt G. Kozlovskiy fought to the last man in being crushed by at least 150 Nazis. Our soldiers drove off the enemy in any possible way. During this battle the deputy political instructor and member of the party bureau M. G. Mayboroda particularly distinguished himself. When the enemy had begun to besiege the battery, he, shouting: "Friends, do not surrender to the beasts!" fired away from his light machine gun at the Nazis attacking from the rear.

The communist's example inspired the men. They mowed down the Nazis with their accurate fire. But Mayboroda's machine gun fell silent. The deputy political instructor was killed. Under a hail of bullets Sgt P. P. Kozlov made his way to him. The machine gun came alive but not for long. A German bullet also cut down the courageous sergeant.

Virtually the entire battery perished. Miraculously Lt Kozlovskiy remained alive. He lay at the bottom of a foxhole unconscious until the morning of the following day when the medical orderlies reached him.

During the second half of the day, when the regiment's situation already seemed hopeless, tanks appeared on the highway from Mozhaysk.

"Friendly! Friendly!" shouted the men joyously, greeting the tank troops by firing into the air. It was the 18th Tank Brigade of Lt Col A. F. Druzhinin. It entered battle without a halt. Here is what the chief of the brigade's political section, Sr Battalion Commissar B. I. Zakharov, wrote about this:

"09 Oct 1941. The 18th Tank Brigade...entered a meeting engagement with enemy units that were reinforced by tanks and motorized infantry.... In this battle the tank troops and motorized infantry from the brigade along with the artillery troops of the 509th ptab destroyed up to 400 enemy soldiers and officers, 10 tanks, 4 anti-tank guns, 2 mortar batteries and several armored vehicles."¹

Having encountered unexpectedly strong resistance, the enemy slowed its drive. For 2 days the regiment, cooperating with the other units, checked the advance of the crack SS units. A short breathing space ensued. The enemy needed this for regrouping its forces. As was later learned, it had brought up against our regiment and the 18th Tank Brigade the basic forces of the 10th Tank Division and the Motorized SS Division Reich, intending to destroy us in the morning of the following day and open up the road to Mozhaysk. However, the Nazi plans were not to be realized. During the night of 11 October, we and the tank troops, upon the orders of the senior chief retreated to the following line toward the Mozhaysk defensive line and the enemy strike was made against empty ground. But it quickly realized its error. Its reconnaissance established our positions and soon again we were driving off Nazi attacks. The fifth battery of Lt Yu. T. Bereznyak fought skillfully. Several tanks were closing in on its position. They were traveling at a high speed, firing the guns and machine guns. The artillery troops did not flinch. The gun commander, Sgt T. S. Ivoylov, calmly chose the target and gave the command "Fire."

The crew worked quickly and smoothly. The round roared. The enemy tank burst into flames from the direct hit. Hesitation arose among the attackers. This was used by Sgt Ivoylov to shift fire from one tank to another. With an accurate round the next tank went up in flames. The same fate befell the third tank.

The other crews also fired accurately. The attack was driven off. Then the Junkers attacked Ivoylov's gun. With a direct bomb hit they destroyed the cannon and the crew. This was a great loss.

By the end of the day it had become clear that although the enemy had not driven us out of the occupied positions, it had been able to feel out our exposed flanks and

began to outflank them, threatening the regiment and brigade with complete encirclement. Considering the existing situation, the commanders of the tank brigade and our 509th ptab decided to take up a better defensive line. During the night of 12 October, the tank troops straddled the highway to the south of Uvarovka and we took up firing positions along the highway from the village of Kundasovo to the village of Yel'nya stringing ourselves out into a line several kilometers long.

The plan of Lt Col Gerasimov was a bold one. Small groups of enemy submachinegunners could freely outflank each weapon and fire on the crews. But he consciously accepted this risk. On the one hand, the lieutenant colonel knew enemy tactics well and on the other he firmly believed in the high qualities of his men.

"We have few forces but the enemy is brazen," said the regiment commander. "It will push along the highway in order to take the Mozhaysk defensive line more quickly as this is not completely held by our troops. Of course there is a risk. A big one. But in war a risk is inevitable, particularly a sound one. In this instance the risk is justified."

Party meetings were held in the unit's subunits and here the difficulty of the pending missions was explained to the men. The best soldiers submitted applications to join the party. The gun commander, Sgt Osepyan, wrote in his application:

"I am ready to give up my life for the motherland. I will fight, as a communist, to my last drop of blood. I will be loyal to the motherland to my last breath."

The morning of 12 October arrived. The command observation post had a good view of the enemy occupied terrain. Lt Col Gerasimov examined it carefully using his binoculars. Next to him stood the chief of staff, Capt N. I. Kaminskiy.

"It looks like things are about to start, Nikolay Ignat'yevich [Kaminskiy]," murmured Gerasimov, pointing out to Kaminskiy a column of German soldiers which appeared far off.

"Yes, it is starting. There can be no doubt." The captain bent down to the telephone operator sitting in a small foxhole and ordered: "Transmit to everyone. Enemy tanks and motorized infantry advancing along highway. Prepare for battle. Take decision to open fire independently."

The enemy column without halting began to deploy into approach march formations. At the same instant we heard the roar of rockets. This was a salvo from the battalion of Capt K. D. Karsanov which had just arrived on the forward edge. Making fiery arcs in the sky, the rockets hit in the midst of the enemy. A column of smoke rose into the sky and the earth shook. The salvo seemed successful. The enemy halted for a moment. But it again resumed its rapid advance. The enemy artillery began to speak. Hundreds of rounds fell on us. Enemy aircraft appeared in the sky. Under their cover, the tanks, armored personnel carriers and motorcyclists rushed forward. Our guns struck. The battlefield was covered by a deafening roar.

Soon thereafter everyone who was at the regiment's command-observation post, including the commander and the chief of staff, were cut off. In retreating under the heavy small arms and machine gun fire, they lost contact with one another and made their way east in groups of two or three men.

The regiment's battalions were in a difficult situation. Regardless of the lack of control, they continued to fight the enemy courageously. A Nazi tank moving at the head of the advancing enemy tanks bore down on the gun of Lt V. N. Donchenko. But an accurate round stopped it. With its broken tracks it became stuck in a ditch. The second round, like a razor, cut the gun turret off the next tank. Behind it came armored personnel carriers. Deprived of cover, they braked sharply and moved into a group. Donchenko, benefiting from the enemy's mistake, sent several rounds there. Two vehicles immediately burst into flames. The Nazis jumped out of them and saved themselves by fleeing. Aircraft hurried up to help the tanks. The Junkers attacked Donchenko's gun and hit it.

The Nazis moved forward. But now they were met by the gun of Lt F. I. Podgornyy. Its firing was accurate. One enemy tank and then a second was hit. Enemy aircraft circled over the gun.

The steel flow of enemy vehicles rolled on but in a low area by the bridge, near the village of Yel'nya, it was met by the two guns of Lt M. I. Mel'nikov. There came the command:

"At the Nazi tanks, fire!"

The gun crew members worked efficiently. The eye of the gunner was good and his hand firm. The first tank burst into flame and then the second while the third came to a stop with its turret askew.... The remainder did not stand the devastating fire but turned back and sought shelter behind natural obstacles.

The enemy attack was stopped. Our artillery and tank troops did not allow it on the move to break into this sector of the Mozhaysk defensive line.

During the second half of the day of 12 October, the German command again threw its troops into an offensive along the highway. Only now at Yel'nya village they encountered not individual guns and tanks and not small infantry subunits but rather the units of the full-strength 32d Rifle Division of Col V. I. Polosukhin which had reached this line.

By the evening of 12 October, the regiment was concentrated in an area to the east of Artemka. It was ordered to sight under the commander of the 5th Army.

During the night of 14 October, we took up the defensive in the region of Vereya--Simbukhovo. On the following day we received an order to return one battalion to the highway. The battalion of Maj Kozhevnikov consisting of just five guns was sent there, to the population points of B. Sokolovo, Kukuyevka, Myza and Mal. Pangerki. The other battalions also numbered five cannons each. Thus, the regiment had just 15 guns. Clearly not enough. But at that time this was also a force.

During the night of 16 October, the Germans went over to the offensive. Our troops put up stubborn resistance. But under the pressure of the superior enemy forces, they were forced to retreat. On 18 October, Mozhaysk and Vereya fell.

The highway was covered by subunits from the 17th Rifle Regiment, the detachment of Maj P. I. Vorob'yev, the 18th Tank Brigade with just five tanks remaining and the

battalion of Maj Kozhevnikov. To the south, along the Protva River from Borisovo to Miyayev, units of the 50th Rifle Division and the battalion of Capt Marchenko were on the defensive. The army's left flank was covered by subunits from the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the battalion of Lt Stasyuk with the battery assigned to him from this brigade.

The continuous battles against superior enemy forces, the mud and cold did not shake the fighting spirit of the men. We vowed not to spare our lives in fighting the enemy, we promised to stop it and were loyal to our vow.

In fighting on the army's left flank, the battalion of Lt Stasyuk became surrounded. Having learned that three of our tanks and two guns from the battalion of Capt Marchenko were waiting in ambush at the village of Golovenka, Stasyuk boldly led all three batteries from his battalion into a breakthrough movement. The enemy, unable to withstand the pressure, retreated and thereby was caught between the Stasyuk and Marchenko battalions. In causing great damage to the enemy, the subunits linked up.

On 26 October, the situation reached a peak. In certain areas of the army defenses there were no rifle subunits and the battle was waged by individual guns, tank crews and groups of soldiers. But at this time the 82d Urals Motorized Rifle Division under Col G. P. Karamyshev arrived and it had glorious fighting traditions. Without halting it entered battle and in cooperation with the 50th Rifle Division and the 20th, 22d and 25th Tank brigades, it stopped the enemy.²

However, the enemy, having assembled its forces, on 19 November again went over to an offensive on our sector. The roar of hundreds of guns shook the air. Enemy aviation appeared in the skies. The Nazi aircraft dove at the forward defensive edge and dropped bombs. Soon all the terrain had changed beyond recognition. The fields were disfigured by black craters. Wedging ourselves against the walls of the trenches and crouching at the very bottom of foxholes, we waited out the artillery shelling and air raids. A steel vortex of enemy shells and bombs seemingly plowed up the foxholes and communication trenches and destroyed the dugouts and shelters. Time seemed intolerably slow. Finally, the rolling barrage moved into the defenses and we saw right in front of us close extended lines of attacking enemy infantry.

"Battle positions!"

"Guns and sights!" came the commands.

The men rushed to take up their places. The enemy had already broken into the first trench. There was a brief hand-to-hand clash. For every one of our soldiers there were several Nazi soldiers. The Germans rushed the second trench. They were supported by tanks. At a high speed they rushed deep into the defenses, to the artillery firing positions.

Then one of our guns struck, followed by a second and a third. Explosions like a wall blocked the enemy's path. The pace of the attack died sharply but still the enemy made headway.

"They are aiming at the highway!" said Gerasimov and picked up the telephone. "Marchenko, immediately shift Berezhnyak's battery to the hill which is to the west of the village of Akulovo," he ordered the commander of the second battalion.

With the battle in full swing the enemy suddenly turned sharply to the north, toward Boldino, into the flank of the 82d Motorized Rifle Division. There Stasyuk had deployed the seventh battery of Lt A. S. Stupachenko. The Nazis took Boldino and rushed on. The battery immediately engaged in battle. The crew of Sgt I. R. Ivanov hit an armored personnel carrier and shifted its fire to a self-propelled gun. With two rounds the artillerymen knocked it out. The other guns of the battery also fired accurately.

"High explosive!" came the command of Lt Stupachenko.

At a height of 10-15 minutes above the heads of the Nazis, the 85-mm shells exploded causing terrible devastation in their ranks. The enemy wavered and started back.

"Get them! Get them!" shouted our riflemen excitedly in rushing after the fleeing enemy. The field was scattered with Nazi bodies.

The Nazis did not succeed in holding the village. The men of the 82d Motorized Rifle Division broke into Boldino right behind them.

In the evening, having assembled the battalion commanders at the regiment headquarters, Gerasimov analyzed the engagement. In conclusion he said that up to 25 German tanks were concentrated in Vyglyadkovo. Thought had to be given in which direction the enemy would make its next attack. It would scarcely attack Akulovo and Boldino head-on. Most probably the enemy would endeavor to outflank our batteries and hit between the second and third battalions. The streams and swamps had frozen over. Now the sparse forest and brush along the low areas were the most enticing route for the tanks. The enemy had altered its tactics. While previously it fought along roads and for roads, now it could be expected from any direction. We could not cover all the dangerous sectors. And we could not extend the antitank defenses into a line.

After a short pause, the lieutenant colonel said:

"We have consulted with Nikolay Ignat'yevich Kaminskiy and have decided to operate as roving platoons."

Thus was born a new tactical procedure for fighting against enemy tanks. Now we did not passively wait for tank attacks but ourselves sought engagements with them, in guessing the routes of their movement. For a start one gun platoon was assigned from each of the eighth and ninth batteries.

On 20 November at 0700 hours, the first salvo from the enemy was heard and then a storm of explosions descended on our positions, obliterating all living things. The shelling lasted for 3 hours. After this, the enemy artillery shifted its fire in depth. The Nazi infantry went over to the attack. Initially it conducted a frontal offensive against Boldino and then, as we had anticipated, attempted to make its way into our rear over the low areas.

Again the village of Boldino was in Nazi hands. Again Stupachenko's battalion was engaged in battle and after it the batteries of A. A. Taranenko and P. T. Vyachin. Our infantry retreated behind the line of batteries, but it did not go far and lay

down nearby. The third battalion was firing rapidly. The Nazi tanks and infantry were advancing in a broad front. Our guns were firing at the tanks while the rifle subunits were firing at the infantry. It would have been difficult to determine who had destroyed how many tanks in that battle. But three T-4 were immediately destroyed by the gun crew of Jr Sgt N. Ya. Chuykin which was the first to open fire against them. The enemy could not stand the crushing fire of the third battalion and hurriedly turned back. The batteries continued to hit the retreating enemy until it fled in panic.

Being unsuccessful in a frontal attack, the Nazis undertook an outflanking maneuver. Eight German tanks and a company of submachine gunners through the sparse forest endeavored to come out in the rear of Stasyuk's battalion and ended up where Capt Kaminskiy had set the platoon of N. I. Baryshnikov in ambush. Not expecting to encounter resistance here, the Nazis came out in a forested glade and halted. The tank troops coming out of the open hatches calmly inspected the terrain with their binoculars. Then a storm of shells descended on the enemy. The head tank was set afire by the gun of Sgt Zaytsev. The second gun hit the rear tank. In a panic the Nazis rushed about the glade. However not a single tank escaped. The artillery troops also dealt with the submachine gunners. In this battle Lt Baryshnikov was severely wounded.

Each day the battles around Moscow became more and more intense and fierce. The enemy, not counting its losses, drove toward the capital. At the peak of the battles we received the orders: "Immediately disengage and by a forced march move to the area of Aprelevka--Golitsyno and report to the commander of the 33d Army."

During the night we left our positions and at maximum speed, without halting for warming up or resting, we rushed forward. The frost reached 25°. An evil glow of fires covered more than half the horizon. Akulovo, Vasilevskoye, Nikiforovskoye, Yershovo, Aksin'ino and Kozino were on fire. Enroute we learned that the Nazi tank units had broken through from Akulovo to the east and on 2 December took the villages of Petrovskoye, Yushkovo and Burtsevo. Enemy units were driving from the interfluvium of the Istra and Moskva rivers toward Golitsyno endeavoring thereby to encircle the troops of the 5th Army.

Around 0200 hours during the night of 3 December, the regiment arrived at the designated area and took up its firing positions, fighting under the command of the 33rd Army. Along with its troops, we participated in a counterstrike made in the direction of Yushkovo and Golitsyno. By the end of the day, Yushkovo, Petrovskoye and Burtsevo had been cleared of Nazis. The army's troops began to develop the offensive toward the southwest. The regiment's batteries cleared the path for the infantry and tanks.

As we later learned, the enemy had previously made a breakthrough between the 33d and 5th armies and by the end of 4 December this had been eliminated.

A day later the troops of the Western Front went over to a counteroffensive. And we moved with them to the west.

Thus, the 509th ptap, regardless of the enemy's superiority, as a whole successfully conducted its defensive engagements. Its men set examples of courage, steadfastness, heroism and skill.

For the heroism of the personnel, for their steadfastness, discipline and organization, the 509th ptap was turned into the 3d Guards Antitank Artillery Regiment. Many of its men, commanders and political workers received orders and medals.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "Borodino 1941-1942," Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1980, p 21.
- ² N. I. Krylov, N. I. Alekseyev and I. G. Dragan, "Navstrechu pobede" [Toward Victory], Moscow, Nauka, 1970, pp 34-35.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

WARTIME OPERATIONS: TANK DIVISION ACTIONS IN MOSCOW BATTLE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 49-52

[Article published under the heading "Memoirs" by Hero of the Soviet Union, Army Gen A. Getman: "The 112th Tank Division in the Battle of Moscow"]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War caught us in the Far East where I was the chief of staff of the XXX Mechanized Corps. All the Far Eastern personnel with great bitterness lived through the failures of our troops in the battles against the Nazi invaders. We rushed into battle, to the west. Soon my request was also granted.

I was appointed commander of the just-formed 112th Tank Division. When its units¹ were moving to the west, the Battle of Moscow was already in full swing. The troop trains tortured us by their slow speed. But then the Volga was behind us and the settlements around Moscow flashed by. Skirting Moscow on the ring road, we soon halted in the area of Podol'sk. It was the beginning of November 1941.

But even then, immediately after our arrival in the front, we felt the atmosphere which reigned there of unbending determination to halt and throw back the enemy from Moscow and the firm conviction that precisely here, by the walls of our capital, the enemy's defeat would begin.

All the division's personnel was enormously impressed by the news of the ceremony held on 6 November in Moscow devoted to the 24th anniversary of October and on 7 November the traditional troop parade on Red Square.

Our command had previously assumed that after the unsuccessful attempt to take Tula without a halt, the enemy would endeavor to encircle it and develop the offensive around Moscow to the southeast. The further course of events confirmed this. We felt that fierce battles were awaiting us immediately upon arrival in the area.

Having unloaded from the trains, the division upon the command's orders took up the defensive to the southwest of Podol'sk, it straddled the Warsaw Highway and began to prepare to repel the enemy attacks. But we commenced combat operations not by the defensive but by an offensive, as upon the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the troops of the Western Front were to make two counterstrikes. "One counterstrike," said I. V. Stalin to G. K. Zhukov, "must be made in the area of Volokolamsk and the other from the region of Serpukhov in the flank of the 4th German Army....

In the region of Serpukhov use Belov's Cavalry Corps, Getman's Tank Division and a portion of the forces from the 49th Army.² The 112th Tank Division was to become part of the operational troop group under the command of Maj Gen P. A. Belov and this was to be created for making a counterstrike against the Nazi invaders at Kashira.

However, before the arrival of the main forces from Gen P. A. Belov's group, the 112th Tank Division and the 173d Rifle Division jointly struck in the morning of 16 November in the sector of Maleyevo, Vyazovka and Vysokinichi. In advancing continuously, night and day, by 1200 hours on 18 November we had reached the Vorontskovka--Troitskoye Highway to the west of Serpukhov.

The enemy was forced to shift a portion of its reserves to Serpukhov to repel the counterstrike by our troops. To a certain degree this weakened the forces of Guderian's 2d Tank Army which was striking out from the region to the southwest of Tula against the defenses of the 50th Army.

During these battles, the tank battalion of Capt P. F. Samara particularly distinguished itself. Its men fought against a numerically superior enemy and they acted courageously and skillfully. In pressing the Nazis, they caused them significant damage. Five times the crew of Jr Sgt P. A. Mazhegov led their tank into an attack. It destroyed an antitank gun, three mortars and two medium machine guns and hit a tank.

The artillery troops also fought skillfully. Two enemy batteries and two machine guns were put out of commission by the battery of Sr Lt L. I. Gureyev from the 112th Artillery Regiment. The crew of the antitank gun under Jr Sgt P. P. Zhukovskiy hit a Nazi tank with direct laying.

Nevertheless, in skirting Tula, the formations of the enemy 2d Tank Army advanced against Kashira in order to capture it as well as the crossings on the Oka and ensure the development of the offensive around Moscow to the southeast. On 25 November, a forward detachment from the 17th Tank Division reached the southern outskirts of the city. On the same day my formation was ordered to make a quick march in order to stop the 17th Tank Division along with the other troops and to attack it.

There was not a minute to lose. The situation was also complicated by the fact that the 112th Tank Division had to carry out the combat mission at less than full strength. A portion of its forces had remained temporarily in the area of Serpukhov and the 124th Tank Regiment had left to defend Tula at the start of November. Moreover, it was armed chiefly with the T-26 light tanks and only one (attached) 131st Separate Battalion of heavy KV tanks (commander, Maj I. I. Gusakovskiy). On the evening of 25 November, at Serpukhov we decided to begin moving the division across the railroad bridge over the Oka. This saved time while the night concealed the maneuver from the enemy. As we had figured, the division's units by morning on the next day were concentrated in the area of Ivan'kovo (to the southwest of Kashira) where they engaged the tank columns of Nazi troops.

Now we were defending not only Moscow but also carrying out a combat mission related to the defense of Tula. As is known, at that time the Nazis had been trying for more than a month to take this city. Since they had not succeeded in taking it on the move, they decided to encircle Tula, outflanking it on the east.

Our division's subunits, arriving in the area of Ivan'kovo, immediately engaged the enemy tank columns. For an entire day and night (without any rest after the difficult night march), in fighting from concealed emplacements, they fired at point-blank range against the Nazis.

Five tanks were advancing against the combat positions of the tank battalion under the command of the junior political instructor, A. Ya. Shamov, who had taken over the battalion after the combat death of the battalion commander, A. M. Likanov, near Serpukhov. A. Shamov's tank was the first to open fire from the ambush. Soon they succeeded in hitting three tanks. The remainder hurriedly turned back. The tankmen from the company of Sr Lt P. I. Orkhov who subsequently was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, also fought bravely. Without losing a single tank, they hit several enemy tanks. The division's artillery troops fought courageously in firing with direct laying from exposed firing positions. Even the wounded did not leave their guns. Aviation also provided us with substantial aid. Enemy bombers tried to bomb our positions more than a score times. The Red Star fighters, in bravely blocking their path, forced them to drop their bombs chaotically and save themselves by fleeing. The tank troops firmly held onto the seized lines.

The I Guards Cavalry Corps of Gen P. A. Belov, which had arrived from Serpukhov, along with the 112th Tank Division and the 173d Rifle Division, with air support, on 27 November made a counterstrike against the 17th Tank Division and threw it back. The Nazis ceased dreaming about the encirclement of Moscow and advancing to the line of the Volga. About these days, Gen Guderian wrote: "The offensive against Moscow had failed. All the sacrifices and efforts by our valorous troops were in vain. We suffered a major defeat."³ But the enemy pushed forward endeavoring to break through to Tula whatever the cost.

It must be admitted that the city's situation was critical. On 2 December, the 3d and 4th Tank divisions of Gen Guderian and the SS Regiment Grosse Deutschland had succeeded in breaking through the positions of the 50th Army under Gen I. V. Boldin. On 3 December the enemy reached the Tula--Moscow railroad and highway. The men of the 112th Tank Division were given the mission of liberating the highway and ensuring free traffic for our troops along it.

Thus, back to battle, without a rest, without a halt.

Even now I recall with a feeling of excitement the energy with which the division's units acted in carrying out the orders. On that day (3 December) there was a heavy snowfall. A cold wind turned the road to ice. But nothing could stop the division's tank, motorized rifle and artillery troops. Our units advanced rapidly to Shul'gin and struck the enemy from the north without a halt. The fierce battle lasted almost a day. The enemy endeavored to throw us back, but in vain. Attacked by us from the north and also by rifle units from the 50th Army from the south, the enemy was between two fires and was ultimately forced to clear the highway. The turning point had been reached in the battle for Tula. The enemy's plans to capture the city had failed. But we continued to advance farther, toward the railroad, in order to clear the enemy from it. The men of the 112th Tank Division even now recall with a feeling of pride their contribution to the defense of the hero city Tula.

Regardless of the high casualties, the Nazi troops, in continuously attacking our regiments and divisions, pushed forward in a frenzy.

The Communist Party mobilized all the forces to defend the capital. The commanders, political workers, the communists and Komsomol members made every defender of the city aware of the party's appeal to defend it. And although the enemy was on the threshold of Moscow, it was unable to step across. The resistance and steadfastness of the Red Army grew constantly. The rear workers worked at full force to ensure victory over the enemy. The party organizations became the guiding centers for carrying out the slogan "Everything for the Front, Everything for Victory!"

The enemy's breakthrough in the area of Naro-Fominsk was the last attempt to change the situation at Moscow. The plan for the Nazi offensive was thwarted. Having ground down and bled the enemy white, the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts on 5-6 December went over to a counteroffensive with the mission of defeating the enemy to the north and south of the capital, to drive back the enemy and once and for all eliminate the threat hanging over Moscow. I recall those days well.

Prior to the start of the offensive, brief party and Komsomol meetings were held. By dawn we were ready for combat.

The going over of the Soviet troops to the counteroffensive became a holiday for us. The battle order "Forward to the West!" was the main thing for everyone.

We were to advance to the west, more accurately to the southwest. The strike was to be made in the morning of 11 December. The battle order for the offensive stated: "The 217th Rifle Division and the 112th Tank Division with two batteries from the 447th Heavy Artillery Regiment, the 34th Separate Rocket Battalion ("katyushas") and a detachment of Col Yushchuk (the 32d Tank Brigade) was to make the main thrust in the sector of Strukovo--Yasnaya Polyana--Shchekino; in cooperation with the 290th and 154th Rifle Divisions, to destroy the enemy in the area of Kosaya Gora; the immediate task is to capture Yasnaya Polyana and by the end of the day of 11 December 1941, to occupy Shchekino."⁴ During the difficult and extended battles we liberated scores of population points. In routing the Nazi invaders, we moved ever-forward. On 14 December, the enemy rear guard was destroyed in the area of Kosaya Gora. On the same day a portion of the forces from the 112th Tank Division together with the courageous infantrymen of the 217th Rifle Division under Maj Gen K. P. Trubenikov, liberated Yasnaya Polyana.

Yasnaya Polyana! The whole world knows this corner of Russia. Each Soviet person and all cultivated mankind esteems the honor of the great Russian writer, Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy. It is easy to imagine with what feelings we approached the place where our literary genius had created his great works. We were profoundly moved and we were happy that we had the honor to liberate the place precious to all.

The enemy had been driven out of Yasnaya Polyana and we entered it. At the very first glance of what the Nazis had done here, anger and indignation seized us. The Nazis, as we had learned from one of the museum co-workers, had tried to set the estate on fire. Combat was already approaching and the enemy was hurriedly retreating. At the last moment, three German officers broke into the house spreading fuel and scattering straw. Soon fires broke out in the rooms but the Soviet troops which hurried up succeeded in extinguishing them.

Having liberated Yasnaya Polyana and Shchekino, the 112th Tank Division as part of the 50th Army (commander as of 22 November, Lt Gen I. V. Boldin) assisted the 49th Army in defeating the Aleksin grouping of Nazi troops and in liberating Kaluga.

The gust of the offensive inexorably led us forward. Yakhroma, Solnechnogorsk, Klin and Kalinin were liberated. On the left wing of the Western Front, the troops of the 10th Army liberated Mikhaylov, Serebryanyye Prudy while the units of the Southwestern Front drove the Nazis from Yelets.

The armies in the center of the Western Front also developed the offensive successfully. They expelled the invaders from Naro-Fominsk, Maloyaroslavets, and then Borovsk, Vereya and Medyn'. The Soviet troops made powerful blows against the crack enemy armies and drove them back. Some 38 divisions, including 11 tank and motorized ones, suffered a major defeat.

In the battle for Moscow, the commanders, political workers and men of the 112th Tank Division gained their first experience in defeating the enemy, regardless of its numerical and technical superiority. Here our formation was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for courage, exceptional steadfastness and the high offensive drive of the personnel. Many men from the tank division received orders and medals.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ The 124th and 125th Tank regiments, the 112th Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 112th Artillery Regiment, the 112th Separate Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, the 112th Reconnaissance Battalion, the 112th Motor Vehicle Battalion, the 112th oru [expansion unknown], the 112th Maintenance and Recovery Company and the 302d pkg [abbreviation unknown].
- ² G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Remembrances and Reflections], Vol 2, Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1975, p 28.
- ³ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1975, p 108.
- ⁴ "Bitva za Tulu" [The Battle for Tula], Collection of Documents and Materials, Fourth Revised and Supplemented Edition, Priokskoye Knizhnoye Izd-vo, 1969, p 309.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

COMMENTS ON 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF CUBAN ARMED FORCES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 53-58

[Article published under the heading "In the Armies of Socialist Countries" by Capt 1st Rank B. Bannikov: "A Glorious Anniversary (on the 25th Anniversary of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces)"]

[Text] On 2 December 1981, the freedom-loving Cuban people will proudly celebrate Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) Day. For a quarter of a century now the FAR have unfailingly stood the honorable watch of protecting the peaceful labor of their people who are building socialism.

The birth of the nation's FAR was a logical consequence of the age-old struggle of the Cuban people for liberty and independence against the Spanish colonialists and the U.S. imperialists.

Some 25 years ago, on 2 December 1956, a revolutionary detachment consisting of 82 men headed by Fidel Castro landed from the yacht "Granma" on the southeastern coast of Cuba in the region of Las Coloradas in Oriente Province. This group became the nucleus and fighting vanguard of the new revolutionary army which was by its very history to bring the revolutionary cause to a victorious end and protect it against the encroachments of the internal and external enemies.

Fidel Castro and his fellow fighters set for themselves the task of freeing the motherland of the Batista tyranny. For this they worked out a plan according to which a revolt should be raised in the city of Santiago de Cuba and other towns of the island to reinforce the landing. The rebels were confronted with the task of attacking the Moncada Barracks and the police building, releasing the political prisoners, blockading the naval base, seizing the weapons magazine and issuing them to the rebels. All of this should distract the Batista forces from the landing which after establishing itself in the mountains would begin operating against the regular governmental forces.¹

On board the "Granma," the fighters learned by radio that a revolt had broken out in Santiago and this had been instigated by members of the Movement of 26 July Organization² and involved around 400 persons headed by Frank Pais. Batista threw numerous forces against the rebels and he succeeded in routing them.

Dealing harshly with the patriots, the dictator's troops armed to the teeth with modern weapons and equipment had concentrated in the area of the landing. On 5 December, in the area of Alegria del Pio, they attacked the landing detachment. An unequal battle ensued. Seeing the obvious superiority of the Batista troops, the 12 soldiers who remained alive headed by Fidel Castro were forced to break off from the enemy and go into the Sierra Maestra Mountains where they continued to fight against the tyranny.

In March 1957, the Fidel Castro group had reached a size of 140 persons. The rebels, in gaining strength, at the same time conducted active operations against the Batista troops. Thus, in May 1957, they attacked the Uvero military camp and seized it.

Regardless of the bloody repressive measures undertaken by the dictatorship against the revolutionary fighters and the population sympathizing with them, the rebel movement continuously grew wider. The rebel ranks in the Sierra Maestra Mountains grew rapidly. By the end of 1957, the Rebel Army under the command of Fidel Castro was already operating there. It consisted of four columns.

Along with the increased number of rebels, the zone of their operations was also expanding. In March 1958, one of the columns of the Rebel Army under the command of Raul Castro³ made a heroic march across an area full of Batista troops and reached the Sierra del Crystal forests in the northeastern part of Oriente Province. New centers of the struggle against the dictator arose also in the center of the island, in the Escambray Mountains.

The successes of the Rebel Army were enthusiastically received and in every possible way supported by broad strata of the Cuban people. The workers, the peasants and the progressive representatives of the intelligentsia joined the rebel ranks. The Cuban workers supplied everything necessary to the men of the Rebel Army and boycotted the actions of the Batista troops.

In seeing a serious threat to his regime, Batista decided to destroy the rebel detachments in Oriente Province, the backbone of the revolutionary forces in the nation, and thereby put an end to the rebel movement. More than 10,000 soldiers equipped with mountain artillery, flamethrowers, tanks and aircraft were shifted into Oriente Province. On 25 May, the Batista units went over to the offensive. Fierce battles and engagements commenced and these were conducted with variable success. However, ultimately the rebels were victorious. On 29 July, after 35 days of battle, they defeated the dictator's grouping at San Domingo. Batista lost over 1,000 killed and wounded and more than 400 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. The remainder were demoralized and surrounded. The rebels captured much booty.

The complete collapse of the Batista offensive against Sierra Maestra had wide repercussions in the nation and abroad. Initiative shifted completely into the hands of the revolutionary forces.

In August 1958, the leadership of the Rebel Army made a decision to shift combat operations outside Oriente Province and clear the tyrant's troops out of Cuba.

The emergence of the units of the Rebel Army onto the plain where the chief bases of the Batista troops were located marked a new stage in the liberation struggle of the Cuban people. The Rebel Army columns began to advance toward Las Villas and then to Matanzas and Havana. The Rebel Army with the active and all-round aid of the population had completely carried out the set missions by the end of 1958. It controlled virtually the entire territory of the nation.

On 1 January 1959, Batista fled the country and on 2 January the remnants of the divided and blockaded government troops ceased resistance. The years-long struggle of the revolutionary Cuban people against the puppet of American imperialism, Batista, ended with a complete victory. On 8 January the basic forces of the Rebel Army entered Havana. The revolution had been victorious in Cuba.

A most important feature of the Cuban revolution was the fact that the Rebel Army played the crucial role in its victory. In assessing its contribution, Fidel Castro at the First PCC [Cuban Communist Party] Congress noted: "The Rebel Army was the soul of the Revolution. As a result of its brilliant victories, there arose a free, fine, powerful and invincible new motherland.... The Rebel Army contributed to the unity and solidarity of all the people and ensured worker power and the existence of the Revolution itself...."⁴

With the establishing of the power of the people, the revolutionary government devoted primary significance to the organizational development of the armed forces. One of the immediate measures in this area was the abolishing of the military apparatus of the overthrown regime. The Rebel Army immediately assumed the function of defending the revolution's victories.

The Cuban leaders clearly realized that the U.S. imperialists would do everything possible to stifle the revolution. For protecting it there would have to be strong, well-organized armed forces armed with modern equipment and weapons.

For these purposes, in October 1959, the FAR Ministry was organized and it had the job of heading the development and training of the armed forces. Also at that time they began to organize the detachments of people's militia.

At the end of 1960, the Cuban government turned to the USSR and the other socialist nations with a request to supply modern weapons and equipment. This request was granted. Soon thereafter Soviet military specialists began landing along with weapons and equipment on the Island of Liberty.

In seeing the successes of the Cubans in building socialism and strengthening their defense capability, the U.S. imperialists endeavored to impede them in every possible way. Initially they organized an economic blockade against Cuba but this did not produce the expected effect. Then they began sending spies, saboteurs and bands of hired murderers into the republic, to organize armed provocations against the Cuban revolutionary army and carry out all sorts of subversion. Thus, in 1959-1960, as a result of piratical air raids, 350,000 tons of sugar cane were burned and many inhabitants killed. In May 1960, American saboteurs blew up the French steamer "Le Cubre"⁵ carrying a load of weapons in the harbor of Havana. Realizing that subversive methods did not prove effective, the United States began to prepare direct aggression against Cuba.

The following facts show the scope of preparations for an invasion of Cuba. In Miami, Florida, a center of Cuban counterrevolutionaries was organized with a membership of 40,000 persons. On 17 March 1960, the U.S. President Eisenhower requested that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) train Cuban emigres "as...forces for overthrowing the Castro regime."⁶ In January 1961, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba and began to prepare overtly for aggression against it.

On 17 April 1961, 1,500 mercenaries of the so-called "Brigade 2506" under the cover of U.S. ships and aircraft and on U.S. vessels landed on Cuban land in the areas of Playa Giron and Playa Larga.

The Cuban revolutionary government took immediate measures to repel the aggressive attack. Martial law was introduced in the nation and mobilization announced. Forces headed by the prime minister of the revolutionary government, Fidel Castro, rushed to the sites of the landing. In the morning of 17 April, a governmental declaration was announced which assessed the occurring events and set the tasks for the armed forces, namely, to defeat the enemy and defend the revolution.

Due to the energetic and effective measures undertaken by the government and to the heroism and courage of the Cuban soldiers and commanders, literally 72 hours after the landing, the invading forces had been crushed. The offensive by the units of the revolutionary army had been marked by organization. The combat operations of the motorized infantry and tanks were continuously supported by the artillery. The pilots also fought skillfully. They covered the troops from the air and sunk the aggressor's landing ships. Thus, Sr Lt Carlos Ulloa boldly attacked a landing vessel of the mercenaries at the very moment that equipment and ammunition were being unloaded. The hero pilot perished in carrying out the combat mission.⁷

The steadfast Cuban people, under the leadership of their tested revolutionary leaders and in relying on the aid of the USSR and the other socialist nations, honorably defended the revolutionary victories in 1961. In speaking at a nationwide meeting on Revolution Square in Havana on 29 January 1974, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that "the defeat of the interventionists in 1961, the rallying of the people around their leaders, the strengthened defenses of socialist Cuba and the development of its all-round ties with the fraternal socialist nations--all of this has convincingly shown the world that the Cuban revolution stands firm and, in the words of Lenin, is worth something as it can defend itself."⁸

During those years, regardless of the active intrigues by the U.S. imperialist circles, during the nation socioeconomic changes were widely carried out and these made it possible for Fidel Castro on 16 April and 1 May 1961 to publically announce the socialist nature of the Cuban revolution.⁹

Events on Playa Giron and the constant threat of a U.S. invasion showed that for securely defending the revolutionary victories of the people it was essential to have a strong regular army equipped with modern weapons. In the middle of 1971, the first regular units and formations began to be organized. Military training was made more concrete. Under the leadership of Soviet specialists, modern weapons and equipment were intensely studied. Party organizations and organizations of the Union of Young Communists were set up in the regular subunits. The party political

work carried out was aimed at indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, love for the motherland and hate for its enemies and in a spirit of close solidarity with the Communist Party, military cooperation with the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the other socialist nations and solidarity with the peoples fighting for national and social liberation and defending their liberty and independence.

The collapse of the U.S. adventure in April 1961 did not dampen the ardor of the American aggressors. In February 1962, they began active preparations for a new invasion of Cuba, they constantly violated the Cuban frontier and invaded its air-space and seacoast.

The United States continued to intensify the situation. In September 1962, the Senate granted powers to the president to call up 150,000 reservists in the army. Some 100,000 Americans were to be used for the attack on the Island of Liberty. Over 180 combat vessels were sent to Cuban shores and these established a sea blockade of Cuba. All ships and transports traveling to and from Cuba were stopped and inspected. They were arrested if military cargo was found.

The aggressive U.S. actions in October 1962 led to an acute international crisis which threatened to grow into a worldwide nuclear war.

In line with the growing threat of attack, the Cuban government turned to the USSR government with a request "to provide aid in strengthening the defense capability of the nation...."¹⁰

The Soviet Union, loyal to its international duty, decisively came to the defense of revolutionary Cuba. In a statement of 23 October 1962, the Soviet government pointed out that the U.S. government "was assuming a serious responsibility for the fate of peace and was unwisely playing with fire." The USSR called for the peoples of the world to block the path of the aggressors.

In the USSR Armed Forces and in the Warsaw Pact nations, measures were carried out aimed at increasing combat capability and vigilance.

The steps undertaken by the Soviet union and the firm determination of Cuba to defend its freedom and independence forced the United States to more soberly assess the developing situation. On 20 November, it lifted the naval blockade and stated it would not attack Cuba.¹¹

The Cuban people and their Communist Party highly regard the constant aid and support of the socialist nations, particularly the USSR. Comrade Fidel Castro, in speaking at the Second PCC Congress in December 1980, emphasized that "with every passing day our friendship and comradely relations primarily with the Soviet Union become ever-stronger as this nation has always shown fraternal solidarity with our motherland...."¹²

The passage of a law governing universal military service on 26 November 1963 was an important event in further strengthening the Cuban FAR and increasing their combat readiness.

In Cuba the troops and naval forces have been equipped with modern military equipment, the combat solidarity of the subunits, units and formations has been strengthened and more efficient work has been carried out by the staffs as control bodies.

In the course of the organizational development of the FAR, the Communist Party and government have given and are giving enormous attention to indoctrinating the personnel and to the methods of work with them. In December 1973, a law governing military ranks was introduced and in 1975-1976, the first certification of officers was carried out. In 1976, a new regulation was instituted on military service for FAR officer personnel. A system of officer training was also developed in the schools and academies. All of these and other measures helped to improve the combat training level of the FAR personnel, to raise the level of indoctrinational work with the officer corps as well as to strengthen and qualitatively improve it.

At present the FAR consists of the following armed services: Ground troops, air defense troops, air forces and navy. These are equipped with modern weapons and equipment.

The subunits, units and formations as well as the staffs, the schools and other military facilities are headed by officer personnel who are loyal to the cause of the revolution and are from the workers, peasants and working intelligentsia.

During the years of people's [communist] power, an ordered system of political bodies has been created and is functioning in the FAR. Due to this the party Central Committee directs the indoctrination of Army and Navy personnel in a spirit of loyalty to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and love for the socialist motherland.

The fraternal ties between the Soviet and Cuban peoples and their armies are constantly growing stronger, developing and deepening. The visit to Cuba by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in January-February 1974, was a vivid demonstration of Soviet-Cuban friendship. It marked a new page in the development of truly fraternal relations between the USSR and Cuba.

Reciprocal visits by military delegations for the purpose of exchanging experience in the organizational development of the armed forces have become systematic. Thus, in February 1981, there was a friendly visit to Cuba by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense, Mar SU N. V. Ogarkov.

In recent years, the Cuban FAR have grown up and become immeasurably stronger. This can be seen from the military exercises conducted in recent years such as "Ayacucho-150," "First Congress" and "The 20th Anniversary of the FAR."¹³ These demonstrated the increased coordination and high level of field, air and sea skills of the personnel.

The carrying out by the FAR of tasks to provide international aid to other nations is also proof of their high combat qualities. Fidel Castro in a report at the Second Party Congress described what the armed forces had done over the 5 years. He pointed out "their decisive and brilliant fulfillment of the tasks posed by the party for providing international aid to Angola and Ethiopia"¹⁴ in their struggle against the imperialists who had encroached on the territorial integrity and independence of these African nations.

At present the Cuban FAR are engaged in carrying out the tasks which have been set for them by the Second Party Congress which was held in December of last year. They are fully determined to carry them out well in order to ensure the necessary defense capability of the nation.

"In the present situation, when the forces of imperialism and hegemonism are increasing international tension," state the greetings of L. I. Brezhnev and N. A. Tikhonov to Comrade Fidel Castro Ruz on the occasion of National Uprising Day, "it is vitally important, in giving them a firm, principled rebuff, to undertake energetic actions in the interests of improving the political climate. We highly regard cooperation with Cuba in the struggle against the military threat and for developing the process of detente and the broadening of international cooperation."¹⁵

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ E. A. Grinevich, "Kuba; put' k pobede revolyutsii" [Cuba: The Path to the Victory of Revolution], Moscow, Nauka, 1975, pp. 147-148.
- ² The "26th July Movement" was a revolutionary organization created after the unsuccessful attempt to take Moncada Fortress by storm on 26 July 1953 and raise a revolt against the Batista dictatorship.
- ³ At present Arm Gen Raul Castro is a member of the Politburo and Second Secretary of the PCC Central Committee, First Deputy Chairman of the State Council and Council of Ministers and Minister of the Cuban FAR.
- ⁴ "I s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Kuby" [First PCC Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p. 176.
- ⁵ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1970, p. 26.
- ⁶ Ibid., pp. 26, 27.
- ⁷ KUBA [Cuba], No 10, 1980, p. 20.
- ⁸ L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskii kurs" [By a Leninist Course], Vol 4, Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, p. 404.
- ⁹ "Sovetskaya Istoricheskaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Historical Encyclopedia], Vol 8, Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1965, p. 230.
- ¹⁰ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1977, p. 86.
- ¹¹ Ibid., pp. 86-87.
- ¹² PRAVDA, 19 December 1980.
- ¹³ V. V. Semin and A. F. Shcheglov, "Armiya ostrova Svobody" [The Army of the Island of Freedom], Voenizdat, 1978, p. 49.

agreed completely with them.⁴ Also characteristically, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Y. Matsuoka whose signature was on the neutrality pact at these meetings was one of the most ardent supporters of an immediate attack on the Soviet Union. In his opinion, the Japanese troops, without losing any time, "should advance in a northerly direction as far as Irkutsk."⁵ With good reason the sentence handed down subsequently (in November 1948) by the Tokyo international tribunal which condemned the main Japanese war criminals, particularly noted the insincerity shown by Japan in concluding a neutrality pact with the USSR in planning to facilitate the implementation of the attack by taking cover behind it.⁶

On 2 July 1941, at a regular session of the Japanese military-political leaders, a decision was adopted to commence preparations for a war against the USSR. The choice of the time for the attack was to be linked to circumstances "favorable for Japan," that is, to the moment when, in the assessment of the Japanese Command, the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German Front would win a decisive success.

The Japanese General Staff worked out a plan of war under the code name of "Kantokuen" ("special maneuvers of the Kwantung Army"). In accord with this a secret mobilization was to be carried out, the Kwantung Army was to be brought up to wartime strength and prepared to attack the Soviet Far East. By 18 February 1942, in Tokyo a program had already been worked out for the activities of the Japanese military administration in East Asia, including in the Soviet Maritime Area, Khabarovskiy Kray, Chitinskaya Oblast and the Buryat-Mongol ASSR.⁷

There then commenced the mass movement of the mobilized troop contingents from the Japanese islands into Manchuria toward the Soviet frontier. This measure by the Japanese Command was characterized by such a broad scale that, regardless of the observance of strictest secrecy, it was impossible to keep it fully secret. According to the information of the American ambassador in Tokyo, J. Grew, by 12 July 1941 the U.S. Embassy had received information from Kobe, Dairen (Dal'niy), Mukden (Shenyang) and Harbin on large Japanese troop movements into Manchuria.⁸ Several months after the start of the movements, by the end of 1941, the formations of the strategic grouping concentrated in Manchuria along the Soviet frontier numbered over 700,000 men;⁹ they had more than 1,000 tanks and 1,500 aircraft.¹⁰ The works by Japanese authors in the postwar period also note the fact of a sharp increase in the Japanese troop grouping in Manchuria immediately after the attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR. In particular, in the above-mentioned work, N. Ike writes that at the end of 1941, an "unprecedented concentration of military strength" had been created in Manchuria and that the number of Japanese troops there had increased by 300,000 soldiers and officers.¹¹

The leaders of Nazi Germany, having prepared and carried out the treacherous attack on the USSR, in their aggressive actions were not unreasonably counting on serious aid from the Japanese militarists.

The leadership of militaristic Japan was informed ahead of time on the pending Nazi aggression against the USSR. At the beginning of June 1941, Hitler, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, Gen Oshima, stated his intention to attack the USSR in the near future. Having boastfully stated that it would take only 2 or 3 months for Germany to defeat the USSR, Hitler stressed the desirability of "cooperation" with Japan during the war.

In endeavoring to force militaristic Japan to enter the war sooner, the Nazi leaders particularly emphasized the circumstance that in the event of the military defeat of China's reliable friend, the USSR, the Japanese imperialists would find it easy "to settle the Chinese question," to break the resistance of the Chinese people, to occupy the nation and thereby secure their rear for further advances into Southeast Asia. The line of argument by the Nazi Minister of Foreign Affairs, von Ribbentrop, came down precisely to this, as stated in his telegram of 28 June 1941 to the German ambassador in Tokyo.¹²

In considering the real danger of aggression by imperialist Japan, during virtually the entire Great Patriotic War the USSR was forced to keep from 32 to 59 divisions of ground troops in the Far East, from 10 to 29 air divisions, up to 6 divisions and 4 brigades of Air Defense Troops totaling over 1 million men, 8,000-16,000 guns and mortars, over 2,000 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount], 3,000-4,000 combat aircraft and more than 100 fighting ships of the basic classes. During the various periods this was from 15 to 30 percent of the effective strength of the Soviet Armed Forces.¹³ These forces were extremely essential in the West where a bloody war was being waged, particularly in the period of 1941-1942 which was exceptionally difficult for our nation and its Armed Forces.

In Nazi Germany there was high regard for the position taken by the Japanese government. On 15 May 1942, von Ribbentrop telegraphed Tokyo that, in concentrating Japanese forces on the Soviet-Manchurian frontier, Japan was providing substantial aid to Germany, "since Russia, in any event, should keep troops in Eastern Siberia for preventing a Japanese-Russian conflict."¹⁴

The situation of the most difficult, initial period of the Great Patriotic War and the real threat of a Japanese attack on the friend and ally of China, the USSR, which was making an exceptional effort to repel the Nazi invasion demanded the establishing of joint actions with China against the Japanese militarists. This also met the national interests of both the Chinese people who for long years had suffered from the Japanese invaders as well as the interests of the Chinese people's revolution the most consistent representatives of which were the Chinese communists who constantly had the all-round support and aid of the Comintern and the USSR. In order to prevent the conquering of China by the Japanese militarists and stop Japan's entry into the war against the USSR, it was essential to strengthen the anti-Japanese war of the Chinese people. With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War of the USSR, the Soviet-German Front became the main front of World War II. Here the fate of world civilization was determined and the direction of the historical development of the world's peoples, including the Chinese, was determined.

The Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek, forced after a number of major defeats to his troops to pull back to Chungking (in the southwest of the nation), from the end of 1938 followed a passive strategy and tactics in conducting a war against the Japanese invaders. It did not plan or undertake any offensive operations. The basic military efforts of the Chiang Kai-shek troops were concentrated on combating the communists and accumulating forces for a decisive clash in a future civil war. Such a military-political strategy of the Kuomintang played into the hands of the Japanese militarists, as it allowed them unobstructedly to create a large offensive grouping of its troops along the Far Eastern frontiers of the USSR and at the same time to plunder and devastate the occupied Chinese lands, to carry out major aggressive actions in Southeast Asia and prepare for armed conflict in the Pacific against their imperialist rival, the United States.

The policy of the United States, England and their allies also contributed to the growth of pro-Japanese sentiments in the Kuomintang and to a stronger passive attitude toward the conducting of an anti-Japanese war as the Allies had not given up hope of focusing the brunt of Japanese aggression against the USSR. The ruling circles of the United States and England made serious concessions to Japanese imperialism and endeavored to incline the Chungking government to a peace of surrender with Japan.¹⁵

Under the existing situation, it would have been unrealistic to hope for the organizing of major offensive operations by the Kuomintang Command on the front which could have impeded the concentration of Japanese troops on the Far Eastern frontiers of the USSR. During the most difficult initial period of the Great Patriotic War, the Comintern and the USSR raised with the CCP leadership the question of joint operations against the Japanese imperialists. On 27 June 1941, the leader of the Soviet group which was in Yanan¹⁶ announced that in accord with the instructions received by him, he raised before the CCP leadership the question of aid to the USSR in the event of a Japanese attack on the USSR. The Chinese leaders stated that they had already planned a number of measures and at the end of the talk Zhu De requested that Moscow be informed that in the event that Japan attacked the USSR, the 8th People's Army would throw all the forces at its disposal against the Japanese and would be able to provide sufficient support for the USSR. On 3 July 1941, Mao Zedong confirmed this statement, however as it became clear subsequently, no measures were in fact taken.¹⁷

In July 1941, Yanan was informed that the Japanese were sending mobilized troops to the continent. It was requested that their concentrations in the Beiping--Kalgan and Baotou sectors, that is, against the USSR, be prevented, and that normal traffic be disrupted on the railroads leading to the designated points.¹⁸ Here it was considered that the 8th People's Army and the partisan detachments under CCP leadership had a real opportunity to carry out the designated measures, as they had sufficient strength and the necessary experience for this.¹⁹ However, this request was disregarded by Mao Zedong and his circle. This made it possible for the Japanese Command to concentrate its troops unobstructedly and quickly along the Soviet frontier in Manchuria.

On 3 September 1941, Mao Zedong was again asked about the possible actions of the CCP in the event that Japan would start a war against the USSR. In reply came confused and evasive statements which placed infinite stipulations and contained a series of clearly infeasible demands on the Soviet Union in the situation at that time. When Mao Zedong was asked directly, without any "ifs" to state what the CCP was capable of undertaking in the event of a Japanese attack on the USSR, he accused the Soviet representative of an "absence of dialectical thinking" and unceremoniously broke off the discussion of the so-important question.²⁰

Subsequently, Mao Zedong and his supporters in the CCP leadership continued to block all attempts to agree upon the coordination of actions.

What can explain such a position assumed by Mao Zedong and his circle and which clearly contradicted not only the interests of the successful development of the people's revolution in China but also the national interests of the Chinese people who were waging a difficult struggle against the Japanese invaders for the independence of their motherland?

One of the most important reasons was the desire of Mao Zedong and his supporters who adhered to petty-bourgeois, narrow nationalistic views and which they concealed by Marxist terminology, to utilize the existing situation for suppressing the Chinese internationalist communists, for deeply implanting their nationalistic views in the party and for establishing the cult of personality for Mao Zedong.

For these purposes an extensive campaign of repression was organized and this, as was characteristic subsequently for the other repressive campaigns organized by Mao Zedong, was concealed under the false name of the "movement for systematizing the style of party work" ("zhengfeng yundung"). This was started in the autumn of 1941, that is, precisely at the moment when the Comintern's attention was focused on the struggle against Nazi aggression and the Soviet Union was experiencing the most difficult time, and lasted up until the Seventh CCP Congress (1945) which adopted new party by-laws which for the first time stated that "the CCP in all its work is directed by the ideas of Mao Zedong."

In September 1941, Mao Zedong and his supporters held a Politburo session at which their main ideological opponents such as Wang Ming, Zhang Wentian, Bo Gu and others, were castigated. They were all removed from their jobs in the higher leading bodies of the CCP and were politically discredited (accusations of "leftist opportunism" and "dogmatism" were fabricated against them). The CCP members were subjected to unceremonious ideological pressure and they were forced to take a loyalty oath to Mao Zedong. Those who resisted or vacillated were threatened with the accusation of "counterrevolutionary activities."

During these years Mao Zedong and his circle organized broad terror and repression against dissidents, including in the form of a "campaign to discover spies." In Yanan they organized "chalk work to catch spies and this was accompanied by ubiquitous meetings at which Mao's supporters made threats and demands for confessions of "spy" and "antiparty" activities and for repentance.

The repression caused the CCP, and in particular its military cadres, great losses. According to some estimates, Kang Sheng and his group in that period (1941-1945) eliminated several hundred thousand men. More than 20,000 committed suicide. During this time of the campaign, the internationalist cadres of the CCP most loyal to the cause of the revolution were eliminated or morally broken.²¹

In forcing the "repenters" to defame not only themselves but also their comrades, Mao Zedong created a situation where, with the exception of Mao himself and several of his closest followers, virtually all the leaders were compromised or under suspicion. In precisely this way Mao's reputation as an irreproachable authority and an "infallible leader" was formed.

It is not difficult to imagine the consequences of the narrow nationalistic policy of the Maoists and their refusal to carry out their international duty. Starting in 1941-1942, the activities of the CCP troops in the fight against Japan constantly declined. Mao Zedong justified this tactic in the following manner: "...We will better save our forces, we will defeat the Kuomintang, we will head China and then, in receiving aid from the USSR, England and America, we will liberate China of the Japanese invaders...."^{21a} In the Chinese press a speech of Mao Zedong was printed given to students of the party school in Yanan in November 1941. In it he advanced

the thesis that "due to the presence of changes in the international situation not favorable to the CCP, our party at present, aside from the greatest possible expansion of its real forces, should avoid sacrifices for maintaining its forces," and throughout the challenge: "Ten percent of our forces to fight the Japanese, 20 percent to fight the Kuomintang, and 70 percent to increase our own forces."²²

These ideas of Mao Zedong were directly aimed at splitting the united anti-Japanese front which had been created in China upon the initiative of the Comintern in the interests of unifying the forces of all the Chinese people in the struggle against the imperialist aggressor. The existence of a united national front was an important factor in resisting the Japanese invaders. The progressive forces united around the CCP were struggling to begin a national liberation war of all the people and to build a new democratic China in the course of it. The internationalist forces in the CCP leadership represented by Wang Ming, Gao Gang and other internationalist communists fought actively to strengthen and broaden this front. At the same time, Mao Zedong who claimed leadership in the nation, in acting from sectarian positions, carried out a line of splitting the united front and this played into the hands of the Japanese invaders.

In accord with the tenets of Mao Zedong, the units of the People's Revolutionary Army under his control did not conduct active combat operations against the Japanese militarists during the period of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people. As a result, favorable conditions were created for maintaining a large Japanese attack grouping on the Soviet frontier in Manchuria and the USSR was forced to keep in the Far East tens of divisions which were so needed on the Soviet-German Front. Here it must be stressed that the passive attitude of Mao to the war against the Japanese occupiers at the same time had an extremely negative effect on the interests of developing the people's revolution in China itself and drew out the time for liberating the Chinese land of foreign invaders. Thus, as a result of the passive waging of war against the Japanese occupiers, in 1941-1943, the territory of the liberated areas in the enemy rear declined by 2-fold, the number of partisan detachments dropped significantly, while the number of soldiers in the 8th and New 4th armies controlled by the CCP was nearly cut in half.²³ In the eyes of millions of Chinese, Russia was the homeland of the October Revolution which had rocked the entire world. The Comintern and the USSR had provided great political, moral and material support for the Chinese communists and for the cause of the people's revolution in China. This forced Mao Zedong to hide his true colors, to temporize and play the part of a friend of the USSR. At the same time he and his supporters underestimated the might of the USSR and overestimated the strength of Nazi Germany. Instead of helping the world's first socialist state, they spread rumors about the "inevitable defeat of the USSR" and that "the military strategy of the USSR is incorrect," and so forth.^{23a} As to precisely what strategy Mao considered to be "correct," one might look at his arguments that Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad should not be defended but rather they should be surrendered to the enemy, like other cities, without resistance, the Soviet Army should be evacuated behind the Urals and a guerrilla war waged against the Nazis while waiting for an anglo-American offensive in the West.²⁴ Any pretext was used in Yenan to discredit the Comintern and the CPSU. Thus, even during those years, Mao Zedong assumed an overtly hostile position vis-a-vis the USSR.

Mao Zedong and his circle even in the 1930's began to toy with the American ruling circles showing a readiness to strike a deal with them. Consequently, the present

approachement of Beijing with the most reactionary imperialist circles has rather deep historical roots. In the period of interest to us there were numerous instances of groveling by Mao Zedong and his supporters before the American imperialists, attempts to achieve cooperation with the USSR by betraying the interests of the Chinese revolution and the refusal to increase combat operations against the Japanese occupiers. We will give only some of them.

At the beginning of 1942, American military observers arrived in Yen-an and they stated that the United States in 1946 intended to land troops on Japanese and Chinese territory and that after this they could provide military-technical and other material aid to the troops under CCP leadership. In this regard called back many commanders and political workers from the troop units as well as secretaries of the district and superior party committees to the Central Party School in Yen-an. These persons who were removed from the active struggle and political activities remained there until the Soviet Army entered Manchuria. All of them, in the words of Chinese communists, were inspired with the belief of American aid and the need to wait for the U.S. offensive in 1946.²⁵

In preparing the grounds to carry out the demands of the U.S. ruling circles to alter the nature of the CCP, Mao Zedong in 1944 intended to rename the party. When rumors began to spread about this, Mao was forced to state to the liaison officer of the Comintern (it was abolished in 1943) in Yen-an who at the same time performed the duties of the TASS military correspondent, P. P. Vladimirov, the following: "We have been thinking of renaming our party. To name it not the 'Communist' but rather something different. Then a better situation would exist for the Separate Region, particularly among Americans...."²⁶ At the same time, the CCP leadership proposed that the Americans be the first to open their diplomatic agency in Yen-an. However, the Americans refused obviously not wanting to aggravate relations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Thus, during the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders, when not only the fate of the world's first socialist state but also world civilization and, finally, the fate of the very Chinese revolution were being determined, Mao Zedong and his supporters, in pursuing selfish narrow nationalistic goals, openly betrayed the principles of internationalism.

FOOTNOTES

¹ See, in particular, "Japan's Decision for War" (Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences), translated, edited and with an introduction by Nobutaka Ike, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1967.

² Ibid., pp 85-89.

³ Ibid., p 87.

⁴ Ibid., p 89.

⁵ Ibid., pp 60-66.

- 9 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 11, Voenizdat, 1980, p 425.
- 10 Ibid., p 169.
- 11 Joseph C. Grew, "Ten Years in Japan," New York, Simon and Shuster, 1944, p 403.
- 12 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny," Vol 11, p 169.
- 13 PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, No 3, 1980, p 17.
- 14 "Japan's Decision for War," pp 76, 112.
- 15 Ibid., pp 71-72.
- 16 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny," Vol 11, p 183.
- 17 PRAVDA, 20 February 1948.
- 18 See: "Istoriya Kitaya s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney" [The History of China from Ancient Times to Our Days], Moscow, Nauka, 1974, p 382.
- 19 The City of Yanan was the center of the Separate Region of China (in the north-western part of the nation) where the CCP Central Committee was located and the basic troop units under CCP control were deployed.
- 20 O. Vladimirov and V. Ryazantsev, "Stranitsy politicheskoy biografii Mao Tszeduna" [Pages from the Political Biography of Mao Zedong], 4th Supplemented Edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p 65.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 In August-December 1940, units of the 8th People's Army and the partisan detachments totaling around 400,000 men, in the enemy rear in the area of North China, conducted a major offensive operation which became known as the "battle of 100 regiments" (115 troop units led by the CCP participated in it). One of its most important aims was to attack the Japanese lines of communications and the railroads of North China (see "Istoriya sovremennoy kitayskoy revolyutsii" [The History of the Modern Chinese Revolution], Edited by He Ganzhi, Translated from the Chinese, Moscow, Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1959, p 402). In the course of the operation, more than 260 bridges, railroad stations and tunnels were destroyed, around 500 km of rail lines and 1,500 km of highways were put out of use.
- 23 O. Vladimirov and V. Ryazantsev, op. cit., pp 65-66.
- 24 Ibid., p 57.
- 25a Ibid., p 67.
- 26 Ibid.

"Istoriya Kitaya s drevneyshikh...", p 391.

¹⁴ O. Vladimirov and V. Ryazantsev, op. cit., p 68.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., p 77.

¹⁷ P. P. Vladimirov, "Osobyi rayon Kitaya 1942-1945" [The Separate Region of China in 1942-1945], Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1973, p 315.

VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 10, 1980, p 78.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

RUSSIAN MILITARY-DEFENSIVE POSTS IN KAZAKHSTAN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 71-76

[Article published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences Zh. Kasymbayev: "Russian Military-Defensive Posts in Protecting the Kazakh Lands Against Enemies (on the 250th Anniversary of the Voluntary Annexation of Kazakhstan as Part of Russia)"]

[Text] On 15 October 1731, the assigning of the charter on the voluntary incorporation of Western Kazakhstan (Little Horde) as part of the Russian state once and for all determined the unity and community of the destiny of the Kazakhs with the destiny of the great Russian and other peoples of Russia.¹

This event, regardless of the colonial policy of tsarism, contributed to a rise in the economy and culture of Kazakhstan and to the ending of the feudal internecine struggle there. It also ensured the external security of the Kazakh lands and saved the Kazakhs from enslavement by the Dzungarian military-feudal state and the Manchu-Chinese Qing Empire.

In the 1740's through the 1760's the Russian military defensive posts played an important role in protecting the Kazakh livestock raising tribes and their possessions. This is particularly true for the fortresses of Yamyshev (founded in 1716), Zheleza (in 1717), Semipalatinsk (in 1718), Ust'-Kamenogorsk (in 1720), Bukhtarma (in 1761) and others. One of the main tasks of the border fortifications was to prevent the conquering of Russian and Kazakh lands by the Dzungarian Khanate,² and later by Qing China. The Kazakhs were given the greatest possible support in their struggle against foreign invasions. At the same time, the fortresses were support points for the Russian state to expand trade ties with the nomads and disseminate Russian influence among them. The further construction of military-defensive posts in the southwestern part of Siberia and on the border of Russia and Kazakhstan, was largely determined by the state of Russian-Dzungarian and Kazakh-Dzungarian relations as well as by the situation in the areas bordering on China. It must be pointed out that the Chinese authorities with the help of all sorts of intrigues endeavored to aggravate the situation in this area of Central Asia and to block a rapprochement between Russia and Dzungaria.

The most devastating raids against Kazakh lands were made by the troops of the Dzungarian huntayji (khan) Galdan-Iseren in 1738-1741. Invading the Middle Horde

and in carrying out a terrible pogrom in the Kazakh villages, they pursued the fleeing inhabitants as far as the very Orsk Fortress.³ The decisive actions by the Russian military administration in defense of the Kazakhs who accepted Russian allegiance forced the Dzungarians to retreat. After this, the demands on the border service were noticeably increased on the questions of more up-to-date information and warning of all aggressive actions by the Dzungarian troops. Thus, the orders from the chief of the Siberian Provincial Office P. Buturlin to the commandants of the reinforced border posts state: "...About them, the foreign Kalmyks (the Dzungarians.--Editors), whatever disorders there may be, the provincial office is to receive thorough news in the shortest time."⁴

In the 1740's the Siberian border authorities undertook steps to further strengthen the defensive lines. For example, along the western bank of the Irtysh River they began to erect the Bol'sheretskiy, Inberiytskiy and Beterinskiy outposts and somewhat later the Vorovski, Verbyuzhskiy and others. In the autumn of 1741, the Cossack mounted patrols were moved from Tara to the west and later the garrison in the city itself was reinforced.

On 20 May 1742, the Senate ratified a special decision on measures to protect the Kazakh population and defend the border areas against the Dzungarians. In particular, provision was made to increase the number of troops in all the border posts and which should be "subjects of the khans and sultans with as many men as can be kept."⁵ During this same year, a special embassy was sent to Dzungaria with a mission to explain the existing situation in Kazakhstan to the khan authorities as resulted from the incorporation of Kazakhstan as part of the Russian state. There were also instructions to state to Galdan-Tseren "that he, being informed of their allegiance (that is, of the Kazakhs.--Editors)...would not cause them any further destruction or send his troops against them."⁶ As a result there followed the liberation of the Russian subject, Sultan Ablay, who had been captured prior to this by the Dzungarians during their invasion of the Middle Horde at the beginning of 1742. Agreement was also reached on a certain limitation of Dzungarian claims against the Kazakhs of this Horde (the Kazakh population was freed from paying the alman (tribute) to the Dzungarian khan).

However, the situation in the areas bordering on Dzungaria continued to remain unquiet. The Oyrats who arrived here in 1744 announced the intentions of Galdan-Tseren to send troops against the Ust'-Kamenogorsk and Semipalatinsk forces and to the Kolyvan works.⁷ In actuality, soon thereafter there was a destructive raid by the Oirat detachments against the Altay mines. The militant neighbors knew well that there were few Russian troops in the border areas and this explained their daring attacks.

Considering the developing situation, the Russian government instructed the chief of the Orenburg Commission,⁸ I. I. Neplyuyev, to dispatch "at the most extreme speed" three Dragoon regiments to Siberia. Other military units were also transferred to the border areas and measures taken to strengthen the fortresses on the Upper Irtysh. The overall command of the border troops was assumed by Maj Gen I. V. Kinderman. The measures undertaken helped to ensure the security of Western Siberia and Kazakhstan and they opened up new opportunities to develop economic ties and trades between the Kazakhs and the Russians. This was understood well by the Kazakh population. One of the sultans of the Middle Horde, Barak, during talks with the Dzungarian ambassadors who were attempting to turn him against Russia, stated: "From

the Russian structures...the Russian fortresses and from them, the Russians themselves, there are not only no insults or impediments but there is also advantage because they (the Kazakhs.--Editors) are satisfied in trading with them."⁹

As is known, the defense of the Kazakhs against Dzungarian aggression was carried out by the Russian government without the use of military force. Both sides (Russia and Dzungaria) avoided overt armed conflicts, preferring to settle the frequently arising disputes by peaceful talks. The Dzungarian rulers themselves (the huntayji Tseven-Rabdan and later Galdan-Tseren) at times even sought the support of the Russian authorities and their aid against the growing threat from Qing China.

An important role in the strengthening of Russian positions in the Central Asian frontiers was played by the successful economic development of Southern Siberia by the Russians, including the Altay and Irtysh area.

The importance of the Russian fortresses in the development of Russian-Kazakh relations and in defending the Kazakhs against external invasions grew particularly after the defeat and destruction of the Dzungarian state by the Qing troops which in the beginning of 1755, upon the order of Emperor Qianlong invaded the khanate with two Chinese armies.¹⁰ The Chinese mercilessly slaughtered the Dzungarians, "putting them to fire and sword."¹¹ Many prisoners were sold into slavery. Several thousand Dzungarian families fled to the Volga to their fellow tribesmen, the Volga Kalmyks.¹²

The Russian government undertook measures to prevent the Chinese in the border areas where the Kazakh and other tribes roamed. At this critical moment, the defense of the Siberian mining enterprises and the protection of Russian subjects (including the Kazakhs) were entrusted to the Siberian governor V. A. Myatlev.¹³ Under his leadership, additional fortified posts were built and new officer personnel were called in to stand border guard duty. In 1763-1764, several cavalry and infantry detachments were organized from the dissenters (old believers) for the purpose of filling out the garrisons of the Southern Siberian fortresses. They were sent to the commandant of the Ust'-Kamenogorsk Fortress for service. A significant number of Don Cossacks and up to 150 exile Dnepr Cossacks were shifted to the Siberian defensive line.

A portion of the Dzungarians pushed by the Chinese was forced to flee to the Russian border fortifications. Many of them, in reaching the Yamyshev, Semipalatinsk, Ust'-Kamenogorsk and other fortresses and redoubts, endeavored to acquire Russian citizenship and thereby avoid the bloody reprisals by the Qing aggressors and clashes with the Kazakh militia. Many Kazakhs at that time felt a fully justified feeling of revenge against the Dzungarians due to the plundering during the years of the "Great Calamity" (1710, 1728 and 1729).

The voluntary accepting of Russian citizenship by a portion of the Oyrat tribes occurred also prior to the defeat of Dzungaria, in the 1740's. Now they flowed in masses to the border fortifications. As the Siberian Governor, V. A. Myatlev, wrote in July and September 1756 to the Department of Foreign Affairs, a large number of the Dzungarians persecuted by the Chinese sought refuge in the Russian "steppe fortifications."¹⁴

The Ust'-Kamenogorsk, Semipalatinsk, Yamyshev and other fortresses became the points where, as a rule, the Dzungarians took their oath of Russian citizenship. On 7 August 1758, the Siberian Governor General, F. I. Soymonov, informed the state department that Kalmyk refugees numbering 5,187 persons had been accepted "under the great hand of the lord" "with about 20,000 of their livestock...."¹⁵ A portion of these persons settled in the border fortresses.¹⁶ Then 6 Togout (Kalmyk) Zaysans arrived at the Semipalatinsk Fortress to request Russian citizenship. They were named Zaman, Manut, Sheareng, Uryankhay, Norbo-Chirik and Louzant and they addressed the following letter to the commandant: "To the great lord, the White Empress, to the secretary of the Semipalatinsk Fortress and other lords.... Because of circumstances we were forced to live under the protection of the Dzungarians, but now the Dzungarians have begun to be destroyed and for some time we have sought an occasion to leave there and although last year we did leave, the Chinese and the Kazakhs dispersed us and did not permit us, we have now come in the hope that since our kinsmen are under the protection of her highness (it is a question of the Volga Kalmyks.--Author), and are quiet we desire to join our kinsmen under the protection of her highness...."¹⁷

Even Amursan who dreamed of "being the autocrat of the Dzungarian khanate," having suffered a number of reverses, on 27 June 1757, fled with his people to the Semipalatinsk Fortress and requested refuge, fearing reprisal from the Chinese. His request was granted.

The Qings repeatedly undertook attempts to punish the Kalmyks who voluntarily accepted Russian citizenship. Thus, in July 1758, beneath the walls of the Ust'-Kamenogorsk Fortress, there suddenly appeared a detachment of Chinese which, brandishing its weapons, demanded the return of the Dzungarian refugees. The commandants of the fortresses responded to such requests from the Qings with a decisive refusal. Thus, the Dzungarians who not so long before had demanded the destruction of the fortresses on the eastern frontier of Russia and Kazakhstan, after the aggression by the Qing Empire, were forced to seek safety behind their walls. The desire of many Central Asian peoples, and in particular the Dzungarians, to accept Russian citizenship evoked resistance from the Chinese government. It, judging from a report by the Siberian Governor, F. I. Soymonov, to the Senate, "to prevent the remaining Dzungarians from going over to Russian citizenship," set out troops close to the frontier in the area of Ablaket and Charkurban Stream. Moreover, "neighbor people" of the Chinese emperor arrived at the Semipalatinsk and Ust'-Kamenogorsk fortresses and they "came to learn of the Dzungarians who had taken Russian citizenship," and demanded the surrender of the Dzungarian Shirin who had adopted Russian citizenship as well as his followers. In addition, Chinese troops, as was learned from the Yamyshev and Semipalatinsk fortresses, "went down the Irtysh along the Kirghiz steppe side,"¹⁸ to put pressure on those who intended to switch to Russian protection. The Siberian authorities learned of their movement and plans in a majority of instances from the Kazakhs who arrived at the fortresses to trade.

In the middle of 1758, the once strongest state in Central Asia, Dzungaria, ceased to exist. It was violently turned into a Chinese imperial vice-regency, Xinjiang (the new frontier) aimed primarily against Kazakhstan. One should note that the Qyrat (Dzungarian) state which blocked the path of Manchu-Chinese expansion in northwestern Central Asia was literally obliterated from the face of the earth by the conquerors. Such cruelty has rarely been encountered in the history of mankind,

although the Qing government stubbornly attempted to represent the defeat of the Dzungarian Khanate as a passifying action against "rebels."¹⁹

At that time the Kazakhs did not possess sufficient force to organize resistance against the Manchu-Chinese armies, although there were instances when the Kazakh militias endeavored to organize resistance against the aggressors but were defeated. At the same time, the Qing military, having got its hands on Dzungaria and Eastern Turkestan, endeavored not only to hold these lands under their authority but also push the Kazakhs out of Xinjiang. A real threat also arose to the Russian possessions in the Altay. All of this served as the grounds for the Russian government to carry out a series of measures to further strengthen the defenses of this vast area.

In 1760, the commandants of the Upper Irtysh and other fortifications were ordered to have Russian troops occupy the lands from the Ust'-Kamenogorsk Fortress to Lake Teletskoye inclusively. In 1763, Lt Gen I. I. Shpringer was sent to Western Siberia to carry out these instructions. He was to settle on the spot the questions of protecting the eastern Russian possessions against probable Chinese incursions. In the same year, in the mouth of the Bukhtarma River, the Bukhtarma Fortress was founded and this completed the creation of the Irtysh Defensive Line. It, like the other defensive lines in the south of Siberia, also included Russian farm settlements and this created favorable conditions for economic activities both by the Russians and the Kazakhs.

In conclusion it must be pointed out that the Yamyshev, Ust'-Kamenogorsk, Semipalatinsk, Bukhtarma and other Russian military defensive posts built in the course of the development of the southwestern areas of Siberia in the 18th Century played an important role in protecting the kazakhs from enslavement by Dzungaria and later by Qing China. Their good positioning, the presence of artillery and regular troop units forced the aggressively inclined neighbors to refrain from direct military operations in the border areas.

The defensive posts contributed to accelerating the voluntary annexation of Kazakhstan by Russia. This was a progressive historical process which was of important significance for economic development and the cultural growth of the Kazakh people.

After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Soviet power also made its triumphant march across Kazakh territory (from October 1917 through March 1918). However, the further development of a new life occurred under conditions of fierce resistance by the bey and kulak [rich peasant] elements and by the incipient intervention and Civil War. The Russian and Kazakh working people had to wage an armed struggle both against the domestic and foreign counterrevolution almost to the end of 1920 before the territory of Kazakhstan was fully liberated of interventionists and White Guards.

The victory over the dark forces of reaction and counterrevolution in Kazakhstan is always linked to the names of such outstanding leaders of the Communist Party and associates of the great Lenin as M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuybyshev and S. M. Kirov as well as with the immortal feats of the Civil War hero V. I. Chapayev, the hero of the Kazakh people Amangel'da Imanov, the Bolshevik commissars D. Furmanov, A. Dzhangil'din, S. Baturin, A. Maykotov, T. Bokin, P. Tuzov, B. Dzhanekeshev, Yu. Shagabutdinov and many other famous fighters for Soviet power in Kazakhstan.

The formation and development of the Kazakh Soviet state are inseparably tied to the name of V. I. Lenin. He personally signed two documents (cf 10 July 1919 and 26 August 1920) which marked the beginning to Kazakh autonomy.²⁰ In 1936, in accord with the new USSR Constitution, the Kazakh Autonomous Republic was turned into an Union one.

The Great Patriotic War was the severest testing for the workers of Kazakhstan as for all our nation. Fighting in the ranks of the Soviet Army were two-thirds of the membership of the Kazakh Communist Party and Komsomol, hundreds of thousands of Kazakh soldiers, including the 316th (8th Guards) Rifle Division under the command of I. V. Panfilov. The feat of the 28 Panfilov heroes in the defense of Moscow has entered the heroic history of the Soviet people forever.

Over the years of Soviet power, Kazakhstan has been turned into a developed industrial-agrarian republic which in terms of the volume of capital investments channeled into national economic development, presently holds third place among the Union republics (after the RSFSR and the Ukraine). With the development of the virgin and fallow lands (25.5 million hectares) in 1954-1960, Kazakhstan became one of the major grain-producing regions of the USSR. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in describing the heroic virgin lands epoch in his book "Tselina" [Virgin Lands], has written: "The virgin lands provided a powerful impetus to the development of Kazakhstan's productive forces, to the growth of its economy, science and culture. Major industrial centers appeared, 90 new cities grew up including such nationally known ones as Rudnyy, Ekibastuz, Yermak, Kentau, Arkalyk and Shevchenko.... And no one is surprised when the once-backward Kazakhstan has started up a fast-neutron reactor.

"At present the star of Kazakhstan burns ever-brighter in the constellation of fraternal republics."²¹

The 250th anniversary of the voluntary annexation of Kazakhstan by Russia is widely being celebrated this year in our country as a holiday of the great and unbreakable friendship among the Soviet peoples who are building a communist society. "...Everything that is a source of pride to the Kazakh people who 250 years ago voluntarily linked their fate with Russia," stated the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party, Comrade D. A. Kunayev, at the 26th Party Congress, "has come with Soviet power, with the ideas and people of Lenin's party and with the great fraternity of peoples to which we have been loyal in any hardships and to which we will be totally loyal in the future."²²

FOOTNOTES

The Kazakh Khanate was formed at the end of the 15th Century. It was divided into three hordes (areas): Great (Semirech'ye), Middle (Central, Northern and partially Eastern Kazakhstan) and Little (Western Kazakhstan). In 1726, in a situation of an internecine struggle and the growing aggression against Kazakhstan by the Dzungarians, one of the Kazakh rulers, Khan Abdulhair, in the name of the elders of the Little Horde turned to the Russian government with a request to accept its allegiance. In 1731, this request was granted. In the 1730's and 1740's, a larger portion of the Middle Horde and certain lands of

the Great Horde were annexed to Russia. In the 1860's, the voluntary incorporation of Kazakhstan as part of Russia was completed.

Dzungaria (the Dzungarian or Oyrat Khanate) was a feudal state of the Oyrats or Kalmyks (this name was extended to a group of Western Mongolian tribes including the Derbets, Bayats, Torguts, Olets, Zahichin and others). It existed from the 1630's through 1757. With Russia it conducted peaceful trade in which the Russian state was also interested. In the second half of the 18th Century, Dzungaria defeated by the Manchu-Chinese troops ceased to exist. Here the Qing conquerers exterminated a larger portion of the population.

Founded by Russians in 1735 at the mouth of the Ora River (modern Orsk) upon the request of the Kazakh Khan Abdulhair. It played a major role in the development of economic ties between Russia and Kazakhstan.

Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, "Sobr. soch. v pyati tomakh" [Collected Works in Five Volumes], Vol 3, Alma-Ata, 1969, p 237.

B. P. Gurevich, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya v Tsentral'noy Azii v XVII--pervoy polovine XIX v." [International Relations in Central Asia in the 17th Through the First Half of the 19th Centuries], Moscow, Nauka, 1979, p 76.

"Kazakhsko-russkiye otnosheniya v XVI--XVIII vekakh (sbornik dokumentov i materialov)" [Kazakh-Russian Relations in the 16th-18th Centuries (Collection of Documents and Materials)], Alma-Ata, 1961, pp 223-224.

State Archives of Altayskiy Kray (GAAK), folio 163, inv. 1, file 55, sheets 101 verso.

The Orenburg Commission (Orenburg Expedition) was a governmental body founded in 1744 for a thorough study and development of the Orenburg area including its settlement and the development of agriculture, the mining industry and trade in it.

B. P. Gurevich, op. cit., p 78.

Archives of the USSR All-Union Geographic Society (AVGO SSSR), folio 69, inv. 1, file 1, sheet 19 verso.

Ibid.

Ibid., sheet 10 verso.

GAAK, folio 132, inv. 1, file 29, sheet 16 verso.

Clifford M. Foust, "Muskovity and Mandarin: Russians and Trade with Its Setting. 1727-1805," North Carolina, 1969, p 17.

State Archives of Omskaya Oblast (GAOO), folio 366, inv. 1, file 46, sheet 1.

Central State Archives of the Kazakh SSR (TsGA KazSSR), folio 630, inv. 1, file 1, sheet 29.

- 17 I. I. Kraft, "Sbornik uzakneniy o kirgizakh stepnykh oblastey (prilozheniya)" [Collection of Legislation on the Kirghiz Steppe Areas (Appendices)], Orenburg, 1898, p 59.
- 18 State Archives of Orenburgskaya Oblast, folio 3, inv. 1, file 52, sheet 74 verso.
- 19 B. P. Gurevich, op. cit., p 120.
- 20 "Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Biograficheskaya khronika" [Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. A Biographical Chronicle], Vol 7, Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 369; Vol 9, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 223.
- 21 L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 7, Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp 196-197.
- 22 PRAVDA, 25 February 1981.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

WARTIME OPERATIONS: EMPLOYMENT OF OPERATIONAL GROUPS IN MOSCOW BATTLE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 76-80

[Article published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" by Lt Col V. Shevchuk: "From the Experience of Employing Operational Troop Groups in the Battle of Moscow"]

[Text] During the Great Patriotic War the operational troop groups were temporary formations of large units and units of a front (army) fighting on individual operational sectors or sectors of a front.¹ They were organized either in the course of operations, when it was essential to immediately carry out suddenly arising tasks and the commander did not possess sufficiently strong reserves or ahead of time for operations on one of the isolated axes or in the enemy rear. As a rule, such groups made counterstrikes, they pursued the enemy, they conducted engagements for major centers of resistance, they covered prepared sectors of the defenses and made raids against the enemy rear.

Their effective strength depended upon the nature of the missions to be carried out and the available resources. In anticipating maneuvering operations, such groups also included a definite number of mobile troops while in breaking through prepared defenses they included predominantly rifle formations and units.

The operational groups were widely employed at Leningrad and Moscow. On the right wing of the Western Front alone in October-November there were 11 of them operating. At the center of this front an operational group was first set up for eliminating the enemy breakthrough toward Golitsyno Station. On 2 December, the 18th Rifle Brigade, two tank and two ski battalions, an antitank regiment and a battalion of a rocket regiment were hurriedly shifted there. The leadership of the group was entrusted to the commander of the 33d Army, Lt Gen M. G. Yefremov. Due to the group's actions, by the end of 4 December, the situation which the troops of the center of the Western Front had occupied prior to the enemy breakthrough was fully restored.

On the southern and southwestern approaches to Moscow, in November-December, the most intense and crucial combat operations developed in the regions of Tula and Kashira. On 24 November the reinforced II Cavalry Corps (on 26 November this was renamed the I Guards Cavalry Corps [1 GCC]) was shifted here from Serpukhov under Cavalry Maj Gen P. A. Belo who had personal responsibility for the holding of Kashira.²

On the basis of the corps, an operational group was created consisting of the 1st and 2d Cavalry divisions as well as the 112th Tank and the 173d Rifle divisions, the 9th Tank Brigade, the 35th and the 127th Tank battalions, the 15th Rocket Regiment, a separate antiaircraft artillery battalion, a special engineer battalion, and a junior lieutenants school placed directly under the front's commander, Arm Gen G. K. Zhukov. It was to halt the enemy in the area of Kashira, after which to drive decisively toward Venev to strike in the flank of the enemy grouping which had surrounded Tula.³

Because of the instructive actions by this group, basic attention is to be given to it in this article.

The course of the combat operations of Gen P. A. Belov's group from 27 November 1941 through 10 January 1942 is shown in the diagram. Over this period its troops made a counterstrike against the enemy's 17th Tank Division, they pursued the enemy, they fought to take centers of resistance and broke through prepared defenses. They participated in liberating many rayons held by the enemy in Moscow, Tul'skaya, Kaluzhskaya and Smolenskaya oblasts and over the 1 1/2 months fought their way 400 km.

Among the particular features of the group's combat operations one should mention first of all the command's constant search for and realization of the most effective methods of carrying out the missions. Thus, in the counterstrike at Kashira, the chief role was assigned to the cavalry reinforced by infantry and tanks. It struck against the enemy flanks in the direction of Pyatnitsa. The offensive started on 27 November and was combined with a frontal defense of Kashira. After 2 days of battle, the enemy went over to pursuing the enemy which retreated to Mordves. Regardless of the undermanning of the group's formations and units, on 9 December it liberated Venev and in the second half of the following day it liberated Pozhil'ki with the forces of the 1st Guards Cavalry Division of Maj Gen V. K. Baranov.

For developing the offensive, the formations and units used every opportunity including breaks in the enemy battle formations for skirting the centers of resistance and cities as was done in liberating Kozel'sk on 28 December. Such outflanking maneuvers made it possible to keep the group's main forces from being drawn into extended battles, they helped to increase the momentum of advance and disorganized enemy actions.

The successful offensive by Gen P. A. Belov's operational group was aided by the active operations of the adjacent (50th and 10th) armies with which close cooperation was maintained although often there was not direct contact with them.

The great dynamism of combat operations and maneuverability of the group and constant action against the enemy were ensured by the flexibility, continuity and firmness of control by the group's commander and staff. After the liberation of Stalinogorsk, the group had to shift from the southern to the southwestern sector and carry out new missions. For example, in the middle of December, Maj Gen P. A. Belov received the directive: "...You are entrusted by the front's military council with a particularly crucial mission: to rapidly reach the area of Yukhnov and defeat the rear services and staff of the German 4th Army...."⁴ However, on 2 January 1942, the new directive to the group stated: "...A very advantageous operational situation has developed for encircling the enemy 4th and 9th armies, and the main role

should be played by Belov's assault group in cooperating with our Rzhev grouping. The basis for the success of our operation will consist in the speed of reaching the Vyaz'ma area and the seizing of the enemy routes of retreat...."⁵

A day later, the front's military council canceled the previous directive and ordered: "...Leave a portion of the forces opposite the Plosk (the name given at that time to the Yukhnov.--Editors) enemy grouping, and turn the main forces toward Mosal'sk to destroy the enemy in the region of Mosal'sk and come out to the west of Yukhnov...."⁶

As a result of such an abrupt change in missions which were necessitated by the rapid change in the situation on the front, the group's command and staff acquired great experience in working out operational plans in a short period of time and in regrouping the troops under the conditions of contact with the enemy. Moreover, from what has been said it can be seen that the staff of the Western Front was responding flexibly to changes in the situation and was using primarily the mobile troops to come out in the enemy rear and encircle its groupings.

The poor cross-country capability of the military equipment under the winter conditions and at times the shortage or lack of the necessary weapons and also tractors for them told negatively on the combat results of the group's cavalry and infantry. While in the battle formations with relatively low momentum of advance on 1 December 1941 there were: 12 122-mm howitzers, 38 76-mm cannons and 7 45-mm cannons,⁷ by 1 January 1942, in reaching Yukhnov away from the front's main forces there were just 20 76-mm cannons.⁸ The remaining artillery had fallen behind the basic forces.

For this reason, in carrying out the missions of rapidly reaching the enemy rear and flanks, the group's troops, without sufficient artillery and air support, as a rule, endeavored to bypass the garrisons and avoided frontal attacks on prepared enemy defenses, using weak points in them, the flanks and boundary areas.

One of the essential factors which reduced the group's combat capabilities was the constant lack of personnel and particularly weapons and equipment. After the war, Col Gen P. A. Belov recalled that, for example, in breaking across the Warsaw Highway on 20 January 1942, there were just 28,000 men in his group (five cavalry and two rifle divisions). "...The Germans," he wrote, "had around 50 tanks and we only around 8. The Nazis were dominant in the sky. From sun-up to sun-down their aircraft bombed and strafed our battle formations, rear areas and wagontrains. The air regiment assigned to us had just three fighters in working order. It often happened that during the night our units advanced capturing several population points but during the day the enemy aviation made a massed raid, the Nazi infantry rose up to a counterattack and with the aid of tanks threw the guardsmen back."⁹

The number of formations and units in the group also changed. During the first 6 weeks, from the adjacent armies and front reserve for a certain time it received the 209th, 322d, 325th and 328th Rifle divisions as well as the 41st, 57th and 75th Cavalry divisions. The 173d Rifle Division was transferred from the group to the 49th Army and the 112th Tank Division to the 50th Army.

The increase in the number of formations and the lack of communications impeded control. For this reason, Gen P. A. Belov sometimes put one division under another,

for example, the 57th and 75th Cavalry divisions were under, respectively, the 1st and 2d Guards Cavalry divisions. Centralized supply of the group with materiel was also not organized. The arriving formations continued to be supplied by those armies in which they had been previously and this often led to confusion in the dates and quantity of delivery for ammunition, fuel and lubricants as well as other types of supplies.

Characteristic in the operations of Gen P. A. Belov's group was the fact that after reaching the area of Vyaz'ma, it made a raid against the enemy rear services in Dorogobuzh and together with partisan detachments from 15 February until June 1942 tied down significant enemy forces which had been assigned to guard the lines of communications. The fighting of the IV Airborne Corps in the enemy rear also aided the group's battles.

In the aim of improving control over the troops and the partisan detachments operating in the enemy rear, in the area between the Moscow--Minsk Highway and the Warsaw Highway, by a directive of the Military Council of the Western Front from 20 May 1942, the operational group of Gen P. A. Belov was ordered to reorganize as the "separate group of Gen P. A. Belov," including in it the 1st and 2d Guards Cavalry divisions, the 239th Rifle Division, separate units of the IV Airborne Corps and all the partisan detachments operating in this region.¹⁰

It should be pointed out that Gen P. A. Belov's group, in comparison with the other operational groups created in the Battle of Moscow, carried out the longest combat operations (7 months). A large portion of the groups carried out their missions in comparatively short times and were then broken up. For example, on 16 December 1941 from the 50th Army there was separated an operational group consisting of the 154th Rifle Division, the 112th Tank Division and the 31st Cavalry Division, two batteries of a rocket regiment, a flamethrower and landmine company, the Tula Workers Regiment and the 131st Tank Battalion with the mission of making a surprise attack from the south and capturing Kaluga. It was under the command of the deputy commander of the 50th Army, Maj Gen V. S. Popov.

The group made a 90-km march, including more than 40 km over enemy-held territory, and by the end of 18 December had concentrated in the forested area to the south of Kaluga and on the 19th began its offensive. On 20 December, by evening, the group was already 2 km to the south of Kaluga and in the morning of the 21st began to storm the city simultaneously from three directions, and, having broken into it, fought until 30 December. After this, Gen V. S. Popov's group was broken up.

In the Battle of Moscow, there were also other analogous examples.

In conclusion it must be pointed out that, regardless of the lack before the war of specially elaborated recommendations (views) on the creation and use of operational groups in operations, during the first period of the war they began to be set up and operate. This was caused by the abrupt change in the situation, by the great scope and fluid nature of combat operations, by the frequent lack of a solid front, by the disrupting of centralized troop control, by the lack of resources on individual sectors, by the great difficulties in organizing the prompt moving up of reserves and by other factors. They were used very widely in the Battle of Moscow.

The experience of the combat employment of the operational troop group under the command of Gen P. A. Belov convincingly demonstrated the effectiveness of such operational groups under the conditions of the fluid nature of combat. They were successfully employed both on the defensive and on the offensive for a counterstrike, for the rapid development of success and for highly fluid operations in the enemy operational depth and rear in isolation from the main forces.

The operational groups, in making deep raids, in operating on separate sectors and making brief surprise attacks, successfully carried out the missions of defeating enemy reserves, reaching the enemy flank and rear for the purpose of completing an encirclement, capturing airfields, supply dumps and other important objectives as well as disrupting control and the operation of the rear.

The composition of the operational groups, as the experience of the Battle of Moscow showed, could be extremely diverse. The main thing was that they should be equipped with highly mobile equipment and their actions supported by air. The operational groups were assigned from the first and second echelons of a front and army.

The organizing of operational groups was one of the forms for improving troop control and command under difficult conditions. As a result of their use, the number of subordinate levels was reduced and this was particularly important in abolishing the corps level of command. However, a weak point was the lack of ready-to-go control bodies with communications which could successfully lead the groups. A formation's staff which was entrusted with control was not always capable of carrying out this task. Another major shortcoming was that the groups were made up hurriedly. This impeded their training and the organizing of cooperation and control.

The experience acquired in the first period of the war of employing operational groups was utilized in subsequent operations, particularly in creating cavalry-mechanized and mobile groups. Nor has it lost its importance at present and merits further research, scientific analysis and generalization.

FOOTNOTES

"Sovetskaya Voennoyaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 6, Voenizdat, 1978, p 50.

TSAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 208, inv. 2011, file 26, sheet 57; file 125, sheet 35.

Ibid., file 125, sheets 130-132, 166-167.

Ibid., folio 639, inv. 4953, file 3, sheet 337.

Ibid., inv. 4052, file 5, sheets 17-19.

Ibid., sheet 34.

Ibid., folio 13-A, inv. 396, file 10, sheet 130.

Ibid., folio 208, inv. 2579, file 35, sheet 12.

* P. A. Belov, "Za nami Moskva" [With Our Backs to Moscow], Voenizdat, 1963, p. 178.

14 TsAMO, folio 206, inv. 2513, file 213, sheet 25.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

OUTLINE FOR LECTURE ON SOVIET ARMED FORCES POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 81-84

[Article published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences, C 1 P. Tsygankov: "To Assist Instructors of Military History: Lecture Instructions for 'The Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces after World War II'"]

[Text] In the lecture it is advisable to examine the following basic questions:

1. The measures of the CPSU and the Soviet government to strengthen the Soviet Armed Forces--20 minutes.
2. The improvement in the organization of the troops and military equipment since the Great Patriotic War--30 minutes.
3. The development of views on the waging of offensive and defensive operations in the postwar years--30 minutes.

In the introductory speech (3-5 minutes) it is essential to establish the timeliness of the question and to show the factors and conditions which have determined the development of the Soviet Armed Forces since the war (man and equipment, the weapons and organization of the troops, the military art of the Soviet Armed Forces and the enemy). It is particularly essential to emphasize the leading role of the Communist Party in military organizational development. The victory over Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan led to fundamental changes in the international situation. There was an abrupt shift in the balance of forces on the world scene in favor of socialism. It emerged from the confines of a single nation and became a world system. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union channeled all its efforts to rebuilding the war-devastated economy.

In consistently carrying out Lenin's peace policy, the USSR made a significant cut-back in the Army and Navy. However, the imperialist states headed by the United States undertook energetic actions to prevent the further strengthening of the Soviet nation and the entire socialist system and to strengthen their influence in the world. Such an aggressive policy by imperialism forced the USSR to take appropriate measures to strengthen its Armed Forces. In particular, closest attention was paid to the successful carrying out of the tasks posed by the minister of defense

In the area of improving the quality of field, air and sea skills of the men and maintaining the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces on a high level.

Two periods can be traced in the postwar development of the Soviet Armed Forces. The first lasted from the end of the war up to 1954. Its main content was a generalizing of the war's experience and a further improvement in the methods of conducting combat operations using conventional weapons. The second started in 1954 and has lasted up to the present. It has been characterized by the introduction of nuclear weapons in the troops and by the training of the personnel for actions under the conditions of their use.¹

In turning to the first question, it is essential first to list the most important measures of the CPSU and the Soviet government in the area of strengthening the state's defense might. These include: the rebuilding and development of industrial production; the elimination of the U.S. monopoly in the area of nuclear weapons; the strengthening of the armed forces considering possible changes in the balance of forces. Then it is essential to analyze these measures in greater detail. Due to the heroic labor of the Soviet people and to the organizational activities of the Communist Party, by 1948, the volume of industrial production in the USSR had basically reached the prewar level, while in 1953, steel casting exceeded the 1940 level by over 2-fold, coal mining by almost 2-fold and the output of electric power by 2.7-fold. All of this established a firm base for strengthening national defense and for equipping the troops with new, more advanced models of weapons and military equipment.

In remembering the instructions of V. I. Lenin that it is essential to be on guard constantly, the CPSU and the Soviet government undertook every measure so that the Army and Navy had everything necessary for repelling an attack by any aggressor.

Great advances were made by the Soviet scientists, inventors and designers. By their accomplishments they greatly raised the prestige of the Soviet Union and the combat capability of its Armed Forces. In 1947, our government announced that the secret of the nuclear bomb no longer existed for the USSR. In August 1953, we tested a hydrogen bomb. In the middle of the 1950's, our nation developed and tested various classes of missiles. Effective work was done to improve the nuclear warheads. In August 1957, the USSR successfully launched the world's first intercontinental multistage ballistic missile and with its aid in October 1957, the first artificial earth satellite was lofted into orbit.

In analyzing the measures undertaken by the party and government to strengthen the USSR Armed Forces, it is important to emphasize that military science has been of determining importance in this question. The paths of military organizational development for the present were determined considering its achievements. All the life and activities of the Army and Navy as well as the combat and political training of the troops and staffs are organized on the basis of military science's recommendations.

In concluding the question, it is essential to point out that in addition to the designated measures aimed at strengthening the defense capability of the USSR, the CPSU and the Soviet government have directed all the life and activities of the Armed Forces, the training, indoctrination and placement of the personnel and have

taken measures to increase the effectiveness of ideological and political indoctrination of the men and to strengthen military unity with the socialist commonwealth nations.

The documents of the 26th CPSU Congress state: "During the report period, the party and state not for an instant lost sight of the questions of strengthening the defense might of the nation and its Armed Forces. The international situation obliges us to do this."³

In the second question it is essential to examine in detail in what areas the improving of the organization of troops and military equipment has occurred. The experience of World War II confirmed the correctness of the theories of Soviet military art that the goals of a war can be achieved only by the joint efforts of all the Armed Services and branches of troops.

During the first postwar years, the USSR Armed Forces consisted of the Ground Troops, Air Forces and Navy. The National Air Defense Troops and Airborne Troops possessed organizational independence. The Ground Troops, as before, comprised the basis of the Armed Forces and included rifle, armored-tank and mechanized troops, artillery, cavalry as well as such special troops as engineer, chemical warfare, signals, railroad and others. The Ground Troops were fully motorized and were armed with modern tanks, modern systems of conventional and rocket artillery as well as modern automatic firearms.⁴ In the second period the units and subunits of tactical and operational-tactical missiles became the main weapon in the Ground Troops.

In the postwar years the Air Forces underwent a substantial change. Jet aviation replaced the piston-driven. Missile-carrying aircraft were able to attack targets located on the ground, at sea and in the air without going into the air defense zone of the given objective. Fighters, employing missiles, machine guns and cannons, were able to hit airborne targets across the entire range of altitudes.

In 1948, the National Air Defense Troops became an independent Armed Service, and in the postwar period they developed considering the experience of the previous war. Initially their improvement was carried out on a basis of antiaircraft artillery. Subsequently the conventional artillery was replaced by antiaircraft guided missiles. The equipping of the Air Defense Troops with highly effective systems for detecting, tracking and hitting airborne targets ensured the virtual destruction of any air attack weapons at maximum ranges, at great and low altitudes and at supersonic speeds, under any weather conditions, regardless of the season or time of day.

The organizational development of the Navy was also carried out rapidly. The overall tonnage of the fighting ships built and commissioned, for example, in 1952, exceeded the tonnage of the fighting ships built in 1940 by 3.5-fold.⁵ With the appearance of nuclear weapons, the Navy became missile-carrying and able to independently carry out large-scale tasks and effectively destroy enemy nuclear submarines and carrier task forces.

In giving the material on the third question, it is important to point out that the Communist Party and the Soviet government, in carrying out the tasks of the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces, as before, devoted great attention to the development of military theory. It is essential to bear in mind that

considering the audience, it is also essential to trace the development of military art along with the use of the Armed Service or branch of troops in joint operations.

In line with the development of weaponry and the increased combat and maneuvering capabilities of the units and formations of the various Armed Services and branches of troops, even in the first postwar years it was considered that offensive operations would be marked by a great scope, by a decisiveness of targets and intensity of combat. The theory of a deep offensive operation underwent further development. The enemy men and equipment were expected to strike to a greater depth than in the war years. In such an operation an increased role would be played by airborne forces and air defense resources. In the theory of conducting an operation in a maritime sector, more attention began to be given to joint operations with the navy using amphibious landings.

The breakthrough of a prepared defense was viewed as the basic and most important stage of an offensive. Proceeding from combat experience, the conclusion was drawn that it should be preceded by air operations in the aim of winning air superiority and creating conditions which would ensure the success of the operation. Powerful artillery and air softening up should directly precede the breakthrough.

For ensuring the rapid defeat of the enemy and the attaining of a high momentum of advance, it was considered essential to create powerful strike groupings and in the breakthrough areas to have maximum densities of men and equipment. For tanks and artilleries these approached the densities at the war's end. In line with the increased level of infantry technical equipping, its densities per kilometer of front were somewhat less.

A new feature on the question of a breakthrough, in comparison with the wartime views, was the fact that the enemy tactical defensive zone should be broken through, as a rule, by rifle corps.⁶ Here an important role in completing the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone was assigned to the mechanized division of the rifle corps. Ordinarily this comprised the second echelon of the corps' battle formation and was committed to battle to complete the breakthrough of the third position of the main zone and capture the second enemy defensive zone.

In examining the views on the conduct of defensive operations in the first postwar period, it must be said that the defensive in those years was considered to be one of the basic types of combat operations. Important attention was given to the stability and activeness of defenses. The defensive zones were to be created in echelons to a great depth. The war-tested system of trenches comprised the basis of their engineer organization.

In giving the views on the conduct of offensive and defensive operations in the second postwar period, it is essential first to explain that the equipping of the troops with nuclear weapons led to substantial changes in the methods of operations. The assault groupings, in order to avoid being hit by the enemy before the start of the offensive, began to be dispersed in areas remote from the line of direct contact with the enemy.

It was considered essential to conduct offensive operations along separate axes,⁷ in advancing predominantly on tanks and armored personnel carriers. This made it

possible to quickly change the direction of the thrusts, to make them by surprise, to carry out bold maneuvers, to outflank unsuppressed centers of resistance and areas of contamination and destruction as well as to rapidly shift the efforts in depth.

It was recognized that under the conditions of employing nuclear weapons there could be extensive use of the method of going over to the offensive from a march formation. In principle this was not a new idea. Even in the last war, attacks from a march formation were practiced rather often. But these were carried out predominantly in crossing enemy defenses taken up quickly with a poorly developed fire plan and insufficiently complete engineer organization.

From its very start an offensive assumed a highly fluid nature. In an offensive an important place began to be given to tactical airborne forces. They were given the task of seizing the positions of nuclear weapons, objectives of operational significance, passes, defiles and so forth.

Also undergoing further development were combat operations at night, the methods of crossing water obstacles, particularly from a march formation, and so forth.

In examining the views on the organization and conduct of the defensive in the second postwar period, it is essential to say that at that time the efforts of military theoreticians were aimed at working out those methods which could ensure the checking of an offensive by large enemy forces, the seizing of the initiative and the going over to a decisive offensive. During the postwar years the antitank stability of defenses assumed particular significance. It was emphasized that antitank defenses comprise the basis of the defenses and for this reason their organization are one of the most important duties of all commanders.

In the lecture it is wise to point out that the time available for creating defenses has been sharply reduced under the conditions of employing nuclear weapons.

The protecting of troops against nuclear weapons has become a new important element in the organizing and conducting of defenses under the conditions of their employment. For these purposes there are plans to employ the protective properties of the terrain and military equipment, radiation, chemical and biological reconnaissance should be carried out continuously, various shelters should be quickly built, when high radiation levels develop the personnel should be quickly evacuated from these areas, rescue work organized and so forth.

In examining the third question, it is advisable to define the basic trends in the development of the organization and conduct of offensive and defensive actions. These can include: the sharp rise in the role of the most important factor for success in a war, that is, the combat readiness of the troops, and the shortened time for organizing an offensive and defensive; the increased activity of combat operations; the wide use of nighttime combat operations, the maneuvering of resources in the course of offensive and defensive combat, the greater importance of surprise actions and the greater complexity of troop cooperation; the questions of combat, special and rear support and the control of the formations and units.

In the conclusion (3-5 minutes) it is essential to sum up the lecture and to name the basic areas for improving the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is essential to emphasize that due to the constant concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the Soviet Army and Navy during the postwar years have been armed with modern weapons and military equipment and the quality of combat training and the ideological tempering of the personnel have increased. They are prepared to give a proper rebuff to any aggressor.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva" [The History of Military Art], a textbook, Voenizdat, 1979, p 281.
- ² "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [Fifty Years of the USSR Armed Forces], Voenizdat, 1968, p 481.
- ³ "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 66.
- ⁴ "Partiya i armiya" [The Party and the Army], Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p 264.
- ⁵ "50 let Vooruzhennykh...", p 487.
- ⁶ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 5, Voenizdat, 1978, p 520.
- ⁷ Ibid., p 521.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," Moscow, Politizdat, 1981.
2. "V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces], 3d Edition, Voenizdat, 1980.
3. "Voyennaya istoriya" [Military History], a textbook, Voenizdat, 1971.
4. "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [The Soviet Armed Forces], Voenizdat, 1978.
5. "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR," Voenizdat, 1968.
6. "Taktika" [Tactics], Voenizdat, 1966.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

BOOK REVIEW: MILITARY QUESTIONS IN STATE AND PARTY DOCUMENTS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 85-87

[Review by Professor and Doctor of Military Sciences, Lt Gen M. Kir'yan, of the book "Voyennyye voprosy v dokumentakh KPSS i Sovetskogo gosudarstva" (Military Questions in CPSU and Soviet Government Documents), an annotated bibliographic index compiled by an author collective at the Military Section of the USSR State Library imeni V. I. Lenin, Voenizdat, 1980, 464 pages]

[Text] Voenizdat has published an annotated bibliographic index of CPSU and Soviet government documents relating to the military theoretical and practical organizational activities carried out by the party and government in settling military questions covering the problems of the development, organization and technical outfitting of the Soviet Armed Forces, their purpose, use and complete supply over the period of October 1917 through July 1979.

The reviewed index includes annotations of accountability reports and decisions of party congresses, Central Committee conferences and plenums, decrees, appeals and letters from the party Central Committee, state legislative documents, the decrees of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee], the ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the decrees of the Labor and Defense Council and the State Defense Committee. It contains direct information on the reports and speeches of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, on the questions of strengthening Soviet defense might, ensuring the security and raising the defense capability of the socialist commonwealth nations. The chronologically placed materials make it possible to trace the theoretical and practical activities carried out by the party and the Soviet government to organize the defense of the motherland starting from the first days of the establishing of Soviet power up to the present.

In the index, well represented are the documents dealing with the creation, the tasks and practical activities of the Worker and Peasant Defense Soviet which held all power in its hands in the course of mobilizing the nation's resources in defense interests as well as the documents relating to the time of the past war.

With the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the question immediately arose of creating a Soviet military science which would conform to the purpose of

the new type of army under definite specific historical conditions. V. I. Lenin as the leader of the revolutionary people and their Communist Party established the principles of this science. They became the cornerstone of further development in Soviet military science during the interwar period, during the years of the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar period.

Proceeding from the Leninist thesis on the waging of war by peoples, a program was worked out for fighting the Nazi invaders. This was embodied in the directive of the USSR Sovnarkom [Soviet of People's Commissars] and the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee to the party and soviet organizations in the front areas on mobilizing all forces and means to defeat the Nazi invaders of 29 July 1941. This showed the just, liberation nature of the war by the Soviet Union. The party's slogan "Everything for the Front! Everything for Victory!" became an unbreakable law for all Soviet people.

Among the most important principles of military organizational development, as is seen from the documents, a leading one is the thesis on the directing and guiding role of the Communist Party as formulated by V. I. Lenin in 1919. This was and has continued to remain a most important principle in improving the Soviet Armed Forces. In a speech by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at a reception in the Kremlin in honor of the military academy graduates on 1 July 1966, he pointed out: "Over all the history of the Soviet state, the party has unswervingly directed the organizational development of the Army and Navy and the training and indoctrination of the personnel in a spirit of total dedication to their socialist motherland...." (p 101). These very important provisions were fully approved and supported at the 26th CPSU Congress. "...The party and state at no time overlooked the questions of strengthening the defense might of the nation and its Armed Forces."¹ The congress expressed confidence that the Soviet military "in the future will dependably guard the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people!"²

The index has also successfully selected the documents which bring out such principles in the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces as the class approach, the unity of the army and people, proletarian internationalism and the friendship of the Soviet peoples.

From the very first days of organizing the Soviet Armed Forces, the party devoted particular attention to strengthening military discipline. In the Appeal "To the Working Population of All Russia," in February 1918, the Sovnarkom demanded "the establishing of strictest discipline in the ranks of the army and throughout the nation...and the maintaining of order with an iron hand" (p 192). Lenin's thesis that "the upper hand will be gained by the side with the greatest equipment, organization, discipline and best machines" (p 193) became the guide for all the Soviet people and their glorious Armed Forces. The party and Soviet state demands for conscious military discipline were reinforced in the military regulations which are a law for all Army and Navy personnel.

The training of highly skilled command personnel is a component part in the activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state to strengthen the basic areas of military and political training for the Armed Forces and for maintaining their high combat readiness. The documents presented in the index provide an opportunity to understand how in various stages the party carried out this task. Even in May 1918, in the Theses

on the Present Political Situation, V. I. Lenin pointed out that "intensified military training for a major war requires not an appeal, not shouting and not a battle slogan but rather extended, intense, very stubborn and disciplined work on a mass scale" (p 10). In December 1918, the Republic RVS [Revolutionary Military Soviet] issued the order "On Measures to Increase the Military Training of Troop Units" so that our army would become an army trained, armed and organized according to the last word of military science. This very important demand was correctly reflected and developed in numerous party and state documents showing that the party and the Soviet state always endeavored that the training of the Soviet Armed Forces was constantly on a level of those tasks which they had to carry out. The party at present pays particular attention to maintaining their high combat readiness. Its significance under present-day conditions was examined thoroughly in a speech by L. I. Brezhnev at a reception in the Kremlin in honor of the military academy graduates. In this he pointed out that combat readiness "is ultimately the zenith of troop military skill in peacetime and the key to victory in a war" (p 231).

Of great scientific cognitive interest are the documents relating to party organizational development and party political work in the Soviet Armed Forces. The Leninist principles of organizing and conducting party political work in the Armed Forces have been, are and will be followed by the CPSU. In the subsequent party decisions, they underwent further development and concretization. The documents show the enormous work carried out by the party in the area of party organizational development and in working out guidelines which determine the standards and style in the activities of the party organizations and all communists.

Well annotated are the documents related to logistical support and technical equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces. The All-Russian Department for the Formation of the Red Army founded on 15 January 1918 solved the questions related to the formation and supply of the army with everything needed for life and combat activities. Subsequently, special bodies were set up to supply the army and organize weapons production. An important party measure was the creation of an all-Union People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry as well as the defense industry commission. In 1939, by an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry was split into four people's commissariats: aviation, shipbuilding industry, ammunition and weapons.

Very important are the materials on CPSU leadership over the military training and military patriotic indoctrination of the workers and particularly the youth.

The reviewed index very completely provides documents showing the diverse military activities of the CPSU and Soviet government in all stages of our state's development. Its compilers have done great work to disclose the sources in which the documents were published and they have studied the official publications and collections of party and state documents.

For convenient use the annotated bibliographic index comes with a chronological list of documents incorporated in it for 1917-1979.

However, the value of the reviewed publication would have been even more significant if the compilers had also included certain other documents showing the party's activities in the area of utilizing the military-technical and military-medical

personnel from the officers of the old army as well as the documents characterizing the party's measures to increase revolutionary vigilance and to keep state and military secrets. Considering the exceptional importance of the disarmament problem, it would have been advisable if the documents relating to it would have been put in one place.

As a whole the annotated index will be a good aid for the officer personnel of the Armed Forces in their practical work of training and indoctrinating Army and Navy personnel and in raising their political and professional training.

FOOTNOTES

1 "Materialiy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 66.

2 Ibid.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

BOOK REVIEW: PARTISAN RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY IN BELORUSSIA

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 29 Oct 81) pp 87-88

[Review by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col A. Knyaz'kov, of the book "Partizanskaya razvedka. Sentyabr' 1943--iyul' 1944" (Partisan Reconnaissance. September 1943-July 1944), by V. K. Kiselev, Minsk, Izd-vo BGU imeni V. I. Lenin, 1980, 128 pages]

[Text] The indisputability of a direct dependence between the availability of enemy data at the staff, the commander's plan and the outcome of battle is beyond question. The more reliable and complete the information, the more effectively preparations can be carried out, the more successful the course and the more significant the results of combat. During the years of the Great Patriotic War partisan reconnaissance was an important source of data on the enemy. The reviewed monograph is one of the first publications on this important problem.

For research the author has selected a short period of time but one full of important events. The Soviet Army's liberation of Belorussia started in September 1943 and it was fully complete in the summer of 1944 as a result of the brilliant execution of one of the major operations in the Great Patriotic War, the Bagration Operation. On the eve and in the course of it in all the republic's oblasts, increased activities were carried out by the underground party committees headed by the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party (Bolshevik). The partisan movement skillfully aimed at the greatest possible aid to the advancing troops achieved an unprecedented scope and strength. The system for organizing reconnaissance was very efficient and its execution was marked by great skill. The partisan scouts, as is shown in the book, succeeded not only in penetrating into the military and occupational apparatus of the Nazis but also the secret services, including the intelligence centers and schools. This provided an opportunity to support the actions of the partisans and secure diverse and valuable information for the Soviet Armed Forces command.

Thus, for 3 weeks on the eve of the Bagration Operation, the partisan reconnaissance bodies were able to discover and confirm the presence of 33 staffs, 900 garrisons, 70 large dumps and 985 km of defensive lines in the rear areas of the Army Group Center. At the same time, the partisans discovered 319 previously undetected enemy field subunits, 30 airfields and 11 landing strips. Moreover, they were able to establish the direction and composition of the freight on 1,642 enemy military

trains, and many documents were seized including 105 particularly important ones in the form of orders, operational maps and reports (p 18).

In the book by V. K. Kiselev the reader will find the comments from the Soviet command on the obtained intelligence data. These confirm the high effectiveness of partisan reconnaissance. Thus, the Military Council of the First Belorussian Front commented: "The troops have received from the partisans much valuable data on the enemy rail movements of troops, equipment and freight. The locations have been discovered of enemy garrisons and strongpoints and supply depots on the front lines of communications.... The partisans provided valuable intelligence data on defensive fortifications, intermediate lines and individual enemy strongpoints in the zone of advance of our troops" (p 98).

The author has analyzed in detail the reasons for the high effectiveness of partisan reconnaissance in correctly seeing them in the broad support given to the partisans by the population of temporarily occupied areas, in the leadership of the Communist Party over the partisan movement, in the mass heroism of the scouts and in their readiness for self-sacrifice for the sake of achieving the planned goal. Working within the system of the Belorussian partisan reconnaissance were around 1,000 communists, more than 3,000 Komsomol members and up to 20,000 nonparty Soviet patriots representing over 20 nationalities of our motherland (pp 63, 64). The communists and Komsomol members raised the population to fight against the Nazi invaders and their stooges.

The reviewed book has been written on a broad documentary basis using party and state archives, the materials from the Belorussian partisan movement staff, collections of documents, party and military history, memoirs and the periodic press of the Great Patriotic War.

However, the work is not free of shortcomings. The author has incorrectly replaced the concept of partisan "agent reconnaissance" which has become established in historical literature with the nonequivalent concept of "operational reconnaissance" (p 88). Greater attention should be given to the questions of the cooperation of the KGB special groups and army intelligence with the party reconnaissance service. In our view, V. K. Kiselev should have taken up in greater detail the joint activities of the partisan scouts and the underground. The book undoubtedly would have benefited if it had more widely shown how the staffs of the Soviet troops considered the information collected by the partisans on the enemy's strength, composition and intentions in taking the decisions for battle (an operation). The work does not sufficiently show such important aspects in the activities of partisan reconnaissance as its work inside the anti-Soviet troop formations set up by the Nazis and the nationalistic organizations as well as the combating of Nazi spies which tried to penetrate the Soviet rear and partisan detachments.

Certain facts also require additional checking. For example, there is the dubious statement that the Vitebsk underground had destroyed an enemy poison gas dump (p 102), as the explosion could have contaminated a large territory and caused many related dangerous consequences.

These, in our view, are the merits and shortcomings of a work which as a whole merits a positive review. The monograph is not only of informative but also

practical significance. The examples found in it of heroism and of the methods and forms of partisan reconnaissance can be used in the training and indoctrination of the men, particularly scouts, as well as in military patriotic work.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272

CSO: 1801/092

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

26 March 82